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A GENERAL INTRODUCTION
TO FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

A Handbook of Fundamental Theology

BY

THE REVEREND JOHN BRUNSMANN, S.V.D.

FREELY ADAPTED AND EDITED BY


ARTHUR PREUSS

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VOLUME I

A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO
FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

NATURAL RELIGION

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
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PREFACE

374
This adaptation of Father Brunsmann's *Lehrbuch der Apologetik* is intended to supply the apologetical treatises now commonly comprised under the title of Fundamental Theology, which the late Monsignor Pohle purposely omitted from his *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik* and which are quite persistently demanded by many of those who use our English version of that theological classic. Having seen these treatises (on Natural Religion, Revealed Religion, and the Church of Christ) provided in a modern and up-to-date form by Father John Brunsmann, S.V.D., professor of Fundamental Theology in the Seminary of St. Gabriel, near Vienna, we obtained permission to adapt his *Lehrbuch* to the needs of those who have been clamoring for these treatises, as a sort of complement to "Pohle-Preuss." We hope the present work will be as favorably received as were the twelve volumes of our adaptation of the latter series, most of which have already reached a fifth edition.

I am indebted to the Rev. Joseph Molitor,

D.D., to the Rev. Henry J. Heck, to the Rev. J. B. Tennelly, S.S., S.T.D., to the Rev. Leo F. Miller, D.D., and to the Rev. Albert Muntsch, S.J., for valuable assistance in the revision of the proof-sheets of this volume.

ARTHUR PREUSS

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A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

§ I. DEFINITION AND OBJECT OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

1. *Definition.*—Fundamental Theology, also called Apologetics, or General Dogmatic Theology, or *Demonstratio Christiana et Catholica*,¹ is that branch of theological science which has for its object the demonstration and defense of the Catholic religion from the standpoint of reason and supernatural revelation.

Fundamental Theology is a science, *i. e.*, a systematically arranged series of organically connected and objectively established theses. It became a science in this sense only in the seventeenth century. The efforts which were made be-

¹ The word *apologia* (ἀπολογία) means defense, justification, in word and writing. From it is derived ἀπολογητική, *i. e.*, ἐπιστήμη, apologetics, *i. e.*, strictly speaking, "the science of the defense of the faith," which appellation, however, is apt to give a one-sided and therefore incorrect idea of the nature of apologetics. *Apologia* has the general meaning of defense (cfr. Newman's *Apologia pro Vita Sua*), and the apology of the Christian religion is merely a particular species of defense.

fore that time to demonstrate and defend the Christian religion, did not succeed in bringing into being a special science, either because they were conceived from a purely theological point of view and consequently had nothing to distinguish them from dogmatic treatises except their subject-matter, or because they neglected to deal with some of the questions which properly belong to our science.²

Fundamental Theology as a science owes its existence, however, to the attacks that were made from the earliest times against the underlying foundations of Christianity (which are mainly three, to wit, natural religion, revelation, and the Church), and to the replies which these attacks evoked. It was from these "apologetics" that the science of Apologetics was later developed.

2. *Object of Fundamental Theology.*—For its material object this science has the religious foundations of the Catholic faith. We say, the *religious* foundations, in order to exclude those remoter postulates of faith (the existence of God, the spirituality and immortality of the human soul, free will, the moral law of nature) which

² Cfr. C. Gutberlet, *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 3, Münster i. W., 1914; Ign. Ottiger, S.J., *Theologia Fundamental*, Vol. I, p. 1, Freiburg i. B., 1897.

are commonly called *praeambula fidei* and treated with considerable detail in our manuals of Scholastic philosophy, thus leaving for Fundamental Theology only those essential truths which stand in a closer connection with the Catholic faith, namely, natural religion, supernatural revelation, and the Church of Christ.³

The object of Fundamental Theology is more closely determined by the phrase, "from the standpoint of reason and supernatural revelation." This phrase clearly describes the formal object of our science, *i. e.*, the aspect under which Fundamental Theology considers the foundations of the faith. Until it has demonstrated the existence of a supernatural revelation, Fundamental Theology is guided solely by the principles of reason; but after it has established the existence of revelation and the infallibility of the Church, it appeals also to these truths in order to solidify the Catholic position on every side.

[What we have just said explains the relation

³ Fr. Brunsmann is devoting a special volume of his *Lehrbuch* to these *praeambula fidei*, which will, however, not appear as a part of this *Handbook of Fundamental Theology*, since the subject does not strictly belong to Fundamental Theology, but which we are willing, *Deo volente*, to adapt into English if there is a sufficient demand for such a work.—A. P.

of Fundamental Theology to philosophy on the one hand, and to dogmatic theology on the other. In its initial portions, Fundamental Theology is a purely rational science, partly historical and partly philosophical in character. In its concluding portions, however, it must be counted as one of the theological disciplines, for it draws on supernatural revelation as a principal source, though only in so far as is necessary to determine the nature of the Church and to establish the conformity of faith with reason.⁴

The purpose of Fundamental Theology is expressed in our definition by the words *demonstrate* and *defend*. To *demonstrate* the foundations of the Christian religion is the main and a positive task; to *defend* these foundations against attack is a supplementary task of a rather negative kind.

⁴ Cfr. Chr. Pesch, S.J., *Praelectiones Dogmaticae*, Vol. I, 5th ed., n. 70, Freiburg, 1915; Ottiger, *Theol. Fund.*, Vol. I, pp. 12 sqq. Father Brunsmann here seems to straddle two alternatives. To consider these truths under the light of revelation is a legitimate procedure indeed, but this automatically incorporates such parts into theology proper. The entire subject-matter can be considered in this way, as Garrigou-Lagrange does in his able work. The restriction to evidence of the natural order is necessary if Apologetics is to be considered as a science distinct from theology proper. The matter has been argued out by Bainvel, Gardeil, Poulpiquet, and others.

§ II. DIVISION OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

The *ratio divisionis* of our science is furnished by its object, namely, the foundations of the faith. Fundamental Theology must demonstrate with scientific accuracy that the religion which is embodied in the Catholic Church is based on divine supernatural revelation and that, consequently, the belief which the Church demands in the revealed truths which she proposes, can be fully justified before the tribunal of reason.

Therefore, Fundamental Theology in Part I deals with the nature, necessity, and origin of natural religion and shows that the duty of practicing religion is deeply rooted in human nature and that man cannot attain his last end and destiny, namely, the perfection of his nature, without the aid of religion.

Part II vindicates the nature, possibility, necessity, and knowability of supernatural revelation, and demonstrates its actual existence. Then the obligation to accept revealed truth is shown to flow from the very essence of natural religion, which demands complete submission of the intellect and will to the ordinances and commandments of God.

Part III demonstrates that Jesus Christ founded a church, and that the Catholic Church alone has the properties and marks which identify that foundation. Thus the Catholic Church appears as the legitimate organ of supernatural revelation, and all who wish to be saved must believe with divine faith in that revelation as set forth by her.

Since the first part of Fundamental Theology demonstrates the existence of a religious obligation, the second the truth of the Christian religion, and the third the claims of the Catholic Church, they are sometimes called, respectively, *Demonstratio Religiosa*, *Demonstratio Christiana*, and *Demonstratio Catholica*.

§ III. NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

1. *Fundamental Theology or Apologetics is necessary for the rational demonstration of the Christian religion.* This proposition can be proved as follows: Belief in supernatural revelation is not rational unless the credibility of that revelation has been demonstrated with sufficient evidence. Before we can make an act of faith in divine revelation, we must be certain that such a revelation has actually taken place.

Fundamental Theology presents in scientific form solid and convincing proofs of this fact, the acceptance of which is a necessary condition of real faith.⁵

Of course, in saying this we do not mean to assert that the act of faith is a necessary sequel from the arguments adduced by this science. Such an assertion would be compatible neither with the supernatural character nor with the liberty of faith, as will be shown in the final volume of this Handbook.

2. *Fundamental Theology is necessary also for theological science.* Every science which offers to furnish certain knowledge presupposes a firm grounding of its object (both formal and material). The theological sciences deal with supernaturally revealed truths and postulate revelation as a historically demonstrated fact. Now, it is the task of Fundamental Theology to furnish scientific evidence for the existence of supernatural revelation, and consequently, the other theological disciplines receive their adequate grounding from this science.⁶

3. *Fundamental Theology is particularly nec-*

⁵ Cfr. A. Schill-Straubinger, *Theologische Prinzipienlehre*, 5th ed., pp. 6 sqq., Paderborn, 1923.

⁶ Cfr. Jos. Kleutgen, S.J., *Theologie der Vorzeit*, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., n. 165 sqq., Münster i. W., 1873.

essary amid present-day conditions. The enemies of the Catholic Church are now directing their attacks against the basic principles of religion, and hence these basic principles must be defended in a scientific manner.

It is not so much particular dogmas that are being assailed to-day, as the foundations of the faith itself, to wit, the reality of revelation, nay, the very existence of the supernatural order. The question which if any of the so-called Christian denominations is in possession of the revealed truth, has been relegated to the background by another, namely, Was Christ really and truly the Son of God and are His teachings divine? or is Christianity merely a phase of the natural development of religion? Either faith or complete unbelief is the alternative. Whoever wishes to be consistent must either join the Catholic Church, which alone can justify its teaching before the tribunal of reason, or reject the whole supernatural order.⁷

A recent writer⁸ justly says: "The development of Apologetics as an independent discipline appears to be demanded by the interests

⁷ H. Hurter, S.J., *Theologia Generalis*, 4th ed., p. 9, Innsbruck, 1903.—A typical example of the "Credo" of infidels see *apud* V. Cathrein, S. J., *Glauben und Wissen*, pp. 112 sqq., Freiburg, 1911.

⁸ A. von Schmid, *Apologetik*, Freiburg, 1900, p. 108.

of the modern age, for the supernatural principle which moves the world must be conceived, safeguarded, and appreciated not only here and there, *obiter* and incidentally, but independently, in its totality and full significance, in view of the modern tendency to obliterate this principle consciously and consistently from science and education, both higher and lower, from art, politics, society, and family life.”⁹

4. *The knowledge of Fundamental Theology is not necessary in an equal degree for all Catholics.* The pastor of souls must be well grounded in this science in order to set forth his religious teaching convincingly and to instruct the faithful so that they will be able to give an account of their religious convictions when they are questioned. For the ordinary layman, however, this theological discipline is not a strict necessity; nay, as a rule he is not even in a position, for lack of proper training, to employ its arguments effectively.

Generally speaking, the mixed method, which appeals partly to authority and partly to reason, is the only feasible one, and entirely sufficient where the faith is supported by adequate train-

⁹ Cfr. Chas. F. Aiken, *s. v.* “Apologetics” in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, pp. 618 sqq.; P. Schanz, *Die moderne Apologetik*, Hamm i. W., 1903, pp. 4 sqq.

ing and tradition.¹⁰ Cultured Catholics, of course, should endeavor to acquire a deeper and more scientific knowledge of their faith, so that they may understand it better and be able to defend it more effectively when it is attacked.

§ IV. THE METHOD OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

1. *The Traditional Method.*—(a) By the method of Fundamental Theology we mean the manner in which this science demonstrates the fundamental truths of religion.

The traditional method is primarily historical and philosophical. It begins by ascertaining the historical facts of religion and revelation and then proceeds to prove the necessity and universality of natural religion and the possibility, necessity, demonstrability, and existence of supernatural, divine revelation.

After these truths are fully established, the method becomes prevailingly theological, demonstrating the nature of the Church and of faith by means of revelation itself, though the employment of historical and philosophical arguments is not by any means excluded.

¹⁰ Cfr. A. von Schmid, *Apologetik*, p. 109.

(b) The application of this twofold method makes it necessary to *prescind, at least theoretically, from the Catholic point of view*. This does not, of course, mean that we suspend our faith, but is merely a methodical device calculated to render the demonstration clearer and more convincing. This *modus procedendi*, by subjecting the faith of the convinced Catholic to a searching analysis, raises it to the rank of a clear and scientifically founded conviction, while it demands nothing of the truth-seeking inquirer but that he follow the dictates of his reason and conscience.¹¹

Merely for the purpose of orientation and comparison, not as an argument, we shall briefly state at the very outset the declarations of the ecclesiastical teaching office touching upon the

¹¹ Cfr. S. Weber, "Die Grenzen des apologetischen Beweises in der Lehre von der Kirche," in the *Katholik*, Mayence, 1910, pp. 1 sqq.; K. A. Kneller, S.J., "Kritische Schwierigkeiten in der Apologetik," in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, 1910, pp. 486 sqq.; A. W. Hunzinger, *Problem und Aufgabe der gegenwärtigen systematischen Theologie*, Leipsic, 1909; A. de Poulpiquet, "Apologétique et Théologie," in the *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 1911, pp. 708 sqq.; T. J. Walshe, *The Principles of Christian Apologetics*, London, 1919; J. P. Steffes, "Die Bedeutung der Religionspsychologie für die Apologetik," in *Theologie und Glaube*, Paderborn, 1919, pp. 25-33; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "L'Apologétique et la Théologie Fondamentale," in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 1920, pp. 352-359.

truths here under consideration and which embody articles of faith.

2. *Some Modern Methods*.¹²—Besides the traditional method explained above there are some newer methods employed by various modern writers on Fundamental Theology.

(A) *The Empirical Method*.—This method owes its existence to the fact that many prominent savants, puffed up with pride over the accomplishments of natural science, have proclaimed an irreconcilable antagonism between faith and knowledge. The description of certain natural phenomena given by Holy Scripture, they assert, cannot be harmonized with the results of modern science. The Catholic faith represents an obsolete and antiquated world-view, which may have satisfied medieval believers, but is apt to repel modern inquirers. From these assertions certain Catholic apologists have deduced the necessity of employing the empirical method and starting from the standpoint of natural science in defending the faith. In their opinion the task of Fundamental Theology is to show that the ascertained results of science in no wise conflict

¹² Cfr. P. von Schanz, *Neue Versuche der Apologetik*, Ratisbon, 1897, pp. 63 sqq.; Chr. Pesch, S. J., *Theologische Zeitfragen*, Freiburg i. B., 1900, Vol. I, pp. 86 sqq.; Le Bachelet, *L'Apologétique Traditionnelle et l'Apologétique Moderne*; Paris, 1900.

with Sacred Scripture. The champions of this method maintain that it is fully justified by tradition, inasmuch as the principle that natural science and religious faith cannot contradict each other and the certain conclusions of the former must be duly considered in interpreting the corresponding portions of Holy Writ, has always had theoretical defenders and has been practically employed in the Catholic Church since the early days. This principle, they say, was held by the Fathers and Scholastics,¹³ by the founders of the Copernican world system, and by the most prominent workers in all departments of natural science,¹⁴ and it has lately been reaffirmed with special emphasis by Pope Leo XIII.¹⁵

Criticism.—It is quite true that some of the questions involved in the relation of God and man to the world cannot be solved satisfactorily without regard to natural science. But these

¹³ A. Schöpfer, *Bibel und Wissenschaft*, Brixen, 1896, pp. 40 sqq.

¹⁴ K. A. Kneller, S.J., *Das Christentum und die Vertreter der neueren Naturwissenschaft*, 3rd ed., Freiburg i. B., 1912; English translation by T. M. Kettle, under the title, *Christianity and the Leaders of Modern Science: A Contribution to the History of Culture in the Nineteenth Century*, with Preface by T. A. Findlay, S.J., Freiburg and St. Louis, 1911; E. Dennert, *Die Religion der Naturforscher*, 7th ed., Berlin, 1908; M. J. Scott, S.J., *The Credentials of Christianity*, New York, 1920, pp. 213 sqq.

¹⁵ Encyclical "*Providentissimus Deus*," of Nov. 18, 1893; cfr. A. Schöpfer, *Bibel und Wissenschaft*, pp. 20 sqq.

questions are beyond the scope of Fundamental Theology and are more properly dealt with in Dogmatic Theology and Biblical Introduction. It would certainly be a mistake to make the points of contact between faith and natural science the *chief* object of Fundamental Theology. To do so would mean to harmonize faith and knowledge without regard to the question whether faith has a sufficient foundation in reason. To demonstrate that it has such a foundation always was and still is the first and foremost task of this science. Hence it is not correct to say, as F. Duilhé de Saint-Projet does,¹⁶ that Apologetics or Fundamental Theology to-day must concern itself first of all with natural science. This objection is purely negative. The essential point, the existence of revelation, would still remain to be proved.

(B) *The Historical Method*.—This method is based on the fact that supernatural revelation made its appearance in the world as a historical phenomenon. Both in the Old and in the New Testament divine revelation is intimately bound up with human conditions and exerts a profound and lasting influence on the development of the race. This historical character of revelation, in

¹⁶ *Apologie Scientifique de la Foi Chrétienne*, 5th ed., Paris, 1899.

the opinion of some writers, constitutes the point of view from which the supernatural origin of Christianity can be most effectively demonstrated. Now-a-days nothing is more strongly emphasized in the study of historical facts than their many-sided inter-relations with similar phenomena and the influence exerted by outside factors on their origin and development. According to the Abbé De Broglie, founder of the historical method in apologetics,¹⁷ the demonstration of the divine origin of Christianity should begin with a historical exposition of all the religions known among civilized nations and furnish convincing proof that Christianity surpasses all its rivals, not only in degree, but also in essence, and consequently cannot possibly owe its existence to a purely human cause. After thus excluding the hypothesis of the natural origin of Christianity, the apologist, according to Broglie, should employ the positive criteria of supernatural revelation, especially prophecies and miracles, to show that Christianity can truly claim a supernatural origin.

Criticism.—The historical method deserves to be highly regarded at the present time, when

¹⁷ A. Th. P. De Broglie, *Problèmes et Conclusions de l'Histoire des Religions*, Paris, 1885; IDEM, *Religion et Critique*, Paris, 1898.

the desire to trace all phenomena back to their causes plays such an important rôle in every sphere of human knowledge. Its application to Fundamental Theology will prove particularly fruitful if we do not content ourselves with the simple collocation of facts and testimonials, but endeavor to trace the causal connections in the religious development of humanity. However, it would be a mistake to relinquish the time-honored historico-philosophical and adopt the purely historical method. It cannot be the primary task of Fundamental Theology to refute the errors of unbelievers, but its principal aim must ever be to give the believing Christian a rational grounding in his faith. To set forth the foundations of the Catholic religion in a manner which will appeal to its opponents, is indeed also a task of this science; but it is of secondary importance, and in accomplishing it, any method that serves the purpose may be made use of. But the rule must be not to build the walls before the foundation has been securely laid.¹⁸

¹⁸ What is said in the text applies also to the labors of the missionary in pagan countries. He has to deal with men who have not yet got the faith and must, therefore, begin by studying the customs and morals, the views and religious practices of the natives, in which he will, as a rule, find quite a few points of contact with the doctrines of the Catholic Church. Msgr. A. Le Roy well says

(C) *The Psychologico-Moral Method.*—

This method is based upon the belief that since religion exercises its influence more in the domain of the will than in the sphere of the intellect, the principal task of Apologetics is to penetrate, influence, and govern the will, and the truth and necessity of supernaturally revealed religion must be capable of being demonstrated from the conduct of its adherents. The advocates of this method further argue that once supernatural revelation is established as the necessary foundation of religion in private life as well as in society, it will not be difficult to persuade men of good will to accept it. It is, they assert, not so much belief in the revealed truths of Christianity as the observance of the moral law of nature that constitutes the main difficulty for non-believers.¹⁹ Apologists must keep this object steadily in view, and must take special pains

on this point (*Anthropos*, Vienna, 1906, I, 4): "In order to attain this aim [namely, to convert the primitives], it is necessary for the missionary,—and particularly for the superior of a mission,—to map out a plan of campaign, based on a careful study of the country and its inhabitants, their customs, laws, religious beliefs, languages, etc. This study is not something foreign to the accomplishment of the missionary's work; it is rather a necessity, and the better he is acquainted with the environment in which he has to work, the less likely will he be to make mistakes, the more will his human chances of success be multiplied."

¹⁹ A. M. Weiss, O. P., *Apologie des Christentums*, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 87 sqq., Freiburg, 1905.

to show the value of the Christian religion from this standpoint.

The moral method has two distinct forms. Léon Ollé-Laprune²⁰ and his followers begin with a detailed examination of the intellectual, moral, and social needs of human nature, and then proceed to show that all these needs are most adequately satisfied by the Christian religion as embodied in the Catholic Church. Therefore, whoever wishes to develop his rational nature to the full, must become a practical Catholic.

Criticism.—The writers of this school justly stress the value of religion as a moral factor in life, but they are one-sided in devoting their attention almost exclusively to its practice. Religion must be firmly founded on reason in order to create a sufficiently strong intellectual conviction. This aspect of the matter is not sufficiently recognized by Ollé-Laprune and his school, and hence their work is one-sided and defective. Whilst their method may be a practical and justifiable procedure in a given case, it is not a sound method of dealing with the subject as a *science*.

(D) *M. Blondel's Theory of Immanence.*—

²⁰ *Prix de la Vie*, 6th ed., Paris, 1899.

Maurice Blondel²¹ holds that the idea of *immanence* plays an important rôle in modern thought, and therefore must be duly considered in explaining and defending the faith. In its ultimate analysis every object and every phenomenon, no matter what its origin, is autonomous and autochthonous, and possesses truth and importance for the mind only in so far as it has been produced by the mind. The Christian, however, must regard the supernatural as something which cannot be produced by the human intellect, but is imposed on that intellect from without, yet commands assent and obedience as a strict duty. How is this opposition to be overcome? Blondel answers: The desire for the supernatural is rooted in nature. Man, in striving to realize within himself the ideal of humanity, soon feels his impotence. His conscience tells him what he must do to attain that ideal, whereas his consciousness assures him that he cannot achieve it by his own power. This realization of weakness gives rise to an ardent desire for redemption, *i. e.*, for some external help by means of which human impotence may become potent. Christianity meets this desire for the

²¹ *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, 1896; IDEM, *Lettre sur les Exigences de la Pensée Contemporaine en Matière d'Apologétique*, Paris, 1896.

transcendental by offering man a supernatural revelation and the means necessary for attaining salvation. Thus autonomy leads of necessity to heteronomy. Immanent thought and feeling show what man needs, and transcendental Christianity adequately meets the need.

Criticism.—M. Blondel's method is useless for the following reasons:

(a) It rests upon the philosophical assumptions of Kantism, which are untenable because they render knowledge of the outside world impossible and deprive the concept of law of its ethical character.

(b) It offers no evidence for the existence of a supernatural revelation and gives no indication of the form which that revelation may be expected to take.

(c) It arbitrarily assumes that the assistance which we expect from God because of our weakness must needs be supernatural. The supernatural, it is true, perfects nature, but it does not constitute its necessary complement. God could conceivably enable us to keep the moral law by purely natural means. That we are created for a supernatural end, *i. e.*, the immediate possession of God through knowledge and volition, and that we need supernatural assistance to attain this end, is a truth which can-

not possibly be deduced from the natural necessities of our moral life.²¹

(E) "*Americanism*."—The modern tendencies which Leo XIII condemned under the generic term "Americanism" cannot claim to be a new method of Apologetics, because they are based on postulates which openly contradict Catholic teaching. The champions of this movement demand that the Church, in order to facilitate the conversion of non-Catholics, should relax her traditional strictness and abolish, or at least dilute certain of her doctrines so that they assume a different meaning than that which they had in the past. "Americanism" was formally condemned by Leo XIII in his famous Brief "*Testem Benevolentiae*," 22 Jan., 1899.²²

(F) *Modernism*.—Modernism arose almost simultaneously in France, Italy, and England

²¹ A good criticism of "Immanence" in Tanquerey's *Synopsis Theologiæ Dogmaticæ*, Vol. I, pp. 56-63 (20th ed., Paris, 1925).

²² A. Egger, *Katholizismus im 20. Jahrhundert*, 3rd ed., pp. 82 sqq., Freiburg i. B., 1902; Leo XIII's Brief "*Testem Benevolentiae*" to Cardinal Gibbons, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart's *Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum, et Declarationum*, 14th and 15th ed., by J. B. Umberg, S.J., Freiburg, 1922, n. 1967 sqq.; Chs. Maignen, *Le Père Hecker est-il un Saint*, Rome, 1896; A. J. Delattre, S.J., *Un Catholicisme Américain*, Namur, 1898; *Américanisme: une Planche de Salut*, Paris, 1898; G. Péries, *La Liquidation du Consortium "Américaniste"*, Paris, 1899 (contains the full text of the Brief "*Testem Benevolentiae*," pp. 67-77); H. Delassus, *L'Américanisme et la Conjuration anti-Chrétienne*, Lille, 1899.

(A. Loisy, Ed. Le Roy, G. Bartoli, A. Fogazaro, G. Tyrrell). Its avowed object was to adapt the Catholic religion to the intellectual, moral, and social needs of the present age, and to that extent Modernism may be regarded as the successor of "Americanism" and of the New Apologetic. Philosophically it is partly based on the Agnosticism of Kant, Huxley, and Spencer, which regards the supra-sensible world as unknowable, and partly on the Pragmatism of William James, which would substitute practical utility for truth. Theologically, Modernism leans to the ultra-Protestant conception of religion, exegesis, and history of dogmas as propagated by Ritschl, Sabatier, Harnack, and other recent writers of the so-called "Liberal" school.

Modernism teaches that human knowledge is limited to external phenomena; the human intellect cannot penetrate to the essences of things (*noumena*), and hence man can know nothing about God and the supernatural. Yet he keenly feels the need of union with God. This need usually lies hidden in the subconscious mind, but not infrequently it crosses the threshold of the conscious mind in the form of an emotional experience of the Absolute. This experience, according to the Modernists, is divine revelation on the part of God and postulates divine faith on

the part of man. There is no other revelation and no other faith. Man's whole religious life begins and ends within his own soul. This is what is meant by *religious immanentism*. When the reflecting mind forms a concept of the Absolute as manifested in the emotions, man has the idea of God, which is raised to the rank of a dogma by the authority of the Church. A dogma is true only in so far as it correctly represents the religious experience of the individual, and its value for others consists in this, that it may serve to awaken similar religious aspirations in their hearts. No dogma has received a definitive formulation, but as religious development advances, the different dogmas are cast into new forms, which may and do differ essentially from those handed down by the Church.

This congeries of heresies is utterly subversive of the traditional Catholic teaching and was, therefore, justly condemned by Pius X in the decree "*Lamentabili*" and the so-called New Syllabus (1907).²³

²³ Decree "*Lamentabili*," of July 3, 1907 (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 2001 sqq.); F. Heiner, *Der neue Syllabus Pius X.*, Mayence, 1907; Encyclical "*Pascendi*," Sept. 7, 1907 (Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, n. 2071 sqq.); Chr. Pesch, S.J., *Glaube, Dogmen und geschichtliche Tatsachen*, Freiburg, 1908; A. Gisler, *Der Modernismus*, 4th ed., Einsiedeln, 1913, pp. 301 sqq.; A. Vermeersch, S.J., art. "Modernism" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. X, pp. 415-421; J. Lebreton, *L'Encyclique et la Théologie Moderniste*,

§ V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY ²⁴

The history of Fundamental Theology may be divided into three periods.

The *First Period* (1st to 8th century) was devoted to the defense of Christianity against the ancient world-view, as represented on the one hand by Judaism, and by Paganism on the other.

The *Second Period* (8th to 15th century) was essentially one of conflict waged by Christianity against the Arabian philosophers and the Hu-

Paris, 1908; T. J. Walshe, *The Principles of Catholic Apologetics: A Study of Modernism Based Chiefly on the Lectures of Père Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., De Revelatione per Ecclesiam Catholicam Proposita*, London, 1926; Jos. Hontheim, S.J., *Theodicea*, Freiburg, 1926, pp. 40-52; J. V. Bainvel, S.J., *De Vera Religione*, Paris, 1914, pp. 39 sqq.; C.S.B., *Modernism, What It Is and Why It Was Condemned*, London, 1908; A. Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiæ Dogmaticæ*, 20th ed., Paris, 1925, pp. 702-711.

²⁴ This is not intended to be an exhaustive account, but merely a rapid survey. For more detailed information the student is referred to K. Werner, *Geschichte der apologetischen und polemischen Literatur der christlichen Theologie*, 5 vols., Schaffhausen, 1861-67; A. Langhorst, S.J., "Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Apologetik," in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, Vols. XVIII, XIX, and XX (1880-81); P. von Schanz, *Apologie des Christentums*, Vol. I, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B., 1910; O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, Freiburg, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1913; Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1914; Vol. III, 1912; A. von Schmid, *Apologetik*, Freiburg, 1900, with a good bibliography; Chas. F. Aiken, article "Apologetics" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, pp. 618 sqq.; A. N. Bellwald, S.M., article "Apologetics" in *Universal Knowledge*, Vol. I, cc.

manists, who tried to counterfeit the teaching of the Church.

The *Third Period* (15th to 20th century) was characterized by the Church's warfare against the Protestant Reformation and against Deism, Materialism, and Rationalism, which followed in the wake of that unfortunate movement.

I. First Period (1st to 8th Century)

(A) *The Beginnings*.—The aged Simeon foretold that the Founder of Christianity would be "a sign which shall be contradicted."²⁵ Christ's life and work bore out this prophecy. The Person of the crucified Redeemer was "a stumbling-block unto the Jews and foolishness unto the Gentiles."²⁶ His teaching as well as the

1045-1063, New York, 1927; Ign. Ottiger, S. J., *Theologia Fundamental*, Vol. I, pp. 24-34; F. Hettinger, *Fundamentaltheologie*, pp. 31-42; J. V. Bainvel, S.J., *De Vera Religione*, Paris, 1914, pp. 3 sqq.; A. E. Dorsch, S.J., *Inst. Theol. Fund.*, Vol. I, Innsbruck, 1916, pp. 79 sqq.; L. Maisonneuve, article "Apologétique—Histoire" in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Vol. I, Paris, 1924, cols. 1533-80; X. M. Le Bachelet, S.J., article "Apologétique—Apologie" in *Dict. Apologétique de la Foi Catholique*, Paris 1914, Vol. I, cols. 189-225; Pullan, L. (Prot.), *Religion since the Reformation*, Oxford, 1923 (Bampton Lectures, 1922); F. W. Macran (Prot.), *English Apologetic Theology*, London, 1905.

²⁵ Luke II, 34.

²⁶ 1 Cor. I, 23.

Church which He established became objects of violent attack even before His Ascension. For this reason Christ in preaching His doctrine at the same time demonstrated its divine origin and defended it against the attacks of His enemies.²⁷ The Apostles followed the example of their Divine Master and made the demonstration of His mission and the defense of His Person, doctrine, and work their chief concern. Thus St. Paul cites the Resurrection of Christ as an argument for his own belief and preaching,²⁸ and St. Peter urges his followers to be "ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you."²⁹

The need for an effective defense of Christianity became more urgent in the post-Apostolic period, when the Church was attacked not merely in word and writing, but by brute force. At this juncture there arose men who made the demonstration and defense of the Christian religion their life-work. They not only preached and debated, but prepared written apologies, which, while differing greatly from one another in form and content, all served the one purpose of proving and defending the truths of revelation and

²⁷ Matt. XI, 5; John X, 38.

²⁸ 1 Cor. XV, 14 sqq.

²⁹ 1 Pet. III, 15.

establishing the historical facts connected therewith.³⁰

Here we have the beginning of the scientific defense of Christianity, out of which in course of time grew the science of Apologetics, as the rational basis of Christian theology. The first apologists of the Christian religion defended only those truths which were attacked by their opponents, without regard to the doctrinal system of the Church as a whole. Though they conducted their defense mainly in a negative way, their writings contain many elements for a positive demonstration of Christian faith and theology.

(B) *Christianity in Conflict with Judaism.*—The Mosaic Dispensation was destined by Divine Providence to prepare humanity for the Christian Church and to be finally absorbed by the latter as its higher fulfilment. The Jews resisted this plan because they misconceived their true vocation and interpreted the utterances of their prophets concerning Christ and His Kingdom in a narrow, nationalistic sense.

There could be no controversy between Jews and Christians with respect to the Messianic implications of the Old Testament prophecies, but there was room for dispute regarding the

³⁰ Cfr. Schill-Straubinger, *Theol. Prinzipienlehre*, 5th ed., pp. 1 sq., Paderborn, 1923.

question whether Jesus of Nazareth was the man in whom these predictions were fulfilled and whether the Christian concept of the Messiah was compatible with the Old Testament.

The most ancient and detailed discussion that has come down to us of this and similar questions is contained in St. JUSTIN MARTYR'S *Dialogue with the Jew Tryphon*.³¹ This work,³² composed about the middle of the second century (150-155), sums up a disputation held at Ephesus between Justin and a learned rabbi. The introduction (ch. 1-9) describes the genesis of Justin's philosophical and religious opinions. In the first part (chapters 10-47) he proves from the Old Testament that the law of Moses has been abrogated in favor of the law of Christ. In the second part (chapters 48-108) he shows from the Old Testament prophecies that the worship given to Jesus does not conflict with the fundamental doctrine of Monotheism. In the third part (chapters 109-141) he proves

³¹ Migne, *P. G.*, VI, 471 sqq.; Justin, *Dialogue avec Tryphon*, *Texte Grec, Traduction Française, Introduction, Notes et Index par Georges Archambault (Textes et Documents pour l'Étude Historique du Christianisme, Vol. 8 & 11)*, Paris 1909; Goodspeed, *Die ältesten Apologeten*, pp. 90-265 Leipzig, 1915.

³² Bardenhewer-Shahan, *Patrology*, Freiburg and St. Louis, 1908, pp. 51 sq.; a fuller account in O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 206 sqq., Freiburg, 1913; J. Tixeront, *A Handbook of Patrology*, St. Louis, 1920, pp. 38 sq.

that the true Chosen People are those who have accepted Christianity; they are the heirs of the Old Covenant and its promises.

TERTULLIAN (died about 258) proves in his treatise *Adversus Iudæos* that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah because the prophecies of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Him.³³

Under the name of ST. CYPRIAN (d. 258) the unknown writer of a work called *Testimoniorum Libri adversus Iudæos*³⁴ has collected a number of texts to show that the Old Testament expectations of the Messiah were realized in Christ.³⁵

(C) *Christianity in Conflict with Paganism.*

—To form a correct judgment of the relation of Christianity to paganism during the early Christian centuries it is necessary to study the circumstances of that time. Christianity's right to exist was not yet generally admitted. The individual followers of the new cult were intensely hated as "contemners of the gods." In consequence of the intimate connection that existed between the worship of the gods and the pagan State, the

³³ Migne, *P. L.*, II, 595 sqq.; Bardenhewer-Shahan, *Patrology*, p. 183.

³⁴ Ed. Hartel, *P. III*, 133 sqq. (Migne, *P. L.*, IV, 675 sqq.); cfr. O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 491 sqq.; Bardenhewer-Shahan, *Patrology*, p. 199.

³⁵ A. Langhorst, S.J., *loc. cit.* (note 24, *supra*), Vol. XVIII, 171.

Christians were looked upon as enemies of the government, and, since the Romans identified their Empire with the whole human race, they held the followers of Jesus to be "enemies of humanity." In the bloody persecutions that ensued, the Christians suffered patiently. They were not permitted to use violence in defending themselves, and therefore had to depend solely on intellectual weapons.

The early apologetes, who undertook the defense of Christianity in word and writing, were encouraged by the conduct of those among the Roman emperors who regarded it as their greatest glory to deserve the name of just, humane, and liberal rulers. They were chiefly: Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius (who loved to be called "The Philosopher"). To these rulers the first apologetes addressed their appeals on behalf of the Christian religion. ST. JUSTIN MARTYR dedicated his *First Apology* to Antoninus Pius (138-161), to his adopted sons Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, to the Roman Senate, and to the entire people.³⁶ He appeals to their wisdom, love of truth, and humane sentiments, and reminds them of Plato's saying that, "Unless princes and people are true

³⁶ Migne, *P. G.*, VI, 327 sqq.; Bardenhewer-Shahan, *Patrology*, p. 50.

philosophers, a nation cannot be happy." He asks above all that the Christians be not punished merely because of their name, and shows how unfounded are the accusations raised against them. The *Second Apology*, addressed to the Senate, concludes with the wish: "May you pass a fair judgment, for your own sake, as it behooves pious men and philosophers."

The first comprehensive and systematic defense of the Christian religion was undertaken by EUSEBIUS OF CÆSAREA (d. 340).³⁷ In the first part of his *Evangelical Preparation* he demonstrates the incomparable superiority of Christianity to all the religious and philosophical systems of the heathen nations. In the second part he expounds the thesis that Christianity is the divine development of Judaism, and its truth can be shown from the prophetic books of the Old Testament.³⁸

The apologetical activity of the Fathers reached its climax in the *De Civitate Dei* of ST. AUGUSTINE (d. 430). This famous and important treatise was composed between 413 and 426

³⁷ Migne, *P. G.*, XXI and XXII, 13-794.

³⁸ Bardenhewer-Shahan, *Patrology*, p. 248; on the Greek apologists in general see A. Seitz, *Die Apologie bei den Griechen des 4. und 5. Jahrhunderts in historisch-systematischer Darstellung*, Würzburg, 1895.

and published piecemeal. It owed its origin to the renewal of the pagan accusations against the Christians. Thus, the responsibility for the sack of Rome by Alaric (410) was laid at the door of the latter. The overthrow of Polytheism, it was said, had irritated the gods, under whose protection the Eternal City had grown to be the mistress of the world. A Spanish priest, Orosius,³⁹ had written a historical refutation of this reproach at the instigation of St. Augustine. However, the latter was not satisfied with his friend's *Historiarum adversus Paganos Libri Septem*,⁴⁰ but undertook to establish for all time the true relationship of Christianity to paganism. His view in the *De Civitate Dei* embraces not only the present, but also the past and the future; the whole course of history lies open before him, and from beginning to end he interprets it with great power and insight. His study rises to the dignity of a magnificent philosophy of history and towers "like an Alpine peak" above all the other apologies of Christian antiquity. In the first part (books 1 to 10) Augustine demonstrates the hollowness of

³⁹ On Orosius and his writings see W. M. T. Gamble in P. Guilday's *Church Historians*, New York, 1926, pp. 30-70, with a good bibliography.

⁴⁰ Migne, *P. L.*, XXXI, 663-1174.

Polytheism. The second part (books 11 to 22) is speculative and metaphysical. It deals with the two great kingdoms (*civitates*) in and through which the development of life and humanity goes on: the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of this world, which struggle with each other for the supremacy. The origin, development, and end of the two kingdoms reveal the instability of this world, whose main representative is paganism, and the divine truth of Christianity, in which the Kingdom of God finds its earthly consummation.

2. Second Period (8th to 15th Century)

(A) *Christianity in Conflict with the Arabic Philosophers.*—Towards the end of the eighth century the power of paganism was broken throughout the greater portion of Europe. Christianity had triumphed, and, as a result, there was no longer such urgent need of apologetical writing as there had been in the earlier centuries. The Catholic philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages devoted more time and attention to the doctrinal *contents* of Christian revelation. As a result, apologetical treatises grew scarce, and such as were composed were of no great importance. But during the Middle

Ages, too, the Church had her enemies. The rôle of defeated paganism was taken over by Islam, and the Jews continued to attack Christianity, some of them with profound erudition.

The principal apologetic work of this period is the *Summa contra Gentiles* of ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (d. 1274). Its later title, *Summa Philosophica de Veritate Catholica contra Gentiles*, sufficiently indicates its content, method, and purpose. The treatise was written at the instigation of St. Raymond of Peñaforte primarily as an aid to the missionaries working among the Moors in Spain. The motive which inspired St. Thomas in composing this work was to demonstrate the truth of Catholic theology by refuting the errors opposed to it. In performing this task he proceeded on the principle that those who will not admit arguments from authority must be convinced by arguments drawn from reason. Holy Scripture does not impress pagans and Mohammedans, and against the Jews one can argue only from the Old Testament.⁴¹ St. Thomas does not proceed in a purely philosophical manner from the creature to the Creator, but follows the way of faith by descending from God to His creatures; he employs all the

⁴¹ *Summa c. Gentiles*, l. I, c. 2.

resources of medieval philosophy to establish his theses.⁴²

The *Summa contra Gentiles* is divided into four books, of which the first three treat of the truths accessible to unaided human reason (the existence and nature of God, the origin and destiny of creatures), and consequently more readily admitted by those who deny supernatural revelation. The fourth book exhibits the principal dogmas of the Christian religion (the Trinity, the Incarnation, the supernatural end of man), and demonstrates them in the light of revelation.

The *Summa contra Gentiles* is characterized by an inexhaustible wealth of ideas, which are set before the reader in a clear and succinct style, with a wonderful depth and clarity of reasoning. A great modern theologian, M. J. Scheeben,⁴³ says that no other human treatise contains so great a wealth of ideas within such a small compass as the *Summa contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas, that classic work in which medieval Apologetics reached its highest speculative development.

⁴² *Op. cit.* l. II, c. 4. The *Summa contra Gentiles* has been largely translated into English and furnished with valuable notes by Jos. Rickaby, S.J., under the title *God and His Creatures*, London, 1905.

⁴³ *Dogmatik*, Vol. I, p. 434, Freiburg, 1873.

(B) *Christianity in Conflict with Humanism*.—The exaggerated esteem in which the Humanists of the Renaissance period held the literature and art of classical antiquity led to a one-sided and in some respects erroneous conception of the Christian religion. The revival of classical learning and the renascence of the Platonic philosophy resulted in a twofold opposition to Scholasticism. The Humanists not only condemned the harsh and barbarous Latin of the Schoolmen, but also strove to supplement their prevailing Aristotelianism by the idealistic philosophy of Plato. In the second half of the fifteenth century these movements produced some apologetical works which bore a distinct anti-Scholastic, nay, in some instances even an anti-Christian, stamp. Thus MARSILIO FICINO (d. 1499) wrote a book, *De Religione Christiana et Fidei Pietate* (1478), in which more attention is devoted to the defense of the Platonic philosophy than to that of the Christian religion, and his gifted pupil, PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA (d. 1494), lost his way in a maze of Neo-Platonic and Kabbalistic errors.⁴⁴

In the writings of the Humanists, especially of Pico, Christianity is represented as the re-

⁴⁴ On these noted writers cfr. the respective articles in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

vival of an ancient system of thought, which had been preserved in the books of the Old Testament, in the religions of the Orient, and particularly in the works of Plato and the Kabbala. It is the most perfect expression of the truths revealed by God to the human race in the early stages of its history, and which continued to live on among men, though periodically obscured by errors.

The endeavors of the Humanists to justify Christianity from the historical point of view marked a step forward in the development of the science of Apologetics. A more thorough and comprehensive study of various religions and a comparison of Christianity with other religious systems, especially those of the Orient, mark the *first beginnings of the science of comparative religion*.

The intended goal, it is true, was indicated rather than attained during the period with which we are dealing, for on the one hand, philological criticism was not yet sufficiently developed and too many Christian elements were carried into the pagan systems, while, on the other hand, the specific content of the Christian world-view was more or less evaporated.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Cfr. A. von Schmid, *Apologetik*, p. 34.

3. *Third Period (15th to 20th Century)*

(A) *Catholicism in Conflict with the Protestant Reformation.*—MARTIN LUTHER, the father of the so-called Reformation, did not start out by proposing an entirely new system of religious doctrine, but at first contented himself with combating real or alleged disciplinary abuses within the Church. In course of time, however, he was led to oppose Catholic dogma and violently attacked the ecclesiastical magisterium; he ended by denying the existence of a divinely ordained ecclesiastical order and of a supernaturally constituted teaching authority.

The Catholic apologists of his day met him step by step, and in their defense of the doctrines impugned, employed the same method against the other "reformers" of the sixteenth century.

Distinct progress followed in the wake of the historical method, which made possible a more extended positive demonstration of the events connected with the establishment and growth of the Catholic Church. Protestantism could be effectively refuted only from the historical point of view and with arguments derived from Holy Scripture. As against the formal principle of the "Reformers" ("the Bible alone") the Catholic

apologists emphasized the importance of ecclesiastical tradition and the legitimacy and infallibility of the teaching office of the Church.

The tactics of the Protestant opposition led to a more complete development and a deepening of the Catholic doctrine concerning the Church. This was mostly achieved by means of controversial treatises and innumerable pamphlets.

The leading defender of Catholicism against Protestant aggression was CARDINAL ROBERT BELLARMINE, of the Society of Jesus, whose acute and comprehensive *Disputationes de Controversiis Christianæ Fidei contra huius Temporis Hæreticos* (1581) were written mainly from the point of view of Biblical exegesis.⁴⁶

Bellarmino's learned contemporary, CARDINAL CESARE BARONIUS, a priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri, tried to accomplish the same object historically by his *Annales Ecclesiastici* (1588-1607), in twelve massive volumes, directed against the "Magdeburg Centuriators," a group of Lutheran scholars who, in a work entitled *Ecclesiastica Historia . . . secundum Singulas Centurias* (i. e., A History of the Church according to Centuries), had sought to

⁴⁶ On Bellarmine see the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 411-413.

destroy Catholicism with historical weapons.⁴⁷

Another epoch-making work on the Catholic side was the *Loci Theologici* of BISHOP MELCHIOR CANO, O.P., first published in 1562 and often reprinted. It deals with the (ten) sources or fountain-heads of theological knowledge and for the first time formally discusses the necessity of developing the almost exclusively speculative theology of the Middle Ages along more positive lines of Biblical exegesis and history, without in any way severing its connection with the older theology of the Patristic and early Scholastic periods.⁴⁸

The Huguenot PHILIP DE MORNAY deserves mention as the first apologist who discarded Latin and wrote a popular defense of Christianity in his native French.⁴⁹

Of more lasting importance than De Mornay's defense of the Protestant faith is the treatise *De Veritate Religionis Christianæ* (1627) of HUGO GROTIUS, who was the first writer to de-

⁴⁷ Cfr. *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. III, p. 534 sq.; Ths. Plassmann, O.F.M., in P. Guilday, *Church Historians*, New York, 1926, pp. 153-189, with a bibliography.

⁴⁸ On Cano and his famous *Loci Theologici* see the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. III, pp. 251 sq.; A. Lang, *Die Loci Theologici des Melchior Cano*, Munich, 1925.

⁴⁹ Cfr. A. von Schmid, *Apologetik*, p. 35; *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, p. 621. De Mornay's apologia is entitled *De la Vérité de la Religion Chrétienne* (1579).

limit the field of Apologetics more narrowly by excluding all materials belonging to the other theological disciplines and assigning them to a separate discipline, which we have come to know as Fundamental Theology.⁵⁰

(B) *Catholicism in Conflict with Deism.*—Deism, founded by HERBERT OF CHERBURY (d. 1648), is a philosophico-religious system which admits the existence of a personal God, distinct and separate from the universe, but holds that, after creating the world, He left it to shift for itself. The Deists regarded the positive preservation and government of the world as incompatible with the unchangeability of a perfect Being and held that any supernatural interference on God's part with the development of His creatures, such as would be involved in revelation, is impossible. Hence they acknowledged a natural, but no supernatural religion.⁵¹

Against this heresy Catholic Apologetics had to demonstrate above all the possibility and reality of supernatural revelation.

(C) *Catholicism in Conflict with Materialism.*—VOLTAIRE (d. 1778) and ROUSSEAU (d.

⁵⁰ Cfr. *Catholic Encyclopedia*, I, 621.

⁵¹ On Deism see the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. IV, pp. 679-683 (with bibliography); Bergier, *Le Déisme Réfuté par soi-même*, Paris, 1765 sq.

1778) transplanted Deism to France, where the ground had been prepared for it by PIERRE BAYLE (d. 1706) and BARUCH SPINOZA (d. 1677). In this fertile soil Deism soon degenerated into crass Materialism. BARON HOLBACH in his *Système de la Nature* (c. 1780) rejected the belief in a personal God and denied the spirituality and immortality of the soul as well as free will, reducing all being and activity to sheer matter. Catholic apologists combatted this new error by demonstrating the existence and necessity of natural religion and its different presuppositions.

(D) *Catholicism in Conflict with Rationalism*.—The same tendency which in France had developed Materialism, bred *Rationalism* in Germany. Rationalism regards the human intellect as the sole source of truth and teaches that what man cannot grasp with his reason, he can never embrace by an act of faith. This school of thinkers was headed by SEMLER (d. 1791) and counted among its chief protagonists SAMUEL REIMARUS, the author of the *Wolfenbütteler Fragmente*, and the editor of this nefarious work, GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING.

Against this school Catholic Apologetics upheld man's ability to receive a supernatural revelation, showing that there are truths which ex-

ceed the grasp of reason and that these truths can and must be accepted by an act of faith.

(E) *The Recent Development of Fundamental Theology*.—Seventeen centuries had passed since the beginning of Christianity, and Apologetics had not yet been received as a separate and independent science among the theological disciplines. However, it would be unfair to blame the theologians for this state of affairs. The writings of the Christian apologists show that the defense of Christianity throughout its entire history was conducted in such a thorough and comprehensive manner that the subject-matter of this science, now at last come of age, had been thoroughly canvassed before the work of rigid scientific organization was undertaken.

The first writer who treated supernatural revelation and the Catholic Church together and designated his work as "*fundamental*," was the Jesuit VITUS PICHLER (1713); but for the first complete treatment of the entire body of truths now embraced by Fundamental Theology we are indebted to MARTIN GERBERT, O.S.B., abbot of St. Blaise in the Black Forest (1760).

The most important apologetical treatise of this period, considered from the standpoint of

method, is the *Demonstratio Evangelica et Catholica* of BENEDICT STÄTTLER, S.J. (1770-1775). The Apology of BEDE MAYR, O.S.B., (1787-1789) marks another step forward, inasmuch as it treats not only of Christianity and Catholicism, but likewise, in great detail, of natural religion, develops the theory of the criteria of revelation to a point never reached before, and emphasizes the importance of the infallible teaching office of the Church.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Fundamental Theology, which had but just emerged as an independent theological discipline, was forced into new paths by Idealism. Though but few Catholic theologians accepted the philosophy of Kant, some of them sought to meet its attacks by requisitioning its method and forms of expression for the defense of truth.

The powerful impulse which Catholic theology received from the interest in Patrology and Church History aroused by J. A. MÖHLER made itself felt in a beneficial way also in the field of Apologetics. JOHANN SEBASTIAN VON DREY (1777-1853) was the first writer who assigned to Apologetics the rôle of a separate theological discipline, which he called Fundamental Theology, because it supplies the foundations for the science of dogmatic theology.

Drey was the head of the Catholic Tübingen school and is regarded as the founder of our science. His *Apologetik* was published in three volumes between 1838 and 1847. In its first part it offers a philosophy of revelation, while in its second it gives a survey of the historical development of religion up to its perfection by Christ, and in its third it presents an exposé of the Christian religion as embodied in the Catholic Church.⁵²

The historico-philosophical method employed by Drey was adopted by the great majority of Catholic apologists in the second half of the nineteenth century, and what was formerly called Apologetics is now quite generally designated as Fundamental Theology and dealt with by way of introduction to dogmatic theology proper.

In spite of the progress thus achieved, however, Fundamental Theology cannot yet claim complete uniformity of procedure. Some authors combine dogmatic arguments with the traditional historico-philosophical demonstrations, without, however, denying the possibility

⁵² M. Buchberger, *Kirchliches Handlexikon*, Freiburg, 1907, Vol. I, 1185; K. Werner, *Geschichte der kath. Theologie seit dem Trienter Konzil bis zur Gegenwart*, 2nd ed., Munich and Leipsic, 1889, pp. 234, 365, 381, 460 sqq., 467, 483 sq., 1561.

of developing Fundamental Theology into an independent science. Others, especially in France, regard the strictly philosophical method as inadequate to convince modern unbelievers and strive to substitute the moral method in its place.

The views of present-day apologists diverge also with regard to the delimitation of Fundamental Theology from philosophy on the one hand, and from the remaining theological disciplines on the other. Some do not hesitate to embody in their treatises large sections of metaphysics and of the philosophy of religion, whereas others hold that this mode of procedure is excusable only where the requisite preparatory training is wanting on the part of the prospective student.⁵³ Some regard the General Introduction to Sacred Scripture as a part and parcel of Fundamental Theology, or at least demand that the latter discipline furnish a survey of the chief results of Scripture study. Others omit all these details on the ground that Introduction to Sacred Scripture forms a separate branch of every seminary course. Finally, there are those who advocate a complete amalgamation of fundamental with dogmatic theology, in order that

⁵³ Cfr. Chr. Pesch, S.J., *Theol. Zeitfragen*, IV, pp. 73 sq.

the truth of the Catholic religion may exert its full force on the minds of men, whereas others regard such an amalgamation as dangerous on account of the unclearness which it inevitably involves.

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PART I
THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION

CHAPTER I

THE NOTION OF RELIGION

I. *Derivation of the Word.*—The etymology of the word *religion* (Latin, *religio*), which is common to all the languages of Western Europe, has been variously explained.

Cicero derives *religio* from *relegere*,¹ Lactantius² and St. Jerome³ from *religare*, St. Augustine from either *religare*⁴ or *religere*.⁵

¹ *De Natura Deorum*, II, 28: "*Qui omnia, quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent et tamquam relegerent, dicti sunt religiosi ex relegendo.*"

² According to Lactantius men are bound to God (*religati*) by the tie of piety, and it is from this that religion has received its name. *De Div. Instit.*, IV, 28 (Migne, P. L., VI, 536): "*Hac conditione gignimur, ut generati nos Deo iusta et debita obsequia praebeamus, hunc solum noverimus, hunc sequamur; hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti Deo religati sumus. Unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non ut Cicero interpretatus est, a relegendo.*"

³ *Comment. in Amos*, IX, 6 (P. L., XXV, 1089 sq.): "*Et fasciculum super terram fundavit: Iste fasciculus una Domini religione constrictus est, unde et ipsa religio religando et in fascem Domini vincendo nomen accepit.*"

⁴ *Retract.*, I, xiii, 9 (P. L., XXXII). Cfr. *De Vera Religione*, c. lv, n. lxx (P. L., XXXIV): "*Religion binds us [religat] to the one almighty God.*"

⁵ *De Civ. Dei*, X, c. 3, n. 2 (P. L., XLI, 280): "*Having lost God through neglect [negligentes] we recover Him [religentes] and are drawn to Him.*"

The derivation of *religio* from *religere* is not well founded; hence there remains only the choice between *relegere* and *religare*. For both derivations analogous forms can be cited; for *ligare*, e.g., *postulio*, *optio*, *rebellio*; for *relegere*, *legio*, *regio*, *pugio*. The transition from *e* to *i* in the second syllable (*religio*) is also found in other formations, such as *dirigo*, *adimo*, *corrigia*. Analogy, therefore, is not a sufficiently reliable guide.

Perhaps a study of the fundamental meaning of the words *ligare* and *legere* will prove helpful for our purpose. From this point of view the derivation of *religio* from *relegere* seems to deserve the preference. *Relegere* means primarily *to gather, to collect*, secondarily, *to recollect, to recall to mind, to reflect*. If *religio* was derived from *relegere*, interior recollection, devotion, was probably intended to be the root meaning of the word. If, on the other hand, *religio* was derived from *religare* (to bind, join, unite), as has been pretty generally held since Lactantius, the idea of union with God must have played the leading rôle. The latter is not, however, as closely related to popular religious consciousness as the feeling of devotion and interior recollection.

But all these theories are purely speculative;

it is impossible to establish the etymology of the word with any degree of certainty.⁶

II. *Use and Signification of the Word "Religion" and its Synonyms.*—Cicero defines religion as "the worship of the gods," or "justice towards the gods,"⁷ and applies it to whatever pertains to the cult of a divine being.⁸ He as well as Livy emphasize its binding force.⁹

The Greek classics (Plato, Herodotus, Æschylus, etc.) variously employ the words *θησικεία*, *εὐσέβεια*, *θεοσέβεια*, *λατρεία*, and, like the Roman authors quoted, combine with this notion the idea of divine worship or the fear of God.¹⁰

From the pagan Romans the word *religio* passed into the Christian vocabulary. The Latin Vulgate translates the Hebrew word used to designate divine worship in Exod. XII, 26, with

⁶ Cfr. Chas. F. Aiken in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XII, pp. 738 sqq.; L. de Grandmaison, S.J., in *Lectures on the History of Religions* (C.T.S.), Vol. I, London, 1910, I, 1 sqq.; M. Jastrow, *The Study of Religion*, New York, 1901, pp. 171 sqq.

⁷ "Religio, id est cultus deorum." "Iustitia erga deos religio dicitur."

⁸ "Religio est, quae superioris cuiusdam numinis curam ceremoniamque affert."

⁹ Cicero: "Tanta religione obstricta tota provincia est, ut" etc. Livy: "Ut religione obstrictos haberent multitudinis animos." (Cfr. any one of the larger Latin dictionaries).

¹⁰ See Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon under the resp. vocables, and S. Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*, Freiburg, 1907, pp. 20 sqq.

religio; in Exod. XXIX, 9, Lev. VII, 36 and XVI, 31, and in Numb. XIX, 2, *religio* takes the place of *divine precept*. To the former term there corresponds in the New Testament *θρησκεία* (Jas. I, 27; Col. II, 18) and *λατρεία* (John XVI, 2; Rom. XII, 1); to the latter also *θρησκεία* (Acts XXVI, 5; Jas. I, 26).

The sub-Apostolic Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers adopted this usage. We need only mention the Letter to Diognetus,¹¹ Justin Martyr,¹² Tertullian,¹³ Lactantius,¹⁴ St. Augustine,¹⁵ and Eusebius.¹⁶ St. Thomas Aquinas, taking his cue from the Fathers and early Scholastics, sums up the case as follows: "Whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it properly denotes a relation to God. For it is He to whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and it is He whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and

¹¹ *Epist. ad Diognet.*, c. ii (*P. G.*, II, 1168 sqq.); English translation in Loeb's Classical Library, *The Apostolic Fathers*, edited by Kirsopp Lake, Vol. II, pp. 347-379.

¹² *Apol.*, I, c. 13 (*P. G.*, VI, 345 sq.).

¹³ *De Oratione*, c. 18 (*P. L.*, I, 1178).

¹⁴ *Div. Inst.*, IV, 28.

¹⁵ *De Vera Religione*, c. 55, n. III.

¹⁶ *Praepar. Evang.*, l. I, c. 1 (*P. G.*, XX, 24).

should recover by believing and protesting our faith." ¹⁷

III. *Definition of Religion*.—Having studied the name, let us now examine the thing itself.

I. *The Basis of Religion, or Religion Objectively Considered*.

a) Though the religious beliefs of nations differ widely, all agree in holding that man depends upon the Deity and must conduct himself accordingly. This is evidenced both by the definitions and paraphrases to which the notion of religion has in course of time been subjected and by the character of the religious life led among the various nations, as we shall see later.

b) Since man's relation to God is the foundation of all religion, it is of the greatest importance that this relation be correctly understood. Every relation is determined by three elements, namely, (α) the subject, (β) the terminus, and (γ) the foundation. The subject of the relation here under consideration is man; its terminus is God. By comparing the subject with the terminus we learn the nature of the foundation or basis underlying man's relation to the Deity. Hence before determining the essence of religion, two preliminary questions must be an-

¹⁷ *Summa Theologica*, 2a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 1.

swered, namely, first, What is God? secondly, What is man?

c) Philosophy demonstrates that God is an infinitely perfect, absolute, spiritual, personal Being, determined only by Himself, the adequate cause of every other existing thing.¹⁸ Man also is a personal being, but he is created and determined in his nature and activity by God. He depends far more upon God than upon his fellow-creatures, because He owes to God all that he is and has. Consequently, man's relation

¹⁸ Jos. Hontheim, S.J., *Theodicæa*, pp. 148 sqq.; S. H. Joyce, S.J., *Principles of Natural Theology*, London, 1923, pp. 18 sqq.—F. Heiler asserts (*Der Katholizismus*, 2nd ed., Munich, 1923, p. 350): "The God whose existence natural theology demonstrates, is not the God of living piety. . . . Hence we can speak only of rational proofs for the reality of an absolute being, . . . not of proofs for the existence of God." This assertion is true in so far as the God demonstrated by philosophy is for our consciousness at first only the God of theoretical reason, and not at the same time the God of the will and of feeling. But the religious life begins with that knowledge of God which springs from the philosophical proofs for His existence. If to this knowledge is added practical acknowledgment, reverent submission, loving consecration, and hopeful trust on the part of the will and sentiment, it attains its full development and perfection; and thus the God of natural theology becomes the God of living piety. However, it is not necessary that the predicates which metaphysics attributes to God should always be actually present to the religious consciousness; it suffices if they are implicitly present as the objectively indispensable and solid foundation of all religious life, to which reflecting reason can always return, in order to lend to religious activity a constantly greater depth and interior solidity.

to God must be defined as one of absolute and complete dependency.

d) This relationship is *real*, that is to say, actually existing, because all its elements—subject, terminus, and foundation—are real.

e) Man's dependence on God manifests itself in a twofold way. God is man's first cause and final end. He is man's first cause because man would not and could not exist without Him. He is man's final end, first, because He is the final end of all things, having created the world for His own sake; secondly, because man, being endowed with a capacity for enjoying truth and goodness, can find genuine happiness and attain the perfection of his nature only in the possession of Him who is substantial Truth and Goodness. Hence man, in his whole nature and being, both as to origin and destiny, is utterly dependent upon God; even in his most exalted state he is and remains a child of God.

f) This dependence of man upon God as his Creator and final end is the basis of religion in its special and proper meaning, and is frequently itself called religion for short. Religion in the objective sense may, therefore, be defined as *man's dependence upon God as his first cause and ultimate end*, or, *the sum-total of those*

truths and duties which arise from man's objective dependence upon God.

2. *Religion in its Proper or Formal Sense.*—Concretely or formally, *i. e.*, in its proper sense, religion is man's conduct as prescribed by his objective dependence upon God. In this aspect, namely, as man's actual profession of his dependence upon the Deity, religion is found among all nations and tribes of the earth. The mode of divine worship among the different nations, of course, differs according to their ideas of man's relationship towards God. On the basis of the theistic world-view, which is the only one that can stand before the bar of reason, we define religion as "*man's free and complete dedication of himself to the service of God.*"

This definition abstracts entirely from supernatural revelation and has in view only human nature as such, and God as that nature's adequate goal. The Catholic Church accepts this definition as true and correct so far as it goes, but deepens and broadens it by insisting on a more intimate union of man with God and giving a more definite description of his final end as derived from supernatural revelation.

3. *God and Religion.*—It would not be correct to say that there is a religion for God either in the objective or subjective sense. For God is

infinitely perfect, and since He does not depend upon any other being, cannot admit any such dependence. He is the principle or efficient cause, not the subject, of (creatural) religion.

4. *Religion and Morality*.—To determine the true relation between religion and morality, we must first explain the meaning of the two words.

a) Religion, objectively considered, as we have seen, is the sum-total of all those beliefs, sentiments, and practices, individual or social, which result from man's relationship to God. That relationship forms the foundation of the moral order, that is, of the free actions of man in all their phases, taken as a whole. Every moral or free-will act performed by man presupposes his dependence upon God and receives its goal, value, and content from the perception of that dependence.

b) If objective religion be defined as the sum-total of the obligations imposed on man by his dependence upon God, there is no distinction between religious and moral obligations or duties, since the latter (namely, man's duties towards himself, towards his neighbors, and towards God) may all be deduced from his dependence upon His Creator.

c) As a rule, however, the concept of objective religion is narrowed by including within it

only man's duties towards God. In this sense man's religious duties represent but a part, though, it is true, the most important part, of his moral obligations.¹⁹

d) From this explanation we can readily see how religion is related to morality. We may subsume under the term religion all those duties which are incumbent upon man as a consequence of his dependence upon God, or, to use a more common phrase, the fulfilment of his duties towards God in the narrower sense. In the former case the fulfilment of man's moral duties is identical with that of his religious duties, while in the latter, the fulfilment of the religious duties constitutes the principal part of the moral law.²⁰

Religion, properly understood, therefore, cannot be divorced from morality. In other words, there is no such thing as morality without religion.

5. *Religion as a Virtue.* (a) Taking religion in the narrower sense, we may say that it is a permanent state, a habit of the soul, or a virtue,

¹⁹ Cfr. Koch-Preuss, *A Handbook of Moral Theology*, Vol. IV, Man's Duties to God, 2nd ed., St. Louis, Mo., 1921.

²⁰ Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., *Moralphilosophie*, Vol. II, 4th ed., Freiburg, 1904, pp. 14 sqq.; M. Cronin, *The Science of Ethics*, Vol. II, Dublin, 1917, pp. 1 sqq.; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., *Moral Philosophy*, 4th ed., London, 1918, pp. 123 sqq.

namely, in the words of St. Thomas, "that virtue which prompts man to render to God the worship and reverence that belong to Him by right."²¹

b) Since religion, unlike the so-called theological virtues, has for its immediate object, not God, but something outside of God, something created, namely, the service of God, and since it is by nature a habit of the will, it is classed among the moral virtues,²² of which it is the most excellent because its object puts it in intimate union with God. St. Thomas subsumes the virtue of religion under justice,²³ because religion resembles, though it does not possess all the properties of, that cardinal virtue. On account of man's absolute dependence upon God, religion, though it instructs him how to serve God as he is in duty bound to do, is not able to establish that complete equality between demand and act that belongs to the essence of justice, nor is a quantitative calculation of religious service according to the principles of strict justice compatible with the nature of religion.

²¹ *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 1: "*Virtus, per quam homines Deo debitum cultum et reverentiam exhibent.*"

²² St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 5; cfr. F. Suarez, *De Relig.*, l. III, c. 3, n. 3 and 4, edit. Vives, Tom. XIII.

²³ *Ibid.*, art. 5, ad 3; cfr. Suarez, *op. cit.*, c. 4, n. 10 sqq.

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CHAPTER II

THE NECESSITY OF RELIGION, OR RELIGION AS A DUTY

1. In asserting the necessity of religion for man, we take the term in its subjective sense, *i.e.*, as the free service of God.

2. We speak here of religion *as such*, not of any particular form of it that might be prescribed, for instance, by way of supernatural revelation. What we call religion in this section of our treatise is the substance of all religions, *i.e.*, that which follows as a necessary consequence from the Divine Essence and from human nature. Hence, the term NATURAL RELIGION, *i.e.*, religion as necessarily issuing from the nature of things, not as the result of an immediate intervention of the Divinity, though, as Newman has observed, the second element predominates in the actual religions.¹

3. The *necessity* or *duty* of natural religion is *absolute*, because it is founded on the nature both

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, N. Y. ed., 1870, pp. 378 sqq.

of God and man. Religion is the necessary means for the attainment of an end:—on the part of man, in so far as that end is human; on the part of God, in so far as that end is divine. Religion raises man to the highest perfection of which his nature is capable, whilst it procures for God the honor and glory that are His due.

4. The duty of natural religion is not abolished by supernatural revealed religion, nor, on the other hand, must it be thought that God has a right to demand of man only such religious service as is manifested by the natural law. If there were no supernaturally revealed religion, all men would be obliged to practice natural religion, and the natural duty of submitting to God remains even after supernatural revelation has become a reality.

(A) Religion is necessary for man because he is absolutely dependent upon God.

The proof for this thesis is based (1) on the nature of human activity, and (2) on man's duty to promote the honor and glory of God.

1. A creature can attain the perfection for which God has intended it only by the natural development of its faculties; but man acts in harmony with nature only if he practically acknowledges his dependence upon God as his

first cause and final end; therefore, man can attain the divinely intended perfection of his nature in no other way than by practically acknowledging that he is dependent upon God as his first cause and final end.

Now, this acknowledgment is what we call religion; therefore, man can attain the divinely intended perfection of his nature only by means of religion.

The activity of a being flows from its nature; it is the revelation of its essence. Every being acts according to its nature, its powers and faculties. God has indicated His will in regard to the activities of His creatures by endowing each with a certain nature and definite faculties. If the creature's activities correspond fully to its nature, then they represent the complete development and perfection of that nature as intended by the Creator.

This rule applies to all creatures, as all creatures without exception are and remain, as long as they exist, absolutely dependent upon God in their nature and activity.

But in another respect there is an *essential distinction between rational and irrational creatures*. The irrational creature attains its perfection when its activity, which is subject to the laws of physical necessity, unfolds itself without

interference. The rational creature, on the other hand, is free to use its powers and faculties according to its own good pleasure. In other words, it can freely determine the nature, the object, and the goal of its activities.

If this free activity and self-determination of the rational creature is to remain natural, every action must be performed with a constant voluntary submission to His law. The rational creature, if it wishes to follow its nature, may employ its faculties only according to the laws which God has implanted in its nature. Here we have the essence of religious activity. Man attains his divinely intended perfection only by serving his Creator.

2. Our second argument is based on *man's duty to promote the honor and glory of God*. According to the theistic philosophy, it necessarily follows that every creature must promote the honor and glory of God to the best of its ability; now man, being endowed with reason and free will, is capable not only of objectively representing the divine perfections, like the irrational creature, but also of acknowledging them by intelligent and free acts; therefore, man is in duty bound to promote the honor and glory of God by acknowledging His divine

perfections subjectively. To comply with this duty means to practice religion. Consequently, man is in duty bound to practice religion.

In creating the world, God in His infinite wisdom must have acted with a purpose. As He is absolutely perfect, and His perfection excludes change,—most of all any change caused by creatures,—the final purpose or end of His creative activity can be none other than Himself, *i. e.*, the external manifestation of His glory. Hence the revelation of His perfection, to the extent compatible with the nature of the creature, was the only possible, and at the same time the absolutely necessary, purpose of creation. The irrational creatures attain this purpose by objectively showing forth the perfections of their Creator. The rational creatures, on the other hand, are capable of something more, and therefore something more is demanded of them, namely, that they should manifest the greatness of their Creator by conscious and free acts, *i. e.*, by acknowledging Him as the first cause and final end of all things and conducting themselves in accordance with this belief. The glory of God thus manifested is called religion. Consequently, every rational creature, including man, is in duty bound to practice religion.

(B) Religion is the necessary basis of morality.

1. The moral law of nature obliges man to perform none but good deeds; but man cannot reasonably comply with this duty unless he acknowledges God as his Lord and absolute Lawgiver; now, so to acknowledge God is an act of religion; therefore, a reasonable submission to the moral law of nature is impossible without religion.

Moral obligation is the state of being in duty bound to do good and to avoid evil. This compulsion asserts itself in the will, which is the principle of all specifically human acts, and consists in the unconditional interior impulse to act in accordance with nature by performing none but good deeds. The morally good act, which bears the character of duty, presents itself to the will as a good that must be desired of necessity. The obligation to perform none but good acts exists always and for all men. Whether we like it or not, we must obey the moral law.

At the same time a morally good action possesses such great value that, if need be, even the most precious earthly possessions have to be sacrificed for its sake.

The infinite value thus accruing to a morally

good act and the absolute power of moral goodness in human life, cannot be the product of human conduct as such, because no human action can transcend its subject, which is a finite and contingent being.

There is but one satisfactory explanation of this mystery, namely, that the morally good act is ordered towards an infinitely valuable end, and the human will depends upon a higher will, endowed with unlimited power. Viewed thus, the morally good act performed by man appears as a means necessary for the attainment of a good of infinite value, and the relation between means and end is the work of the Creator, who has implanted into the human soul an irresistible impulse to perform or not to perform certain actions, this being a natural law which free will can, but should not, resist.

Hence, if the moral law is to have a foundation adequate to the demands of reason, the rational creature must first acknowledge God as the supreme Lawgiver; in other words, religion must be made the basis of moral duty.²

2. Our second argument is based on the fact

² Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., *Moralphilosophie*, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 372 sqq.; C. Gutberlet, *Ethik und Religion*, Münster i. W., 1892, pp. 30 sqq., 102 sqq.; Ph. Kneib, *Jenseitsmoral*, Freiburg, 1906, pp. 20 sqq.; W. Schneider, *Göttliche Weltordnung und religionslose Sittlichkeit*, 2nd ed., Paderborn, 1909, pp. 449 sqq.

that the moral law of nature would lack sufficient sanction without religion. Every law must have a sufficient sanction; but the moral law has no such sanction except in religion; therefore, religion is necessary as a sanction for the moral law.

By *sanction* we understand the detriment, reward for observance, or loss of reward, or other coercive intervention annexed to the violation of a law, as a means of enforcing it. In order that all men may obey the law, it is necessary, in view of the weakness of human nature, to back it up with an adequate sanction. The punishment which follows a violation of the law must not be so light that men will readily disregard it, and the rewards that are offered for its faithful observance must be of a kind efficaciously to determine the will to do what is right.

The moral law has a twofold sanction, the one earthly, the other heavenly. The earthly sanction consists essentially in the continuous aptitude and inclination to do good, which follows the habitual observance of the law and the consciousness of duty well performed, bringing peace and what we call a good conscience. Transgression of the law, on the other hand, is followed by an increased tendency towards evil,

a rebellion of the lower against the higher faculties of the soul, and the qualms of an uneasy conscience.

In addition to these effects there usually results from the observance of the moral law bodily well-being, whereas a vicious life shatters the health of the sinner and hastens his death.

A virtuous life, finally, obtains for a man the esteem, love, and friendship of his fellowmen, whereas vice entails suspicion, contempt, and disgrace.

Consequently, there exists an earthly sanction of the moral law: virtue by its very nature brings blessings, whereas vice is followed by evil consequences.

But this sanction is inadequate, since the blessings in question do not necessarily follow the observance of the law and the punishments are not necessarily annexed to its transgression. Only those goods or evils that are essentially connected with moral goodness or evil are inseparable from them. The other phenomena accompanying moral conduct frequently fail to make their appearance because their causes do not lie wholly in the moral acts of men, but partly in purely external circumstances, such as good health, wealth, a favorable environment,

or bodily predisposition. Thus it may happen that a good man has to suffer excessively, whereas his wicked neighbor enjoys enviable health and is prosperous in all his undertakings.

In order, therefore, that the sanction of the moral law may prove adequate, *i. e.*, fully sufficient for its purpose, it must extend beyond the confines of this world into the next. Religion alone offers such an efficacious sanction by teaching that the final end of man is the eternal possession of God, who is substantial Truth and Goodness, and the enjoyment of the beatific vision in Heaven. This consummation, which comprises within itself the highest perfection of which human nature is capable, has for its necessary condition the observance of the moral law in this world. Perfect happiness in the next world will then be the reward of faithful observance of, whereas eternal loss of happiness will be the punishment of disobedience to, the moral law.

The sanction of the moral law, as just explained, has its strongest factor in the everlasting duration of both reward and punishment. Eternal duration follows as a necessary consequence from the notion of perfect happiness. If a man had to fear that his happiness would sooner or later end, he could not be perfectly

happy. The punishment of the sinner, too, must be everlasting, else the threat of it would not be able to induce him to strive earnestly for his ultimate goal, the possession of God, and to keep him always on the straight and narrow path. If it were possible for a sinner to indulge the hope that, in spite of all his crimes, he might some day attain to eternal happiness, he would not be strong enough to persevere in the oftentimes almost hopeless struggle with his passions.³

To recapitulate: Without the hope of eternal reward and without the fear of eternal punishment, both of which have their basis in religion, the moral law of nature would lack adequate sanction; consequently, religion is necessary for its enforcement.

(C) Religion is necessary to make human life on earth bearable.

1. *Religion helps the mind of man in regard to the most important problems of life.* The empirical sciences can tell us nothing about the many facts that lie outside their sphere, and

³ Cfr. Cathrein, *Moralphilosophie*, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 379 sqq.; Pohle-Preuss, *Eschatology*, pp. 65 sqq.; Koch-Preuss, *A Handbook of Moral Theology*, Vol. I, pp. 203 sqq.; J. P. Arendzen, *What Becomes of the Dead?* London, 1925; Schneider-Thurston, *The Other Life*, N. Y., 1920; J. C. Sasia, S.J., *The Future Life*, N. Y., 1918; D. J. Lanslots, O.S.B., *The End of the World and of Man*, N. Y., 1925.

what information they do furnish, is insufficient to satisfy the craving of the intellect for truth. Those most important questions: "Where does man come from?" "What is his destiny?" "What must he do to attain his ultimate goal?" receive no reply whatever from science. Religion alone is able to answer them definitely, clearly, and satisfactorily.

2. *Religion aids the will in acting as well as in suffering.*

(a) *Religion assists the will in acting.* The prospect of attaining the sublime goal pointed out by religion in the next world inspires man with enthusiasm and courage to perform heroic deeds, to serve his fellowmen, to endure privations patiently, and thus ennobles his earthly life by giving it a higher content and value.

(b) *Religion aids the will in suffering.* It directs man's thoughts to the Providence of God, who fondly watches over His creatures and rules the destinies of all with supreme wisdom and benevolence. Religion alone, with its doctrine of eternal retribution in the world beyond, can console and strengthen the poor sufferers who frequently have no other earthly prospect than an inglorious death after a life of agonizing torments. For religion teaches with unshakable certitude that there will be a final equation be-

tween the observance of the moral law and happiness, between external fate and interior merit. Without religion man is the most pitiable of all creatures; he is helplessly exposed to the powers of nature, his reason serves but to intensify his sufferings, and there is no prospect for him but dumb resignation, despair, and finally suicide.

(D) Religion is necessary for the existence of society.

I. *Religion is necessary for the existence of the family, to solidify the union between husband and wife, and to establish the proper relationship between parents and children.*

a) *Religion is necessary to strengthen the matrimonial bond.* The union between husband and wife, which entails a most intimate relationship of love and unreserved mutual devotion, by its very nature demands indissolubility as the only effective means of preserving the dignity and holiness of the married state. Religion is equally necessary for the proper training of children, which constitutes one of the most important tasks incumbent on parents, and for the parents themselves, in order that they may not suffer want in their old age. Now, this indissolubility of the matrimonial bond is secured

only by religion. The sexual affection which usually prompts men to marry and establish a family, may and often does grow cold in later years, and the happiness of the family is endangered by accidents, diseases, and difficulties of every description. If there are no higher motives, if duty, based on religion, does not uphold the union, if there is no prospect of a better life in the next world,—which prospect religion alone can hold out,—then the institution of the family, so necessary for the existence of society, is in great danger of dissolution.

b) *Religion is necessary also to establish the proper relationship between parents and children.* Parents and children are intimately bound together by mutual duties and corresponding rights. The parents are obliged to train their children in morality by giving them the right kind of an education. The children, on their part, are bound to reverence their parents and to obey them in all reasonable matters. To these duties there correspond certain rights. All these precepts are found in the moral law of nature; but religion alone provides a firm basis for authority and duty. It alone can effectually prevent both the abuse of rights and the neglect of duties.

2. *Religion is indispensable for the existence and prosperity of the State.*

Society could not possibly exist without an authority qualified to impose duties. All duty has its ultimate foundation in God. Consequently, the authority of the State and its power to impose duties, is based upon the very order of nature.

The same truth applies to those who are subject to authority. A nation without religion would be extremely difficult to govern, because it would lack the basis of obedience, namely, the sense of duty, which springs from religion.

Finally, religion alone can furnish the necessary guarantees for the proper administration of justice. Social justice is based on the idea that the State, too, is a creature of Almighty God, and its rulers govern in His name and as His representatives. Justice must be dispensed impartially in the making and enforcement of laws, in the imposition and collection of taxes, in the adjudication of quarrels and disputes, and so forth; for the State cannot flourish without justice. "*Iustitia fundamentum regnorum.*"

3. *Religion is necessary for orderly social intercourse among men.* If religion did not supply the motives for right conduct, there would be

no justice or charity, no honesty or fidelity amongst men, and egotism would rule supreme. To "get the most out of life" would appear as the only desirable goal to the majority of men. No one would regard himself as bound by promises, contracts, or a relationship of service, except when it was to his own selfish interest. No one would be safe in his person or property, and violence and trickery would be commonly considered the most appropriate means of assuring one's own life and possessions and those of one's dependents. "Of all the duties which man has to fulfil," says Leo XIII, "that, without doubt, is the chiefest and holiest which commands him to worship God with devotion and piety. This follows of necessity from the truth that we are ever in the power of God, are ever guided by His Will and Providence, and, having come forth from Him, must return to Him."⁴

A recent writer expresses the opinion that "religion considered as a bond reaching into the other world, and as an activity for the attain-

⁴ Leo XIII, Encyclical "*Libertas*," of June 20, 1888: "*Ex omnibus hominum officiis illud est sine dubitatione maximum ac sanctissimum, quo pie religioseque Deum colere homines iubemur. Idque necessario ex eo consequitur, quod in Dei potestate perpetuo sumus, Dei numine providentiaque gubernamur, ab eoque profecti ad eum reverti debemus.*"

ment of a goal that lies far beyond the grave, cannot be shown to be necessary for all men in this life. To attempt such a demonstration," he thinks, "would derogate from the dignity of religion, because if religion were merely a necessary means for the support of earthly institutions, it would have to be entirely determined and governed by the latter."⁵ This opinion does not appear to be well founded, for it cannot be shown that earthly utility and indispensability have no connection with a bond extending into the world beyond and an activity tending to a goal lying in that other world. In matter of fact there *is* such a connection, and it is a most intimate one. In the arguments here under consideration religion is credited with no other utility and indispensability than moral conduct in general. Religion is the foundation of morality, both in general and in particular, *i. e.*, in the individual. As we deduce the necessity of morally good conduct from its relation to an other-worldly goal, so we deduce the necessity of religion from the fact that morality lacks a stable foundation without religion, since religion represents man's practical acceptance of his goal in the world beyond. By this practical acceptance, it is true, religion at the same time

⁵ See Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*, pp. 38 sq.

becomes a necessary means for the support of certain earthly institutions, but only in so far as it impresses on these institutions (the family, the State, mutual intercourse between men) the stamp of moral goodness in regard to obligation and sanction. That religion should govern itself according to the earthly institutions in question, therefore, is not a legitimate conclusion, since the necessity of religion, as just explained, implies precisely the opposite relation, namely, that the family, the State, etc., must adapt themselves to the demands of religion.

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CHAPTER III

THE ACTS OF RELIGION

We have already explained that religion, taken in its proper sense, manifests itself in acts. The question now arises: In what specific acts?

Man's religious life legitimately shows itself in certain acts, the nature and quality of which are determined, on the one hand, by his ontological relation of dependence upon God, and, on the other, by the peculiar character of his nature, which is partly material and partly spiritual.

From the last-mentioned point of view we may distinguish two species of religious acts, interior and exterior.

The interior acts of religion are acts of the intellect, of the will, and of the emotions. They are manifested and completed by corresponding exterior acts.

§ 1. THE INTERIOR ACTS OF RELIGION

1. Religious Knowledge

The first religious act of man, and the preliminary condition of all other religious acts, is an act of knowledge.

The proof for this thesis is taken from the nature of religion. Religion consists in the worship and service which man freely renders to His Creator; now, man cannot perform a free act unless an act of the intellect has preceded and accompanied that of the will; therefore, intellectual knowledge is a necessary factor of the other religious acts and belongs to the essence of religion.

"Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum," that is, nothing can be willed that has not been previously perceived by the intellect, is a philosophical axiom of the schools. Experience teaches that every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect. This applies also to the religious sphere. Here the intellect serves the purpose of apprehending God, who is man's ultimate end, and of acquainting the will with the motives for serving Him, namely, the perfections on account of which He is worthy of supreme

worship. If God should demand of us acts not discoverable by reason alone (*e. g.*, the observance of the Sabbath), this demand would have to be made known to the will by means of the intellect. In addition, every act of the will performed in the exercise of religion must be preceded and accompanied by a corresponding act of the understanding.

The truths which belong to the religious sphere are called religious truths. The knowledge of these truths,—as, for instance, man's dependence upon God,—is not the whole of religion, but merely its first stage. We, therefore, call this knowledge man's first religious act.¹

Hence we must reject as one-sided and erroneous the following opinions:

a) The teaching of the *Vedantic philosophers of India*, that the contemplation of Brahma is sufficient to redeem man from all suf-

¹ That every religious experience includes an operation of the intellect is admitted by the representatives of the modern science of the psychology of religion. Thus Girgensohn (*Der seelische Aufbau des religiösen Erlebens*, Leipsic, 1921, p. 440) writes: "It is certain that wherever religion is experienced, man, in living the religious life, somehow or other seeks to outgrow his own limitations—interior as well as exterior—and conceives himself in connection with, or in a state of dependence upon, something higher and greater, even though this something may be never so indefinite and 'predicate-less.' I do not see how an experience which entirely lacks this thought-relation, and the interpretation of such an ex-

fering, to enable him to become absorbed into the godhead, and thereby to attain ideal perfection.²

b) The doctrine of a certain school of *Gnostics*, who limited the religious life to an act of the intellect and regarded this (gnosis) as sufficient for salvation, regardless of good works.

c) *Hegel's* assertion that religion is "the perception by the finite spirit of its essential absoluteness," and the contention of some *Pantheists* and *Materialists* that religion ought to be replaced by science.³

2. *Religious Acts of the Will*

The innermost essence of religion is constituted by the activity of the will.

Religion is man's free dedication of his whole being to the service of God. As the subject of human freedom and of self-determination is the will, religious activity must proceed primarily from this faculty of the soul.

perience, can be called religious." (Cfr. T. K. Oesterreich, *Einführung in die Religionspsychologie*, Berlin, 1917, pp. 17 sq.)

² P. D. Chantepie de La Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. II, 3rd ed., Tübingen, 1905, pp. 61 sq.; 4th ed., 1925, Vol. II, pp. 81 sq.

³ Cfr. O. Pfleiderer, *Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie*, 3rd ed., Berlin, 1893, pp. 414 sqq.

The religious activity of the will consists in worshipping God as the Creator and ultimate end of man.

Worship is superior to honor. We may honor a man, even though he be an inferior and a subject, by freely acknowledging his character and merits; but we worship only those who surpass us by their prerogatives, inspire us with admiration and reverence, and command our respect and submission.

If we apply this truth to God, we find that His chief prerogative in relation to man consists in this, that He is the author of man's being and his last end.

Man's acknowledgment of the infinite greatness and majesty of God, and of his own absolute dependence upon Him as to origin, existence, and destination, is what we call divine worship or *adoration*,—clearly distinguished from every form of veneration given to creatures.

The acknowledgment of the divine prerogatives includes acts of complete submission and consecration, which, though not identical with, are closely related to, humility and obedience. Man's unreserved surrender of himself to God, the Author of his being and the Goal of his highest perfection, contains an acknowledgment

not only of his own lowliness and weakness (humility), but likewise of the majesty of God, who transcends all human greatness, to whom we owe whatever we are and shall be when we attain our highest perfection. Similarly, reverential submission to God is not an act of obedience in the strict sense of that term; for although God is our supreme Lord and Master, we subject ourselves to Him not only because He commands us to do so, but also on account of His infinite majesty and perfection and our own absolute dependence upon Him.

Love of God and hope in Him are necessary conditions of divine worship. Such acts of love and hope, however, do not, strictly speaking, belong to the sphere of the religious life, because they are directed to God Himself, not to His service and veneration; but they bear an intimate relation to divine worship for the reason that they are a practical condition and support of that worship.

The first and most important task that devolves upon man when he has arrived at a knowledge of God and of himself, and feels a desire to regulate his relation to the Deity, is to determine the goal of his activity. The properties of his own nature, above all its restless craving for truth and happiness, and the experience

that no created good can satisfy this craving, compel him to realize that God, the infinite Truth and Goodness, is the exclusive goal of his striving, and that only in the possession of that goal, *i. e.*, in the knowledge and love of God, can he find that perfection and complete happiness for which his nature yearns.

The will must, therefore, co-operate in the attainment of man's last end. It must direct his aspirations and desires towards the possession of the Supreme Good. Created goods may also be the object of the will's desire, but only in so far as they are subordinate to the Supreme Good. To love God above everything else and to strive to possess Him forever,—is the goal towards which the Creator wishes man to tend.

As long as this love is not yet in possession of, but merely in process of striving for, its object, it must, in order to be permanent, be joined to hope. For without a firm confidence that, in spite of all obstacles, we shall sooner or later attain that exalted aim through our own efforts and with the help of God, even the most heroic soul would eventually grow weary and lose courage. Hence the love of God and the hope of attaining happiness by possessing Him, are inseparable in the heart of man as long as he sojourns on this terrestrial planet.

Love and hope establish the first and fundamental connection between the free-will activity of man and its ultimate goal, *i. e.*, God. [The acts of these virtues are modified and more definitely determined by those acts which properly constitute divine worship. It is not enough that man should love God above all else, and that he should confidently hope and earnestly strive to possess Him;—no, he must likewise keep constantly before his eyes God's infinite majesty and his own absolute dependence upon Him, and be practically guided by these motives in all his acts of love and hope. Hope and love must rest on truth. Only when the motives of divine worship are taken up into the acts of these two virtues, and all these activities interpenetrate one another and become fused into one, as it were, does human conduct possess those properties which are demanded by man's dependence upon God.]

The action of the will occupies the first place in the religious life of man; but religion must not, as Kant and many of his followers would have it, be detached from theoretical knowledge and regarded merely as a postulate of the will, to be ultimately absorbed into the activity of the latter faculty.

3. Religious Emotion

Religious emotion naturally follows intellectual cognition and the activity of the will.

Man is not a pure spirit, but a composite of body and soul, and consequently does not exercise his reason apart from his other faculties. The bodily organism has its share in every movement of the spiritual life. The imagination is the constant companion of thought and frequently stirs the sensitive appetite to a greater or less degree. The spiritual appetency also plays a rôle, in that it unconsciously accompanies thought.

The sum-total of the unconscious movements of these two appetitive faculties towards some object perceived as good or bad by the intellect, is called emotion. The different emotions have no necessary connection with the will, but often arise in opposition to it and its desires. Sometimes they can be suppressed, but quite often the will is powerless in regard to them.⁴

⁴ Cfr. J. Jungmann, *Das Gemüt*, 2nd ed., Freiburg, 1885; J. Schuchter, *Empirische Psychologie*, Brixen, 1897, pp. 149 sqq.; H. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, Vol. II, 5th ed., Leipsic, 1905, pp. 381 sq.; J. Geyser, *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie*, Vol. II, 3rd ed., Münster i. W., 1920, pp. 381-436; IDEM, *Intellekt oder Gemüt*, Freiburg, 1921; J. Fröbes, S.J., *Lehrbuch der experimentellen*

From what we have said it follows that emotion plays an important part in man's religious life. Our thinking and willing is always accompanied by emotions, be it of pleasure or displeasure, taking these terms in their widest sense. Religion, as an act of the intellect and the will, is naturally accompanied by emotions of one kind or another. That emotions play a more important part in the domain of religion than elsewhere, is owing to the nature of the object of religion and to the lively interest which both the intellect and the will take in that object. In accordance with the nature of religion, which sees in God the absolute Lord of creation, in whom alone man can be completely happy, the emotions that assert themselves in the religious sphere are primarily a feeling of dependence, reverential awe, yearning, confidence and security, exaltation, happiness, and joy.

Though emotion is by no means the main factor of religion, its value must not be underestimated. First and above all emotion is a splendid means of promoting the activity of the mind. The more narrowly human activity is limited to the purely spiritual, the more difficult and laborious it seems to be, the more quickly does

the soul grow tired and weary. This is quite natural, for a purely spiritual activity corresponds to only one element in the double nature of man. It is only when the senses receive their proportionate share of attention that man's whole nature sets to work. Such mixed activity, therefore, is exercised easily and with pleasure, and thus disposes the harmoniously co-operating faculties and powers of man to performances which constantly grow more perfect. The most powerful influence in this regard is exercised by emotion, which, on the one hand, is based upon man's sensitive nature and, on the other, stands in intimate relation with the higher aspirations of his intellect and will.

As the religious acts of the intellect receive greater strength from the co-operation of emotion, so, conversely, emotion reflects the intensity of the intellectual operations. For only a cognition which takes place with power and vividness is able to awaken the emotions by stirring up all the appetitive faculties of the soul.

It is a wise provision, which clearly proves the goodness of the Creator, that emotion shows its strength and exercises a beneficial influence principally in cases where the imperfect development of the mind and the weakness of the will make this appear desirable, namely, in

early youth and in the female sex. This fact explains why children and women are not inferior to man in the practice of religion, nay, often perform heroic acts of piety.⁵

While religious emotion, therefore, undoubtedly plays an important part in connection with the other acts of religion, it would nevertheless be a serious mistake to assign to it a dominant rôle, and still more foolish to place the whole essence of religion in feeling, as Jacobi⁶ and Schleiermacher⁷ have done.

We cannot here discuss the extraordinary phenomena of mysticism and their relation to the ordinary religious activities of the soul. These phenomena, so far as they appertain to the sphere of natural religious experience, are, on the one hand, too rare and too little known in their nature, while, on the other hand, if we take into consideration the supernatural mysticism of the Catholic Church, they presuppose divine faith and revelation, and consequently lie beyond the scope of natural religion.⁸

§ II. THE EXTERNAL ACTS OF RELIGION

Religious sentiment, considered in its sensitive aspect, is so fused with man's purely spiritual activity, that external acts of religion

⁵ Cfr. C. Gutberlet, *Apologetik*, Vol. I, 4th ed., Münster i. W., 1914, p. 36.

⁶ Cfr. O. Pfleiderer, *op. cit.*, pp. 224 sqq.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 300 sqq.

⁸ On this topic the student may consult: J. Zahn, *Einführung in*

invariably combine with interior acts as their complement and visible manifestation.

This statement can be proved, (1) from the nature of the interior acts of religion, (2) from man's dependence upon God both as to body and soul, and (3) from the fact that man is destined by His Creator to live in society.

1. Since the nature of man is both material and spiritual, his interior acts of religion cannot fully develop without manifesting themselves outwardly. This full development is demanded by the nature of religion, which involves a complete surrender of man to God, and therefore, external religious acts must be combined with internal.⁹

That interior acts of religion require external acts for their full development can be demonstrated by a twofold argument.

a) On account of the intimate mutual relation between body and soul, the spiritual acts

die christliche Mystik, 2nd ed., Paderborn, 1918; E. Krebs, *Grundfragen der kirchlichen Mystik*, Freiburg, 1921; M. Grabmann, *Wesen und Grundlagen der katholischen Mystik*, Munich, 1922; W. Müller-Reif, *Zur Psychologie der mystischen Persönlichkeit*, Berlin, 1921; O. Söhngen, *Das mystische Erlebnis in Plotins Weltanschauung*, Leipsic, 1923; G. M. Sauvage, in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. X, pp. 663 sqq.; J. Howley, *Psychology and Mystical Experience*, London, 1920.

⁹ St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 7; *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, c. 119.

of divine worship, when they take a strong hold on man, naturally manifest themselves externally and sensibly, thus constituting what is called *external cult*. The religious thought, the subjection of the will to God, the religious emotion, are garbed in words and deeds, that is to say, they manifest themselves in oral prayer, the folding of the hands, the chanting of religious hymns, a devout attitude of the body, the bending of the knees, the bowing of the head, and, above all, in the offering of sacrifice, which is the most pregnant symbol of man's consecration of his person and service to God.

b) External worship reacts inspirationally on, and strengthens, the internal disposition. It is natural for man, whose intellectual activity begins with sense perception, to ascend from the sensible, especially from the knowledge gained by the external senses, to the spiritual sphere. We can see this exemplified in the elevating effect of common devotions and prayers and the enthusiasm aroused by religious meetings and processions.

2. Our second argument is based on man's dependence upon God both as to body and soul.

Man's religious acts must reflect his dependence upon His Creator; now, man depends

upon God both as to body and soul; therefore, his religious acts must be acts of the body as well as of the soul, *i. e.*, they must be external as well as internal.¹⁰

If, as we have seen, the dependence of the whole man upon God is the foundation of religion, external bodily acts of worship cannot be regarded as non-essential. When man acknowledges the Divine Majesty reverently and submissively, and admits his own weakness in acts of prayer and sacrifice, the body, which forms one nature with the soul, must participate in this worship in its own peculiar way, that is to say, as inspired and animated by the intellect. For every act of religion, whether it be internal or external, is by nature a vital manifestation of reason and free will. God wishes to be adored "in spirit and in truth."

3. Our third argument is derived from the fact that man is a social being, destined by His Creator to live in the company of others.

Man, we say, by his very nature, is not merely an individual, but also a social being, destined to dwell with others of his kind, and consequently he must practice religion also as a member of society. Now, the social exercise of re-

¹⁰ St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, 1a 2ae, qu. 101, art. 2.

ligion is possible only by means of external acts. Therefore, man is in duty bound to manifest his religious convictions by external acts.

Man has a strong natural tendency to live together with his fellowmen, *i. e.*, in society. It is only in society, in company with others of his kind, that his powers, faculties, and aptitudes reach their full development, and, conversely, every individual, as a part of the social whole, contributes his share to the well-being of society. Man would become stunted in body and soul if he were compelled to spend his entire life in solitude. This general truth applies first of all when there is question of performing the more important tasks of life, chief among which is undoubtedly the practice of religion. Hence man's social nature and tendency must be taken into due consideration in the religious sphere. He is bound to live according to the dictates of his religion, and must do so in harmony with his social nature, *i. e.*, as a member of society. In other words, divine worship is not limited to the individual, but is a duty of society, which, as a moral person, must acknowledge God as the Author and last end of man.¹¹

¹¹ Cfr. Leo XIII in his encyclical letter "*Immortale Dei*," Nov. 1, 1885: "*Natura et ratio, quae iubet singulos sancte religioseque Deum colere, quod in eius potestate sumus, et quod ab eo profecti*

Now, there can be no social worship of God except through the instrumentality of palpable, external acts. For it is only through such acts that a number of individuals can unite in paying external homage to the Deity. The purely interior acts of the individual remain hidden to his fellowmen and consequently cannot influence their religious thought or conduct, nor can they be controlled by authority and directed to a common end.

External acts of religion, therefore, are necessary if divine worship is to correspond adequately to human nature and its necessities. But in its external manifestations, religion must not be detached from knowledge and emotion, lest it resemble a shell without a kernel and justify the contention of those who reject all religious

ad eundem reverti debemus, eadem lege adstringit civilem communitatem. Homines enim communi societate coniuncti nihilo sunt minus in Dei potestate, quam singuli: neque minorem, quam singuli, gratiam Deo societas debet, quo auctore coaluit, cuius nutu conservatur, cuius beneficio innumerabilem bonorum quibus affluit, copiam accepit." ("Nature and reason, which command every individual devoutly to worship God in holiness, because we belong to Him and must return to Him, since from Him we came, bind also the civil community by a like law. For men living together in society are under the power of God no less than individuals are, and society, not less than individuals, owes gratitude to God, who gave it being and maintains it, and whose ever-bounteous goodness enriches it with countless blessings." (*The Pope and the People*, London, 1912, p. 75).

ceremonies as empty gestures savoring of Pharisaism.

READINGS

Besides the works cited in the footnotes and at the end of the preceding chapters the student may with profit consult the following:

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CHAS. F. AIKEN in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XII, p. 746.

PART II
RELIGION IN THE LIFE OF
NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In the first part of this treatise we have explained wherein the essence of religion consists and what man must do in view of his objective relation towards God. This natural religion, as it is called, constitutes the foundation of supernatural revelation. In order to show to what extent natural religion, as such, actually exists as a basis of supernatural revelation, we shall now examine (1) the universality of religion and (2) its origin and development.

CHAPTER I

THE UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION

§ I. THE UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION AS A FACT

The nature of religion would lead us to expect that it should exercise a controlling and governing influence upon all men. We find this to be the case. Religion has always been the most important factor in the life of nations and in the development of the whole human race. For this reason belief in God and religious convictions exist everywhere, not merely as potential dispositions and the logical preambles of supernatural revelation, but likewise as its real and objective foundation. Moreover, as we shall see presently, the universality of religion is a proof of its objective truth.

However, since religion has its source in free-will, and religious activity in general as well as its perfection depend on the unhampered self-determination of that faculty, the universality of religion (a) must not be understood in the physical sense, *i. e.*, as if it admitted no excep-

tion, but only in the moral sense, and (b) we must not expect to find too much perfection in the different natural religions. A nation must be admitted to be religious if the essentials of religion can be traced in its beliefs and customs. Religion exists wherever men are convinced of the existence of a supernatural Being which governs their destinies and to which they owe submission.

Religion is found among all nations and in all ages.

1. *Religion existed among men as far back as historical records reach.*—According to CICERO (d. 43 B. C.), there is no nation or tribe so uncultured that it does not acknowledge some sort of a deity,¹ and belief in God is inborn in all men, engraved upon their very souls, as it were.² SENECA (d. 38 A. D.) asserts that there is no nation so completely beyond the reach of law and morality that it does not believe in gods of some sort.³ PLUTARCH agrees with him. "If

¹ *De Leg.*, I, c. 24: "*In hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immansueta neque tam fera, quae non etiamsi ignoret, qualem habere deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat.*"

² *De Nat. Deorum*, II, c. 4 sq.: "*Inter omnes omnium gentium summa constat: omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos. Quales sint, varium est, esse nemo negat.*"

³ *Ep.*, 117: "*Omnibus de diis opinio insita est, nec ulla gens unquam est adeo extra leges moresque posita, ut non aliquos deos credat.*"

you travel from country to country," he says in a famous passage, "you may find cities without walls, without sciences and arts, without kings and palaces, without riches; cities where money is unknown or not in use; cities without public buildings and theatres; but no one has ever seen, and no one will ever see, a city without temples, gods, prayers, oaths, and oracles; a city which does not seek by means of sacrifices and religious festivals to obtain favors and to avert evils." ⁴ ARTIMIDOR (about 200 A. D.) expresses the opinion that "there is no nation without a god." ⁵ In the much earlier poems of HOMER we meet with the statement that "all men have an inborn yearning for the gods." ⁶

2. The leading modern representatives of anthropology, ethnology, and comparative religion,—men like Waitz, Peschl, Gerland, F. Max Müller, von Strauss-Torney, Quatrefages, Tylor, Tiele, and Ratzel,—agree that *there is no nation entirely without religion*. For the sake of brevity we shall quote only RATZEL. "Ethnography," says this eminent authority, "knows no peoples entirely without religion, but only an unequal development of religious ideas,

⁴ *Adv. Coloten.*, 31.

⁵ *Oneirocr.*, I, c. 8.

⁶ *Odyssey*, III, 48.

which with some nations remained in the germ, or, more correctly, in the pupillary stage, small and unimpressive, whereas with others it has developed a wealth of myths and legends.”⁷

We shall illustrate this proposition by a survey of the various existing religions, which will show that there has never been a nation entirely without religion, but that, on the contrary, the character and development of the religious beliefs held by various nations indicate that, in point of religion, the human race stood higher in the beginning than in later ages.

Some Objections Refuted

Against our thesis that religion is universal the following objections have been raised:

1. The ancient testimonies cited are neutralized by others which deny the universality of religion on the ground that there have been infidel nations as well as individual unbelievers. The existence of nations without any religious beliefs whatever is attested, for instance, by CARNEADES OF CYRENE (d. 130 B. C.)⁸ and by PONTIFEX COTTA,⁹ a contemporary of Cicero.

⁷ *Völkerkunde*, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Leipsic, 1894, p. 37.

⁸ Cfr. E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, Vol. III, Pt. 1, 5th ed., Leipsic, 1923, pp. 505 sqq.

⁹ Cfr. Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, I, 23, 62.

Of individual atheists we need only mention DIAGORAS the Sophist,¹⁰ and THEODORE OF CYRENE.¹¹

2. Even at the present time, we are told by such writers as Sir JOHN LUBBOCK¹² and LUDWIG BÜCHNER,¹³ there are nations that have no idea of God or religion, as is attested by many travelers and missionaries.

3. Others point to the 500 million human beings who profess Buddhism, which is essentially atheistic. If one-third of the human race is without religious convictions, they say, religion cannot be universal.

4. Finally, it is said, we must reckon with the notorious fact that all civilized countries at the present time are badly infested with atheism.

We answer:

1. No weight is to be attached to those ancient writers who assert the existence of godless nations, for none such are named, and the testimonies in question are merely the expression of subjective opinion or conjecture.¹⁴ As regards

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, I, 23, 63.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Pre-Historic Times*, 6th ed., London, 1900, pp. 551 sqq.

¹³ *Kraft und Stoff*, 21st ed., Leipsic, 1904, pp. 379 sq.

¹⁴ For instance, Cotta's: "*Equidem arbitror, multas esse gentes . . .*" (Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, I, 23, 62).

Diagoras and Theodore of Cyrene, their atheistic professions do not disprove or weaken our thesis, because we assert the moral, not the physical universality of religion.

2. The list of godless nations drawn up by Sir John Lubbock and others has dwindled to nothing in the light of recent investigations. *Not a single nation has been found that does not possess at least some primitive form of religious belief.* The earlier assumption that godless nations actually existed, was the result of inadequate observation, wrong presuppositions, one-sided judgments, and unfounded assertions on the part of writers who were not properly equipped for this kind of work or went at it with the set purpose of discrediting religion. Some travelers based their conclusions as to the absence of religion among this or that tribe on casual observation, impeded, moreover, by ignorance of the native languages. The worthlessness of their conclusions has been established by more adequately equipped and keener students, who sometimes discovered the existence of religion only after years of careful observation in a tribe which they themselves had at first regarded as godless.

Prejudice, too, has contributed its share to the erroneous notions that have been current on

this subject, and has made it very difficult in some cases to form a correct estimate of religious beliefs and usages. The champions of materialistic evolution never for a moment doubted that religion was impossible among peoples in a low state of civilization, and hailed with pleasure every report that seemed to favor this opinion, ignoring those which could not easily be reconciled with their assumption.

The well-nigh insuperable disinclination of many savages to talk about their religious opinions and customs,—either because they fear to see them derided or profaned, or because some positive law forbids them to reveal the names of their deities or the nature of their worship,—makes it difficult to interpret their religious beliefs correctly. Moreover, uncivilized peoples usually have an imperfectly developed religious consciousness, which renders it difficult for the individual to answer questions that may be put to him in regard to his beliefs. Hence it is not strange that many of their religious beliefs were concealed and others purposely misrepresented.

Finally, it should be noted that in judging religious phenomena and conditions many scholars employed criteria which inevitably led them astray. If a language lacked a word, for instance, it was forthwith concluded that the peo-

ple who spoke it lacked the corresponding concept. Where no equivalent was found for such terms as "God" and "religion," it was assumed that the respective ideas were wanting. The unreliability of this method could be shown by many examples.¹⁵ It was equally unscientific to employ the refined religious concepts of highly cultured nations as a standard for gauging the beliefs and practices of uncivilized tribes and thereby to stamp primitive ideas and customs as superstitions or the product of sorcery or fear of ghosts. Quatrefages pointed out the right way when he wrote: "However simple and incomplete, however naïve and childish, however absurd it may be, a belief should not lose its character in his [the anthropologist's] eyes, if it has any connection with that element which is common and essential to all religions."¹⁶

Keeping in mind the errors that have been made in investigating the religious beliefs and practices of uncivilized tribes, we find it easy to understand why so many nations were looked upon as godless by a certain class of writers, whereas the real authorities on ethnology and

¹⁵ Cfr. G. Roskoff, *Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*, Leipsic, 1880, p. 10.

¹⁶ A. de Quatrefages, *The Human Species*, International Scientific Series, New York, 1879, p. 483.

comparative religion knew nothing of this alleged deficiency.¹⁷

3. Regarding *Buddhism*, the number of its adherents has been greatly exaggerated. It is not permissible to count the followers of Confucius and the Taôists of China among the Buddhists.¹⁸ We must also take into consideration the fact that the population of China has been considerably over-estimated.¹⁹ In the light of more recent and seemingly reliable statistics the total number of Buddhists amounts, not to 500,000,000, but to something like 120,000,000, and even these 120,000,000 do not constitute a clearly defined religious body with uniform

¹⁷ W. Schneider, *Die Naturvölker*, Vol. II, Paderborn, 1886, pp. 347 sqq., gives the scientific proofs for the above assertion. Cfr. the same author's work, *Die Religion der afrikanischen Naturvölker*, Münster i. W., 1891, pp. 2 sqq.; G. Roskoff, *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*); Msgr. A. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, tr. by N. Thompson, New York, 1922, pp. 238 sqq.—Important work in investigating the religion of the primitive races has been done of late years by P. Wm. Schmidt, S.V.D., who has published a number of books on the subject and created an organ for the publication of research work in the quarterly ethnologic and linguistic review *Anthropos*, which he established in 1906 and edited until 1925. In 1926 Dr. Schmidt was appointed by the Holy Father director of the new Lateran Museum for Missionary Science and Ethnology in Rome.

¹⁸ Cfr. E. Hardy, *Der Buddhismus*, new ed., Münster i. W., 1919, pp. 4 sq.; W. S. Lilly, *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*, London, 1885, p. 104.

¹⁹ *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, Vol. 65 (1903), p. 204.

doctrines and usages.²⁰ Wherever Buddhism had gained a foothold, as in Ceylon, Tibet, China, and Japan, it has accommodated itself to the existing religious beliefs of the people. While it is true that Buddhism was originally atheistic, it is equally true that, in view of man's natural need of God and religion, this sect was not able to preserve its primitive character. Belief in God always reasserted itself, even though only in an imperfect, polytheistic form. The great mass of the common people returned to their primitive belief in the life beyond, regarded Nirvâna as a paradise of delight, and worshipped Buddha as the supreme lord of heaven.²¹ Thus in the minds of most of its adherents Buddhism is no longer an atheistic system and cannot, therefore, be cited as an argument against the universality of religion.

4. Nor is our thesis disproved by the fact that atheism is rampant in the Occident. Positive

²⁰ Cfr. L. de la Vallée Poussin in *Lectures on the History of Religions* (C.T.S.), London, 1910, Vol. I, "Buddhism."

²¹ O. Wecker, *Christlicher Einfluss auf den Buddhismus*, in the *Theologische Quartalschrift*, Tübingen, 1910, pp. 444 sqq.; Chas. F. Aiken in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. III, pp. 28 sqq.; IDEM, *The Dhamma of Gotama the Buddha and the Gospel of Jesus the Christ*, Boston, 1900; W. S. Lilly, *op. cit.* (note 18), pp. 36 sqq.; E. R. Hull, S.J., *Archaic Religions*, Bombay, 1913, pp. 139 sqq.; P. Sinthern, S.J., *Buddhismus und Buddhistische Strömungen in der Gegenwart*, Münster i. W., 1905.

unbelief is confined to a few and has by no means penetrated the masses. It flourishes for the most part among the young and immature, whose vision is blurred by passion and moral aberrations.²² Most of them adopt saner ideas as they grow older and learn from experience.

²² Cfr. F. Paulsen, *System der Ethik*, Vol. I, 9th ed., Berlin, 1913, p. 424; Esser-Mausbach, *Religion, Christentum, Kirche*, Vol. I, 5th ed., Kempten, 1923, pp. 68 sqq.—Kneller (*Christianity and the Leaders of Modern Science*, Engl. tr. by Kettle, p. 394) observes: "Lichtenberg says somewhere that in society he often professed to be an atheist, *exercitii gratia*. Sebastian Brunner, a man of great insight and experience,—relates that while in his youth he was wont to scoff at those of his comrades who were openly pious, he none the less never failed to say the prayers 'in his little prayer-book,' morning and evening, and he adds that on enquiry he found this to be a very common 'psychological phenomenon.' (G. Lichtenberg's *Vermischte Schriften*, Vol. I, Göttingen, 1867, 15; S. Brunner, *Woher und Wohin?* III, 94). If this was the case in Brunner's day, still more is it so in ours; unbelief is the ruling fashion, and to confess one's faith in Jesus Christ and His Church is to ensure bitter criticism and contempt. It needs courage to stand out against so strong a current of opinion. But in spite of this 'psychological phenomenon,' it is a fact as firmly established as any observation of science, that mankind in general has ever been on the side of belief, and that religion has its root deep in the core of the human heart. The mass of humanity gives way readily to superstition, but not to scepticism. The Cagliostros, Saint-Germains, and Mesmers of the 18th century, the table-turners and spiritists of the 19th are a conclusive proof of this. Man is naturally religious in mind and heart; and the blatant unbelief of the newspapers and the popularizers springs from no profound and ingrained conviction. A great part of it, at least, must be regarded as a mere current fashion, a phenomenon not of philosophy, but of 'good tone.'" On the possibility of atheism see Pohle-Preuss, *God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes*, pp. 49 sqq., with bibliography.

Convinced atheists are rare exceptions and serve but to confirm the rule that all men are by nature religious.

§ II. THE UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION AS A PROOF OF ITS OBJECTIVE TRUTH

For a really conclusive argument in favor of the objective truth of religion we must turn to philosophy, which demonstrates beyond doubt that God exists and that man is dependent upon Him as the creature upon its Creator.²³ We presuppose this demonstration here and shall merely attempt to show how it is confirmed by the fact that religion is found among all the nations of the earth.

The universality of religion proves that religious thought and practice have a basis of objective truth.

Although men had every reason for trying to escape the duties imposed on them by religion, they have acknowledged those duties theoretically and practically in every age. Such a universal acknowledgment, under such circumstances, would not be possible unless reli-

²³ Jos. Hontheim, S.J., *Theodicea*, Freiburg, 1926, pp. 282 sqq.; G. H. Joyce, S.J., *Principles of Natural Theology*, London, 1923, pp. 439 sqq.

gion were based on objective truth; therefore, the religious thought and practice of mankind is based upon objective truth.

We regard the universality of religion as a proof of its objective truth, not only because men have always and everywhere believed in the existence of higher beings, to whom they owed submission, but also and above all things for the reason that religion retained its universal dominion in spite of the onerous duties which it imposed, and in spite of man's keen desire to evade these duties.

Per se the universality of an opinion or of a conviction does not guarantee its truth. For many centuries men believed that the sun moved around the earth, and yet we know to-day that this is not so. The circumstances under which a belief or an opinion gained universal credence must be taken into consideration. These circumstances in the present case justify us in regarding the universality of religion as a proof of its objective truth. Religion with its influence permeates all conditions of life, and it could not have held its own if the notion of God had not irresistibly forced itself upon the mind and compelled man to acknowledge the existence of a supernatural Being which completely dominates him and leads him to perfection. The thought

that this was a most important question, upon the correct solution of which depended the lasting welfare of the individual as well as of society at large, must have been a constant incentive for the human mind to examine the objective basis of religion and its claims to acceptance. Had the postulates of religion proved to be unfounded, most assuredly belief in God and divine worship would have long since perished from the earth. The constant and universal persistence of religion amid the most untoward surroundings is an irrefutable proof that it has a solid basis of objective truth and that to deny this would be contrary to reason and human nature.²⁴

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²⁴ Cfr. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 302 sqq.

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CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

§ I. MISTAKEN ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

That religion has always been regarded as a highly important factor in human life is a fact which cannot be denied. The atheistic world-view and the theory of materialistic evolution are incompatible with this universal conviction of mankind. As a consequence, atheists and materialists are eager to demonstrate the falsity and worthlessness of religion. Their efforts are first of all directed towards the destruction of the natural, as the foundation of revealed, religion. They try to show that the religious life of mankind is not based on nature and man's dependence upon God, but owes its existence to arbitrary invention and weakness.

The various attempts that have been made to claim a purely natural origin for religion may be divided into four groups. (1) Some hold that

religion is a human invention. (2) Others trace it to self-deception. (3) Others again regard it as a mere sentiment, and (4) a fourth group believes to have discovered the ultimate source of religious phenomena in animal instinct.¹ A careful analysis of these theories will show their falsity and thus in a negative way confirm the objective truth of religion.

1. *Religion Not a Human Invention*

Those who hold that religion is a human invention may be divided into two groups. The first of these groups asserts that religion was the invention of a few deceivers, who imposed it by fraud upon the masses, while the second maintains that it was introduced by the common consent of all.

¹ Some of the theories concerning the origin of religion with which we deal here, are no longer held by scientific ethnologists; yet they cannot be ignored because "nearly all psychological theories concerning the nature of religion which have been excogitated since man began to reflect, still have living, scientifically trained defenders,—beginning with the robust but sterile interpretation of religion as the product of sacerdotal deception and pathological degeneracy up to the most highly sublimated and spiritualized theories, which in their profundity can be appreciated only by those conversant with philosophical speculation." (K. Girgensohn, *Der seelische Aufbau des religiösen Erlebens*, Leipsic, 1921, p. 3).

We maintain that religion was not introduced by fraud and intentional deception on the part of priests and lawgivers.

The theory that priests and lawgivers invented religion is as old as the hills, but it did not become popular until the so-called era of enlightenment, when VOLTAIRE and other rabidly anti-Christian writers based their claims on the ancient legislative codes with their largely religious content and on the close connection that existed between religion and civil government among the nations of antiquity. Legislators and priests, they contended, introduced religion for their own advantage and for the benefit of the commonwealth. "*Is fecit, cui prodest.*"

That religion, in ancient as well as in modern times, has frequently been made to serve the purposes of State polity, and that unscrupulous priests and rulers sometimes deceived the masses for selfish motives (as we read, *e. g.*, in the Book of Daniel) cannot be denied; but this was merely an abuse of something that already existed, and hence no conclusions can be drawn therefrom as to the origin of religion.

a) If religion had originated in the manner alleged by Voltaire, it ought to be possible to ascertain when and where it was invented. But this

is impossible. On the contrary, no matter how far back we go, we always meet with religious opinions and practices. All the known founders of religions took up the beliefs and customs which existed among the people and altered them, thus substituting a new religion for an old one.

b) The argument adduced by our opponents merely proves that religion was held in high honor by the ancients and that religious needs are more deeply rooted in human nature than political considerations. It also furnishes welcome testimony to the great importance attributed to religion by the rulers and statesmen of the early days.² But it does *not* prove that religion was invented by priests or law-givers.

c) Voltaire's theory is psychologically impossible. How could a nation have been persuaded by designing and selfish leaders to believe in the existence of superhuman beings and to impose upon itself the most burdensome sacrifices and obligations, not for a decade or a generation, but for centuries? How could the

² Cfr. W. Schneider, *Göttliche Weltordnung*, 2nd ed., Paderborn, 1909, pp. 367 sqq.; F. J. Mach, *Notwendigkeit der Offenbarung Gottes*, Mayence, 1883, p. 104; P. von Schanz, *Apologie des Christentums*, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 109.

whole of humanity at all times and everywhere have been induced to shoulder the most onerous duties without inquiring into their objective validity and discovering the intended deception? This would be conceivable only on the assumption that error and lack of solid argument appeal more strongly to the minds of men than the truth with all its convincing demonstrations.

Religion was not introduced as the result of a common agreement among men.

a) The assertion of HOBBS and ROUSSEAU that religion was introduced as the result of a common agreement among men, is based upon the *arbitrary assumption* that the human race originally had no religious beliefs whatever. In spite of many and strenuous efforts it has not been possible to establish the existence, either in the past or present, of any nation entirely destitute of religious beliefs and practices.

b) If it were a historical fact that religion was introduced among men as the result of a common agreement, it ought to be possible to show when and where this agreement was made. But no one has ever been able to do so.

c) If religion had originated in the manner described by Hobbes and Rousseau, it would be

impossible to understand how it could have held its own up to the present day. The readiness of men to assume a multitude of burdensome obligations for the sake of an imaginary higher order simply cannot be explained, and it remains an unsolved riddle why this common agreement, regarding which no one knows how, when, and where it was entered into, has not been abrogated long since, for men are usually quick to abolish burdensome contracts whose juridical basis is doubtful.

2. Religion Not the Result of Self-Deception

Religion is alleged to be the result of self-deception either on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will.

*A. Religion Not a Result of Self-Deception
on the Part of the Intellect*

Those who ascribe the origin of religion to an error of the intellect, unanimously assert that religion is the result of a crude and faulty manner of thinking, due to a defective development of reason, and conclude that it can be tolerated only so long as man is unable to discern the truth from falsehood.

When it comes to specifying the reasons for

this alleged error of the intellect, our opponents are very much at variance. The principal reasons alleged by them are: fear, an unbridled imagination, and a false interpretation of the data of moral consciousness.

a) The opinion that *fear is the mother of religion* may be traced to such ancient writers as EPICURUS (d. 271 B. C.), LUCRETIUS (d. 55 B. C.), PETRONIUS (d. 67 A. D.),³ and STATIUS (d. 96 A. D.). Among its modern champions DAVID HUME⁴ and DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS⁵ are the most prominent.

If religion is a product of *fear*, how did men get religion? Terrifying natural phenomena and strokes of misfortune, say the defenders of this theory, aroused fear in the childish mind of primitive man. He found himself helplessly facing thunder and lightning, the waves of the sea and the ravages of epidemics. Storms and earthquakes filled him with terror. As the causes of these phenomena were unknown to him, and he was naturally inclined to conceive the powers of nature after the analogy of his own, he con-

³ The fragments preserved to us from the writings of Petronius contain the following verse:

*"Primus in orbe deos fecit timor, ardua caelo
Fulmina dum caderent."*

⁴ *Natural History of Religion*, Section II (Works, Vol. IV).

⁵ *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, 15th ed., Leipsic, 1903.

cluded that all the phenomena which inspired him with dread were traceable to higher beings resembling man. Though these beings caused damage, they did not seem to be entirely malevolent, since nature offers many blessings, and hence men had reason to believe that they could conciliate these powers by submissiveness, gifts, petitions, and sacrifices. This belief, we are assured, gave rise to the crude forms of primitive worship.

b) If this theory were well-founded, the existing religions would have to show at least some traces of their origin. This applies especially to the most ancient religions of mankind and the lowest forms of nature-worship among the primitives of the present time, since they are as near to the origin of religious development as it is possible for us to get. Now, we can nowhere discover phenomena which might serve as a connecting link between religion and fear. The gods of the Vedas of ancient India, those of the Egyptian papyri, and those of the Persians and Chinese, all stand high above nature and appear primarily as protectors and governors of the moral order.

The sentiment of fear, it is true, plays a certain rôle in the oldest religions of pagan antiquity and in the writings of the Old and the

New Testament; but it is a noble fear, transformed into reverence, a fear inspiring dread of divine retribution, and hence not the cause, but an effect, of religious convictions. The question how the latter originated cannot be answered by ascribing them to the former.

Among barbarous tribes that live in a state of abject intellectual degradation, the deity is almost always regarded as a being inspiring fear, one that makes man feel his impotence amid the destructive phenomena of nature. But even here there has usually been preserved a memory of the fact that mankind formerly stood in a more satisfactory relation towards the deity. Besides, fear among these tribes is not the cause, but the effect of an already existing religious belief. No causal relation can be shown to exist between fear and the origin of natural religion.

c) If fear of the humanly conceived forces of nature had inspired religion, the cultured portion of humanity at least would long since have given up religious faith and practice. As man becomes more familiar with nature, its laws and their mode of operation, he loses his fear of natural phenomena. If the religious beliefs of humanity rested on no other basis than fear, faith would disappear simultaneously with

fear. That faith continues to flourish with unbroken power in the life of highly cultured nations, is an additional argument against the hypothesis here under examination.

If that hypothesis were true, the scientists who devote their lives to the investigation of natural phenomena and their causes would of necessity become estranged from religion, whereas precisely the contrary is the case. Father K. A. Kneller, S.J.,⁶ has shown that of the men who have done most during the nineteenth century to enlarge our acquaintance with the forces of nature, nearly all have been believers in religion. More than two hundred of them were convinced Christians. These two hundred experts represent all branches of

⁶ K. A. Kneller, S.J., *Christianity and the Leaders of Modern Science; a Contribution to the History of Culture in the Nineteenth Century*, tr. by T. M. Kettle, Freiburg and St. Louis, 1911. Fr. T. A. Findlay, S.J., says in his introduction to the English edition of this excellent work (p. vii): "It stands to the credit of the founders of modern science—the master minds of the 17th and 18th centuries—that they had a salutary sense of the limitations of empirical methods. Their discoveries, which opened the way to all subsequent progress, did not interfere with their faith in God, or their belief in the spirituality and immortality of the human soul. If anything, their reverence for the Mind that reveals itself in Nature grew more profound as their knowledge of natural phenomena became deeper. The more enlightened of their successors in the 19th century have upheld their conception of Nature's God, and of man's place in Nature." See also Jules Riche, *Les Savants sont-ils des Croyants?* Paris, 1926.

science, from astronomy to zoölogy, and their example shows that Bacon was right when he said that, while slight draughts of knowledge may lead a man to atheism, a deeper insight into the forces of nature will make him profoundly religious.⁷

Those scientists who are opposed to religion have allowed themselves to be carried away by a false philosophy, without taking the time and trouble to subject its assertions and claims to a careful examination. This fact may seem surprising, but it is easily explained. The ability to engage in philosophical speculation gradually diminishes in proportion as the mind occupies itself exclusively with matter and its quantitatively determinable laws; all the more so if the amount of intellectual energy of which a man disposes is not large. The smaller it is, the more he must concentrate in one direction, and the sharper his intellect grows within a certain sphere, the narrower becomes his vision and the less his ability to judge of matters outside of that particular sphere. Thus many a scientist gradually loses interest in, and the ability to

⁷ "*Leves gustus philosophiae movere fortasse ad atheismum, sed pleniores haustus ad religionem reducere.*" (*De Dign. et Augment. Scientiae*, l. I, n. 30). Lord Kelvin (Sir William Thomson) expressed himself in a similar manner.

study, religious problems. This also explains the curious phenomenon that, as Fr. Kneller notes, the greater minds of science have ever shown warmer friendship and reverence for religion than the lesser, and that it is precisely the most distinguished scientists who remain loyal to the faith.⁸ From this point of view we can understand what the late Bishop Haffner meant when he said in his book on "Materialism in the History of Civilization": "The human mind with its inventions resembles an animal tamer, who is imprisoned by the beasts which he himself has subdued. His command over matter has intoxicated him, and in this state of intoxication he begins to adore what he had laid at his feet. At the moment when he is able to exercise greater power over material nature than ever before, he seems to be more completely than ever under the control of nature. The more fully man develops the supersensitive power of the intellect and the superterrestrial energy of the will, the more he seems to forget these sublime powers which he unfolds."⁹

⁸ Kneller, *l. c.*, p. 391 sqq. Cfr. E. Dennert, *Die Religion der Naturforscher*, 7th ed., Berlin, 1908; IDEM, *Weltanschauung des modernen Naturforschers*, 2nd ed., Halle, 1911; H. Pesch, S.J., *Die soziale Befähigung der Kirche*, Berlin, 1911, pp. 46 sq.

⁹ *Der Materialismus in der Kulturgeschichte*, Mayence, 1865, pp. 10, 276 sqq. (quoted by Pesch, *l. c.*); cfr. F. Paulsen, *System der*

d) Nevertheless, there are some elements of truth in the theory under consideration.

α) Man's helplessness in the face of nature may have furnished many with an opportunity to meditate on themselves and the things which surround them, and to seek for the true causes of natural phenomena. Thus fear may have led man to form the idea of a super-human, powerful being that created and governs both him and nature, and can protect and aid him in adversity and danger. In that case, of course, the concept of deity is not produced by fear, but fear and terror constitute the extrinsic motive or occasion of inquiring into the conviction of the existence of God and thus arriving at a reverential acknowledgment of Him.

β) Fear may have led man to the conscientious performance of his religious duties and thereby induced the renewal and perfection of the religious life already existing in his soul.

γ) Finally, fear, and the mental disposition of man in general, may have contributed its share towards impressing upon some religions

Ethik, Vol. I, 6th ed., 1903, pp. 438 sq.; M. Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, Vol. I, Leipsic, 1921, pp. 514 sqq. With many, of course, the chief reason for refusing to accept the true faith is ethical. Faith is a grace which a person can lose through his own fault.

their peculiar character. The final causes in such cases would have been mainly: *natural environment* and *climate*. This may largely explain the sadness and melancholia peculiar to the religions of the North and the more joyful character of the Greek religion. But it would be a mistake to generalize, since the native tribes of Mexico, in spite of perpetual sunshine, developed a hideous and bloody cult, of which human sacrifices formed a prominent feature.¹⁰

¹⁰ O. Peschel, *Völkerkunde*, 7th ed., Leipsic, 1897, p. 328.—C. Crivelli, S.J., in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. X, p. 251, *s. v.* "Mexico," says: "The religion of all these nations [the aborigines of Mexico] was a monstrous polytheism. Human sacrifice was a feature of the worship of nearly all the tribes, but in none did it assume the gigantic proportions that it did among the Aztecs in their great teocalli, or temple, at the capital. Father Motolinia in his letter of 2 January, 1553, to the Emperor Charles V, speaking of the human sacrifices with which the Emperor Ahuitzotl (1486-1502) celebrated the opening of the great temple in Mexico, says: 'In a sacrificial service lasting three or four days 80,400 men were sacrificed. They were brought through four streets walking single file until they reached the idols.' Father Durán, speaking of this same sacrifice and of the great number of victims, adds: 'Which to me seemed so incredible, that, if history and the fact that I found it recorded in many places outside of history, both in writing and pictorially represented, did not compel me to believe it, I should not dare to assert it.' The Vatican and Tellerian manuscripts give the number of victims as 20,000; this number seems more probable. . . . Father Mendieta, as well as Father Motolinia and other authorities, agree in affirming that the number of victims annually sacrificed to Huitzilopozotli and other Aztec deities reached the number of 15,000 to 20,000."

Religion is not a figment of the imagination and consequently did not originate in Fetishism, Animism, or magic.

Man loves to idealize and to personify inanimate objects. Imagination is a means of transmuting the all too harsh reality and of peopling the world with fantastic figures. This faculty is strongest in childhood, when reason has not yet acquired full control over the senses and the imagination. "The child attributes the life with which he is animated to his environment; he endows all the objects by which he is surrounded with a personality resembling his own. The child knows no dead or lifeless objects; he regards the world as peopled by living beings, with whom he quarrels and chats, at whom he grows angry, whom he loves and fondles."¹¹ In a similar manner, according to TYLOR, SPENCER, LIPPERT, SABATIER, KING, and others, we must conceive the childhood of the human race as a time when man had scarcely yet crossed the threshold of instinctive life. It is here that these savants believe to have discovered the fountain-head of religious consciousness. As to the development of this consciousness, they do not agree, but propose various theories, known, respectively, as

¹¹ A. Sabatier, *Philosophie de la Religion*, p. 95.

Animism, Manism, Fetishism, and Magism.

The most comprehensive of these theories is *Animism*, which comprises Manism and Fetishism, and has been most fully developed by TYLOR.¹² According to this theory, certain striking biological phenomena, such as the opposition existing between sleep and the waking state, trances, dreams, and visions, led to the formation of the idea of a soul. Hand in hand with this notion went a belief in the survival of the soul after death and the transmigration of souls from body to body. In course of time the qualities of the human soul were transferred to other beings, and the universe was conceived as animated by a sort of over-soul (Animism). The cult of deceased ancestors (Manism) further led to the formation of the concept of a pure spirit, which was believed to reside either in material objects (Fetishism) or to enter into relations with nature, its objects and processes (Nature Worship). This, it is asserted, was the origin of the higher forms of Polytheism and the worship of a god of heaven, or of the storm, or of the rain. The ultimate product of this

¹² E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, London, 1863, and later editions; a brief statement of the theory in Th. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, pp. 47-67; Windle, *Religions Past and Present*, pp. 109 sqq.

evolution was Monotheism in a more or less pure form.

While Tylor traces the beginnings of religion to the spirits which animate nature—hence the term *Animism*—HERBERT SPENCER¹³ finds the origin of religion in man's cult of his ancestors (*Manism*). The spirits of primitive religion are not merely formed according to the type of the human soul, but they are true human souls.¹⁴ This view is at bottom merely a revival of ancient *Euhemerism*, *i. e.*, the theory that the gods and kings of mythology were deified mortals and their deeds nothing more than the amplification of human acts by the imagination.

Fetishism is intimately related to the two theories we have just mentioned. It means the

¹³ *The Principles of Sociology*, 3 vols., London, 1900.

¹⁴ A. Borchert, *Der Animismus*, Freiburg, 1900, p. 3; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1926, pp. 18 sqq.; B. C. A. Windle, *Religions Past and Present*, N. Y., 1927, pp. 109 sqq. J. T. Driscoll in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, pp. 526-530, says: "Spencer's theory is known as 'the Ghost-theory of Religion' and at the present time is generally discredited even by evolutionists. With Tylor the worship of the dead is an important subdivision of Animism; with Spencer it is the one and all of religion. Lippert consistently carries out the theory of Spencer and, instead of Animism, uses the word *Seelenkult*. De la Saussaye says that Lippert pushes his view to an extreme and supports it with rich, but not over-trustworthy, material. Schultze considers Fetishism and Animism as equally primitive. F. B. Jevons rejects the theory that all gods of earlier races were spirits of dead men deified."

religion of the fetish. The term *fetish* is derived from the Latin *factitius*, i. e., something that is made. Portuguese sailors used *feitiço* to designate the charms and talismans of the Negroes with whom they came in contact on the West Coast of Africa. The word occurs in books of travel written at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but was not introduced into literature until 170 years ago by a French writer, C. De Brosses.¹⁵ Comte employed it to designate the lowest stage of religious development.

The term *fetish* has been variously defined. Bishop Wm. Schneider, who went to considerable research to establish its true meaning, says: "A fetish is an object of nature or art, frequently of no intrinsic importance, which is permanently or temporarily protected, influenced, or even inhabited by a spirit and invoked and venerated as a miraculous helper and protector. . . . The common basis of the belief in fetishes is the thought that the world of phenomena, animate as well as inanimate, serves as the abode of spirits and that any beast, plant,

¹⁵ *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiches*, 1760; cfr. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. I, 4th ed., Tübingen, 1925, p. 5; J. T. Driscoll, article "Fetishism" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. VI, pp. 52-58; A. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 74, 178, 299; Th. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, London, 1926, pp. 64 sq.

or mineral may be chosen by a spirit, not only as an instrument with which to exert its power, but likewise as its permanent or temporary dwelling-place. This belief is accompanied by the confident persuasion that man, when in need of aid, is guided by the hand of his god or guardian spirit in the choice of a fetish."¹⁶ The Supreme Being is never degraded to the level of a fetish. "The fetish body, whether animated or not, is merely the external object of veneration; the intrinsic reason of this veneration is the fetish spirit, which dwells in, or is incorporated with, the body."¹⁷ "The notion of fetish is split when it is not limited to actual idols, but extended to the spiritistically influenced means of protection, charms or talismans, and consistently also to their counterpart, namely, magic employed with a hostile intent. Fetish idols exercise their influence as embodied spirits through their own power; . . . they are regarded as persons. Fetish amulets, on the other hand, produce their effects by means of a force that is communicated to, or coöperates with, them from the outside."¹⁸

¹⁶ *Die Religion der afrikanischen Naturvölker*, Münster i. W., 1921; cfr. A. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 299 sqq.

¹⁷ Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 172.—Farnell (*Evolution of Religion*, London, 1905) and other writers do not distinguish clearly between fetish and

J. H. KING regarded *Magic* as the first step in the evolution of religion.¹⁹ Since we cannot observe the spiritual life of primitive man at the time when religion first took its rise, he says, and since we have no reliable records of that age, the problem can only be solved in the light of psychology. When primitive man, at the beginning of his spiritual development, commenced to observe his proximate and remote environment, he was astonished at many extraordinary phenomena, such as storms, epileptic fits, hallucinations, somnambulism, etc., which he was unable to explain. Prompted by a natural urge to assume an adequate cause for every effect, he postulated occult forces transcending the powers of nature as they were known to

amulet, which leads Driscoll to say (*Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. VI, p. 54): "Farnell . . . calls relics, crucifixes, the Bible itself, fetishes. In his view any sacred object is a fetish. But objects may be held as sacred by external association with sacred persons or places without having any intrinsic sanctity. This loose use of the word has led writers to consider the national flag (especially a tattered battle-flag), the Scottish stone of Scone, the mascot, the horseshoe as fetishes, whereas these objects have no value in themselves, but are prized merely for their associations,—real in the sense of the battle-flag, fancied in the case of the horseshoe." Cfr. B. C. A. Windle, *Religions Past and Present*, pp. 131 sqq.

¹⁹ *The Supernatural, its Origin, Nature, and Evolution*, 2 vols., London and Edinburgh, 1892; cfr. J. P. Arendzen in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XI, pp. 197 sq.; Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 216-237.

him,—in other words, magic, as the cause of that which had aroused his astonishment and filled his soul partly with ardent desire and partly with fear.

In the course of his further development primitive man tried to obtain control of these "supernatural" powers by the use of magic formulas and incantations. This practice gave rise to the caste of magicians or medicine men, who claimed and were believed to be able to control the mysterious powers of nature and to employ them either to the advantage or to the disadvantage of their fellowmen. Under the influence of these sorcerers, and with the coöperation of extraordinary psychic phenomena, such as dreams and hallucinations, these magic powers or forces were personified, and there arose the idea of soul or spirit, from which in course of time developed the concept of God and religious worship.

Though this theory was subjected to numerous modifications by its chief defenders (KING, HUBERT, MAUSS, DURKHEIM, PREUSS, VIERKANDT), its fundamental groundwork is everywhere the same, namely, the assumption that primitive man first believed in the existence of an impersonal mysterious power (*mana*,

orenda), transcending all the known forces of nature, which power could be controlled by means of magic, and that the gradual unification and personification of these forces led to the belief in a Supreme Being.²⁰

According to this school of thinkers, therefore, religion is not based, as Animism would have it, on the assumption that all things have a soul, but on a belief in "supernatural," impersonal, magic forces.

²⁰ On the theory of the origin of religion based on the survival, in many of the lower forms of religion, of beliefs which are generally grouped around the words *mana* and *orenda*, see Th. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, pp. 32 sqq. The word *mana*, according to this writer, is derived from Polynesia, the word *orenda* from the language of the Iroquois Indians. "*Mana* implies a conception of universal power, which has many uses and manifestations. It is as if there were some universal electric current, which might be tapped at any point and made available for the service (or disservice) of man. Individuals may possess a greater or less share of it themselves, and in proportion to their endowment of *mana* they will be powerful and successful in such occupations as hunting or war. But other objects may also share in it, and, when they do, have unusual capacities and powers. It may to some extent be controlled by men; they may acquire it for themselves or they may even be able to infuse it into inanimate objects, which then become to all intents and purposes personal." This would be another proof for the belief that religion springs from a primitive Monotheism, were it not that "*mana* seems in no sense personal, and can hardly be called an object of worship; it is rather a pervasive influence whose presence may lead to the worship of objects in which it dwells." (*Ibid.*, pp. 32 sq.) On

We now proceed to prove our assertion that *religion did not originate in Fetishism, Animism, or Magic.*

a) To begin with, *Fetishism cannot be regarded as the first manifestation of religious life.* This follows from its very nature. The Fetish worshipper venerates material objects, not for their own sake, but on account of the spirits which are believed to reside in or stand in relation to them. Hence Fetish worship necessarily presupposes a belief in superhuman, spiritual beings, and man's dependence upon them,—which belief constitutes the essence of religion. In order to ascertain the origin of religion, therefore, we must find a definite answer to the question: *How was man led to acknowledge spirits over and above him?* Those who regard Fetishism as the most primitive form of religion, fail to explain this difficulty. They confound a definite stage in the evolution of the religious consciousness of man with its origin, and completely overlook the fact that Fetishism is but a degenerate ghost worship.

b) *Equally untenable is the Animistic-Manistic theory of the origin of religion,* proposed by TYLOR and SPENCER.

magic as the origin of religion see Windle, *Religions Past and Present*, pp. 119 sqq.; Anwander, *Die Religionen*, pp. 45 sq.

a) This theory rests upon the false supposition that religion originated at a time when man was wholly guided by instinct and his imagination was so strong that he projected its figments into the external world, personified, and finally worshipped them as beings of a higher order. This assumption (a logical postulate of the evolution theory) is absolutely gratuitous. That the intellectual life of man should have sprung from animal instinct is impossible, for the simple cannot proceed from the complex, nor the immaterial from the material, nor what is essentially more perfect from what is essentially less perfect, because such a process would contradict the law of causality. Moreover, while it may be admitted that the human imagination has a tendency to idealize and personify material objects, it never exerts itself in the manner demanded by this theory, except in those who are mentally defective. The human race has never passed through a period of infancy such as that postulated by Tylor and Spencer.

β) The theory here under examination finds no support in the existing religions. On the contrary, it openly contradicts the fact that the idea of God in the most ancient religions of civilized man approaches pure Monotheism

precisely in proportion to its antiquity, and that traces of Monotheism appear most clearly in the development of the most backward nations, whereas Ancestor Worship is entirely unknown among, for example, the natives of Southeastern Australia and Tierra del Fuego.²¹ According to Tylor and Spencer the contrary should be the case:—the religion of the primitives and the religious beliefs of the most backward tribes ought to give the clearest testimony to the primitive worship of ancestors and of the soul.

γ) Ancestor Worship presupposes the existence of religion. Not a single nation or tribe has ever been discovered whose religion consisted of Ancestor Worship pure and simple;²² in fact it can be shown that Ancestor Worship became a constituent of existing religions at a comparatively late period in history.²³ Not even in China, the classic home of Ancestor Worship, did this cult form the beginning of religion. Here, as everywhere else where Monotheism was introduced and spread, distin-

²¹ Cfr. Andrew Lang, *The Making of Religion*, London, 1900, pp. 174, 195; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, I, pp. 117, 129 sqq. These writers show that the most primitive savages believe in a supreme and moral God.

²² A. Borchert, *Der Animismus*, Freiburg, 1900, p. 157.

²³ Borchert, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

guished men (heroes, chiefs, etc.) were deified and given a cult similar to that of the gods.²⁴ This extension of divine worship to the spirits of the dead clearly postulates the previous existence of a belief in God and a religious cult. Consequently, Ancestor Worship, in the form in which it was or is actually practiced, cannot by its very nature have been the primitive form of religion.

c) The theory that religion originated in *Magic* is equally untenable.

a) This theory rests upon false psychological suppositions. To say that primitive man explained various astonishing phenomena of nature by ascribing them to impersonal magic forces, is to misunderstand completely the tendency and need of the human soul to seek a cause for every effect. This tendency and need, which primitive man, who was no less a rational being than his modern descendants, must have felt within himself, have their foundation in reason, which demands an adequate cause for every effect. It is in reflecting upon our own intellectual and volitional activity that we form our first acquaintance with the law of causality. We apply the notion of cause, as we have experi-

²⁴ J. T. Driscoll, *Cath. Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, p. 529; P. Ehrenreich, *Götter und Heilbringer*, Berlin, 1906, pp. 576, 599 sq.

enced it within ourselves, to the outside world. Where we find purely material causes insufficient to explain certain effects, we assume that spiritual and personal causes are at work. That is precisely the way primitive man proceeded in contemplating his proximate or remote environment. The more remarkable and imposing were the objects and phenomena which he faced, the more lasting was the impression they made upon him, the greater his astonishment, and the more intensive his speculation as to their probable causes. Under these circumstances the perception of the regular movements of the heavenly bodies, especially the sun and the moon, thunder storms, etc., no doubt soon convinced him that these natural phenomena must be attributed to a personal being greatly superior to man in wisdom and power. This conviction furnished the point of departure and the first inspiration of religious speculation, and there is no reason for assuming that primitive man had recourse to unknown and impersonal magic forces, of which he knew nothing.

β) The theory under consideration is based upon false historical assumptions. It is not true that man's intellect developed from brute forms and that, at a certain far distant period of time,

he passed through a phase of evolution which was favorable to the genesis and growth of magic superstitions. Even if it could be shown that the human body was derived from animal ancestors, it would not follow that the soul is the product of a similar development, for it is metaphysically and physically impossible that a spiritual soul should develop out of a brute soul intrinsically dependent upon matter. It is far more likely that man was in the full possession of reason and free will at the moment of his creation.

γ) The theory of Tylor and Spencer furthermore rests upon unfounded ethnological postulates. If it were true, the idea of magic and its practice would have to occupy a very important place in the life of at least the more backward nations of the earth, almost completely effacing every trace of belief in God. In matter of fact this is not so. "The various tribes of pygmies, which undoubtedly belong to the most ancient races of the earth, show comparatively few traces of magic belief and practice,—fewer at any rate than most ethnologically younger and culturally more highly developed nations . . .," and "it is precisely among the pygmies that we find, not only religion in general, but the idea of

a Supreme Being most clearly developed.”²⁵

In this connection it should be noted that among the aborigenes of Southeastern Australia, who are still in the first stages of civilization, the medicine men claim to have their power from a higher being, which they conceive as a person, though not as a spirit.²⁶

We go farther and maintain that religion does not owe its origin to a deception of man’s moral consciousness.

It is through his moral consciousness that man first learns the difference between good and evil. This perception is followed by a prompting to do the one and to avoid the other. After moral thought and sentiment were awakened in man, they soon found their consolidation in community life. Not being able to interpret the nature of duty, the moral law, and the mysterious activity of conscience (say the defenders of this theory, *e. g.*, PAULSEN, GIZYCKI), men at first regarded these factors as immediate effects of higher, superhuman powers, and this belief

²⁵ W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, Vol. I, p. 487; cfr. A. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 248 sqq.

²⁶ Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 423.—On the magic theories in general see the same author, *op. cit.*, pp. 422–488 and “*Der Ursprung der Gottesidee: eine weiterführende Übersicht*,” in *Anthropos*, Vols. XVI–XVII (1921–1922), pp. 1006–1018; E. R. Hull, S.J., *Archaic Religions*, Bombay, 1913, pp. 56 sqq., 150 sqq.

gave rise to the consciousness of man's dependence upon divine beings and to religion as the necessary practical complement of this belief. Religion and the belief in God consequently owe their origin to the infancy of the human race. They were adopted at a time when reason was not sufficiently developed to give a correct account of the facts and phenomena of the moral world. Remnants of these ancient religious ideas, resting upon deception, still exist among those who imagine they hear the voice of God in the dictates of conscience and from the facts of moral consciousness conclude that there is a personal God.²⁷

1. This theory rests on the false assumption that morality originally flourished without religion. Neither history nor the science of comparative religion gives the slightest support to this assumption. Wherever we meet with moral opinions and principles, we find that they are intimately bound up with religion.²⁸

²⁷ Cfr. W. Schneider, *Göttliche Weltordnung*, 2nd ed., Paderborn, 1909, pp. 452 sq.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 453; see also the same author's *Allgemeinheit und Einheit des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, Cologne, 1895; V. Cathrein, S.J., *Moralphilosophie*, Vol. I, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B., 1904, pp. 569 sqq.; Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, London, 1894, pp. 53, 267; O. Pfleiderer, *Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage*, 3rd ed., Berlin, 1896, pp. 367 sqq.; *Religion und Religionen*, Munich, 1906, p. 23.

2. The theory with which we are dealing cannot account for the facts of moral consciousness. Religion and morality are inseparable. The infinite worth of moral goodness and the absolute power of moral obligation imperatively demand the existence of a supra-mundane, personal God. Morality is founded on faith in a supernatural lawgiver of unlimited power and infinite perfection. Without a religious basis, man's moral consciousness would be an insoluble enigma.

It is true that the moral law is within us, and therefore we obtain our first knowledge of it through instruction. Philosophical proof of its existence comes later. But that which is first for us in the logical order need not necessarily be first also *per se* in the ontological sphere. As we have an idea of cause and effect before we know God *qua* first cause and final end of our existence, so, too, reason, starting from conscience and the moral law within us, and proceeding logically from cause to effect, can arrive at the knowledge of God as Author of the moral order by a perfectly legitimate process of ratiocination.

*B. Religion Not a Result of Self-Deception
on the Part of the Will*

Those who attribute religion to self-deception

on the part of the human will argue as follows: Man, becoming dissatisfied with this earthly life, which he found full of imperfections, privations, and suffering, conceived a desire for a happier existence, and when he discovered that he was unable to improve his lot by his own efforts, he cast about for outside help, from imaginary beings, superior to, and favorably inclined towards, himself,—mighty beings of another world, who would help him to realize his ambition. Thus originated the idea of God and together with it that of religion.²⁹

An indication of this evolution is seen in certain names and activities attributed to the deity. Wuotan, whom the Romans identified with Mercury, is interpreted as the God of wishes.³⁰ Hermes (interpreter, magic formula) bears the magic wand denoting jurisdiction and is regarded as the representative of human wishes before the throne of the deity. The word Brahma, finally, has the double meaning of prayer (wish) and God. The deification of the wish could not be more plainly expressed.

²⁹ "He [God] is himself the realized wish of the heart," says L. Feuerbach, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, new ed. by W. Bolin, Stuttgart, 1903, p. 145.

³⁰ L. Feuerbach, *Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion*, new ed. by W. Bolin, p. 314.

Another argument for the alleged origin of religion in the selfish wishes of humanity is derived from the peculiar religious activity of the will. This activity, it is claimed, retains traces of blind instinct, which always serves man's use and advantage; it is nothing but a naked egoism, solely intent upon its own benefit.³¹ The will, in submitting itself to God, acts from a purely selfish motive, *i. e.*, a desire for the most perfect attainable happiness, to which even the deity is made subservient.³² Religious ideals and aspirations belong to the sphere of Eudaemonism and Utilitarianism. The prospect of obtaining the highest benefits is the most efficacious motive for leading a religious life, and if religion denies its followers earthly possessions, it does so for the

³¹ "Who can deny that human egoism is the source of religion and theology? For if the adorability and venerability, and consequently the divine dignity, of a being depend entirely upon its relation to the welfare of man, if only a being beneficent and useful to man is divine, then the reason for the divinity of that being lies solely in the egoism of man, who regards all other things only as related to himself and values them according to this relation." (Feuerbach, *Vorlesungen*, p. 78).

³² "The Christian God as food for consumption . . . is just as much an object of egoism as bodily food is among the heathen." (Feuerbach, *op. cit.*, p. 102). "The religious man negatives the futility of human activity by . . . making man the purpose of God, . . . employing the divine activity as a means of human salvation. . . . Thus man has only himself in view in and through God." (Feuerbach, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 37).

distinctly Epicurean motive that these possessions cannot be enjoyed forever.³³

As against these assertions we maintain that religion did not originate in self-deception on the part of the human will.

a) The interpretation of divine names alleged by our opponents is for the most part arbitrary. Wuotan was the god of the winds and of the realm of the dead, and sailed through the air with an army of departed spirits. His very name marks him out as the god of the winds, not of wishes.³⁴ That Tacitus places him by the side of Mercury is probably owing to his alleged relations with the realm of the dead. Hermes, as the messenger of the gods, carries a herald's rod, which may originally have had the form of a magic wand. But there is nothing to show that the Greeks believed this god to be the executor of human wishes to such an extent that he might be regarded as the personification of the latter.

³³ "Even when he [man] gives up all earthly goods, and rejects all sensual and human pleasures, this self-denial is only the means of attaining and enjoying heavenly or divine happiness." (Feuerbach, *Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion*, p. 91).

³⁴ D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. III, 3rd ed., Tübingen, 1905, p. 556; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, Vol. I, 4th ed., by E. H. Meyer, Gütersloh, 1875, p. 109. Grimm derives the word *Wuotan* from the Old High German *watan*, from *wout* = to hasten, to advance hurriedly.

The case is somewhat different with *Brahma*. [This word has a twofold meaning. It signifies prayer and it is also the proper name of the deity. While this fact alone does not prove that the deity is the personification of human wishes, such an interpretation is not positively excluded, though rendered rather improbable by a study of the development of Brahminism. The word *Brahma* originally signified a prayer addressed to the deity, but in course of time, as Brahminism gradually assumed a pantheistic tendency, it came to mean an immersion of the mind into, and its identification with, the divine. Though this peculiarity of Brahminism seems to favor the view of our opponents, it really affords no information with regard to the origin of religion. For, on the one hand, the fundamental meaning of the word *Brahma*, *i. e.*, "prayer addressed to the deity," actually presupposes the notion and acknowledgment of a deity, and, on the other hand, it is not permissible to employ for the explanation of other religions a phenomenon peculiar to Brahminism without various qualifications.³⁵

b) The arguments derived by our oppo-

³⁵ Cfr. Chas. F. Aiken in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 730 sqq.; B. C. A. Windle, *Religions Past and Present*, N. Y., 1927, pp. 215 sqq.

nents from the religious activity of the will are inconclusive.

a) The religious will, we are told, is related to blind instinct and consequently serves only selfish purposes. But, we answer, instinctive impulses and spiritual aspirations of the will are totally different things, which must not be confounded. Instinct manifests itself in objectively purposive acts, governed by sense perception,—which acts, however, are not perceived as purposive by the subject. Instinctive acts necessarily follow sense perception and possess in the impulse which directs them a guide for the satisfaction of needs which arise from the conservation and development of the individual or the species. The will operates quite differently. Its aspirations follow intellectual knowledge and are guided by an intrinsic appreciation of the object to which they are directed. The activity of the will is, moreover, subject to law, inasmuch as the moral consciousness indicates the direction which the will must take if its operations are to be conformable to human nature and to aid that nature in reaching its highest perfection. But the operation of the will is not the result of natural forces which work their effects with sheer necessity; it is rather the result of free choice and self-determination.

β) The religious aspirations of the will are not *per se* effects of a censurable egoism. The goal towards which religion seeks to draw men is truth and goodness in the spiritual possession of the most perfect of all beings, whereas egoism strives for the possession of purely material goods to the exclusion of those of a higher order. In the domain of the spiritual, in the life of the intellect and the will, this egoism has no place. Truth satisfies a thousand minds as completely as it satisfies one; a spiritual good can become an object of love for the whole race in the same way as for a few individuals.

But, it is objected, is not the deity, the alleged final goal of religious aspiration, in matter of fact degraded by man to the level of a means to an end,—that end being human happiness? This would be the case if there were question of sensual pleasures or material possessions. A material good can serve sensual pleasure only in so far as it is subjected to that pleasure as a means to an end, because sensual pleasure is essentially dependent upon the (at least partial) material incorporation of its object with the organism of the subject, whereas spiritual pleasure is enjoyed without any change in its object and without subjecting that object to the intellect and the will. Thus, too, it is with the happiness

which man expects to enjoy in the possession of God. He attains possession of the supreme good by the activity of the will, directed by the intellect, which requires nothing more than the presence of the object. This presence determines the intellect and thereby subjects knowledge and love to the object. It is in this manner that, in the state of final perfection, God works upon the human intellect and the human will and incites these faculties to perfect acts of cognition and love. The spiritual feeling of happiness, well-being, and joy is merely an accompanying, though a necessary, complement of this activity of the intellect and the will. The final end and goal of man is and remains the Deity *qua* infinite truth and goodness; the knowledge, love, and happiness which man experiences in the possession of the Supreme Good, are wholly subordinate to this end.

We have just spoken of the attainment of man's last end in the world beyond. But even in this world no religious activity deserving the name can be entirely selfish. Since the earliest times the worship of the Deity among all nations was primarily always a social function.³⁶ The gods are worshipped above all as patrons of the

³⁶ Cfr. A. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 182 sq., 189 sq.; Fr. Heiler, *Das Gebet*, 4th ed., Munich, 1922, pp. 53 sqq.

common interests of a group or of humanity at large. Only in so far as the individual constitutes a part of the whole, can he expect his prayers to be heard.

All religions, moreover, impose self-denial. Man is to be governed, not by his own wishes, but by the will of the gods. Some religions impose upon their followers the greatest sacrifices, culminating in the complete subjection of the will, nay, the surrender of life itself. For this reason it may be truly said that inordinate individual selfishness finds no support in what may be properly regarded as divine worship. It is only when that worship deteriorates and, setting aside its higher objects, turns to the lower deities and to fetishes, that selfish aspirations gain the upper hand. But this phenomenon is a symptom of decay, which never occurs at the beginning of religious development, and consequently may not be regarded as either a source or an essential property of religion as such.

γ) The religious activity of the will has nothing in common with Eudaemonism, with Utilitarianism, or with the peculiar beliefs of a certain school of Epicureans. All these systems primarily aim at material, sensible goods, in the quiet, undisturbed possession of which they see the maximum of earthly pleasure both for the

individual and for humanity as a whole. The object of religious aspiration, on the contrary, is the supra-sensual, moral good, both in this life, as an activity governed by man's compound nature, in its dependence upon God, and the ultimate goal in the next life, *i. e.*, as the spiritual possession of God through knowledge and love. The attainment of this goal produces supreme happiness in the soul by harmoniously developing its powers and faculties without let or hindrance.

Our opponents assert that religion, like the Epicurean school mentioned above, rejects one pleasure in order to enable man to indulge all the more freely in another, keener pleasure. This is true only in the sense that religion teaches man to despise that which is mean and debasing, because it forms an obstacle to the attainment of the highest and noblest good. This teaching has nothing in common with that Epicureanism which craves only for sensual pleasure, whereas religion shows an exalted desire to lead human nature to that perfection which is the sole purpose of its existence. If there is anything to condemn in this, we fail to see it.³⁷

³⁷ Cfr. H. Schell, *Religion und Offenbarung*, 3rd ed., Paderborn, 1907, pp. 129 sqq.; J. Mausbach, *Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists*, New York, 1914, pp. 215 sqq.

3. *Religion Not a Mere Emotion*

The theories which we have just considered agree in regarding religion as a symptom of weakness, as a characteristic mark of the infancy of the human race. Mankind is supposed to have outgrown this weakness in the course of its development. The theory which we are now about to study, shares this view in one respect, but, in another respect, is opposed to it. Its defenders do not, indeed, regard religion as the highest development of the spiritual powers of the intellect and the will, but as a necessary substitute for the defects and limitations to which these faculties are subject. This substitute lies in "the consciousness of the infinite" or the immediate experience of God by the soul. The origin and essence of religion are traced to emotion, which is an activity of the soul differing from cognition and the exercise of the will.

JACOBI maintained that the world of the spirit, of the supra-sensual and free, can never become the object of intellectual knowledge, and that, consequently, the existence of God is indemonstrable and can only be *felt*. This feeling he called faith, and in his later writings he used the words "faith" and "reason" indifferently, as having the same meaning. Reason to Jacobi

was opposed to intellect. Intellect led to the conclusions of Science, while "reason" led to God and the metaphysical. In this sense Jacobi said of himself that while his heart was Christian, his reason was pagan.³⁸

F. SCHLEIERMACHER finds in man, as the basis of religion, a particular faculty, the pious sense or feeling, by means of which there is an immediate intuition or feeling of the infinite and eternal amid the finite. To feel everything as a part of the whole and to become one with the eternal is religion. Piety or subjective religion is neither a matter of cognition nor of action, but a determination of feeling or self-consciousness.³⁹

RITSCHL asserts that religious knowledge consists solely in value judgments, *i. e.*, ideas regarding our attitude towards the world, which are of importance only in so far as they awaken feelings corresponding to the promotion or hindrance of man's dominion over the world. "Religion," according to this writer, "is a belief in spiritual powers which supplement the faculties

³⁸ O. Pfleiderer, *Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie von Spinoza bis auf die Gegenwart*, 3rd ed., Berlin, 1893, pp. 224 sqq.

³⁹ Pfleiderer, *op. cit.*, pp. 298 sqq.; Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1821; cfr. the *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, Vol. IX, p. 467; L. F. Miller, *A History of Philosophy*, New York, 1927, pp. 293 sq.

of man with a view to enable him to attain goods or the highest good.”⁴⁰

JOHN STUART MILL sees the essence of religion in the energetic direction of the emotions towards an ideal of the greatest perfection and sublimity, transcending all objects of selfish desire.⁴¹

. SABATIER explains religion as “an activity of the spirit, apprehending in itself the superdominion of the Supreme Spirit by an anterior act of faith, by a tremendous instinctive *élan* of a being that is on the verge of destruction, but becomes conscious of its own dignity, and lets the religion of the spirit break forth with irresistible power from its own bosom. If we consider the religious belief of the spirit in itself and in its supreme dominion in this first psychological moment of its existence,” he says, “it is but the higher form and, so to speak, the prolongation of the instinct of self-preservation, which rules all nature. The spirit, crushed beneath the weight of material objects, rises up again and triumphs in feeling its own eternal dignity.” According to Sabatier, “revelation is the progressive knowledge of God in the con-

⁴⁰ Pfeiderer, *op. cit.*, pp. 482 sq.

⁴¹ Pfeiderer, *op. cit.*, p. 605; W. G. Ward, *Essays on the Philosophy of Theism*, London, 1884.

sciousness of each individual. Knowledge of God arises from the internal emotion of adoration. From this emotion springs prayer. The emotion of fear gives rise to the concept of divine justice, the emotion of love to the idea of divine goodness and paternity. Hence dogmas represent emotions; they symbolically express religious experience. Certain simple doctrines, such as the Fatherhood of God, are immutable. Others change, (a) by desuetude, such as belief in eternal punishment; (b) by intussusception, *i. e.*, development of new meanings, *e. g.*, the Trinity; (c) by the renovation of old or the creation of new concepts, *e. g.*, justification by faith.”⁴²

WILLIAM JAMES says that religion, “like love, like wrath, like hope, ambition, jealousy, like every other instinctive eagerness and impulse, adds to life an enchantment which is not rationally or logically deducible from anything else. . . . Religious feeling is thus an absolute addition to the subject’s range of life. It gives him a new sphere of power. . . . If religion is to mean anything definite for us, it seems to

⁴² A. Sabatier, *Esquisse d’une Philosophie de la Religion d’après la Psychologie et l’Histoire*, Paris, 1897; *Les Religions d’Autorité et la Religion de l’Esprit*, quoted by T. J. Walshe, *The Principles of Catholic Apologetics*, London, 1926, p. 75.

me that we ought to take it as meaning this added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper of espousal, in regions where morality so called can at best but bow its head and conscience. . . . Discarding the over-beliefs and confining ourselves to what is common and generic, we have in *the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self, through which saving experiences come*, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, *is literally and objectively true as far as it goes.*"⁴³

The *Modernists* hold that religion consists essentially in a certain mysticism, which aims at enabling man to experience the vivifying presence of God in his soul. TYRRELL derides the Schoolmen for trying to reach God through syllogisms rather than by way of religious experience.⁴⁴ According to the Modernists, we read in the Encyclical "*Pascendi*," "religious sentiment comprehends within itself an intuition of the heart, whereby man immediately and without an intermediary apprehends the reality of God and obtains a conviction of His existence and operation, both within and outside of man,

⁴³ W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 23rd impression, New York, 1922, pp. 47 sq., 514 sq. (Italics are the author's).

⁴⁴ G. Tyrrell, *Scylla and Charybdis*; cfr. A. Gisler, *Der Modernismus*, 4th ed., Einsiedeln, 1913, p. 515.

which far exceeds all scientific conviction in firmness."⁴⁵

The advocates of this theory all agree in holding that religion is a feeling of certainty and confidence, of elation and power, and the majority of them trace this peculiar sentiment to man's connection with the all-controlling divine power and perfection. They differ in this, that some of them do not regard the feeling of helplessness and impotence, of dissatisfaction and yearning for a happier life, to which they ascribe the origin of religion, as completely overcome by the religious sentiment, whereas others define religion as purely and simply a feeling of perfect safety and joy, of triumphant power and liberty, and again others see in it an immediate realization and actual comprehension of the Deity.

This divergent teaching compels us to distinguish three different forms of religious emotion, namely: (1) as the expression of a need felt by the soul; (2) as the expression of joy and satisfaction, and (3) as the expression of a real union of the soul with the divine essence. None of these three forms, as we shall see, fur-

⁴⁵ Encyclical "*Pascendi*;" cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart-Umberg, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, No. 2081.

nishes an adequate explanation of the nature and origin of religion.

Religion, in its essence and origin, is not a mere emotion.

1. *Religion is not an emotion expressive of an inborn need of the soul.* Religion rests on the conviction that there is a God. Where there is nothing but a feeling of helplessness and a yearning for union with a higher power, religion does not yet exist. A man's consciousness of his own impotence and his desire for help may indeed smooth the way for religion, and facilitate its acceptance, but it can never take the place of religion itself. For religion, being unreserved submission to, and reverent service of, God, essentially implies the clear perception and firm conviction that God is the author of nature and the ultimate goal of every creature. It is only on this indispensable foundation that emotion can be super-added as a development and as the crown of the religious life.

2. *Religion is not an emotion of joy and satisfaction.* Satisfaction and joy are felt when the desired goal is reached and the soul rests content in the possession of a good that is adapted to its nature. But joy in itself is not religion. It assumes a religious character only when it enters into re-

lationship with religion and its objects, inasmuch as it accompanies religious knowledge and religious acts of the will. Even religious joy is not the essence and root, but rather the blossom and fruitage, of religion.

3. *Religion is not an emotion produced by the union of the soul with the Godhead.*

a) The phenomena cited against this proposition by the Modernists are not conclusive.

a) The Modernists allege certain interior psychological (for the most part pathological) experiences which in matter of fact have nothing whatever to do with religion. To this category belong mind cures,⁴⁶ photisms or luminous visions,⁴⁷ ecstasies,⁴⁸—all accompanied by an indescribable realization of the immediate presence of the one, all-pervading, and vivifying Divine Spirit, which, according to these writers, is identical with the subconscious portion of the spiritual element in man.

β) Other examples are taken from the domain of experience. Attention is called to certain individuals who had been cold and indifferent towards religion until they suddenly received

⁴⁶ W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 94-97, 102-105, 108, 120-124, 137.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 251 sqq.

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 394 sqq.

full light and assurance from their own subconscious experience. What is meant by "religious experience" may be seen from the following account of a "revival meeting": "The preacher spoke eloquently and forcibly of the necessity of bringing religion into the ordinary affairs of everyday life, and of not being ashamed to confess one's beliefs before all men. The dimly lighted chapel was packed with folk hanging on the preacher's every word. The air was electric, charged, as it were, with emotion. The preacher seemed to take complete possession of his audience, and as his grip upon them increased, his voice sank lower and lower. He appealed to all to abandon themselves to the promptings of the Spirit stirring within them. 'Let those who are resolved to live a new life, stand up and let all men see that they are not ashamed of their faith.' Waves of emotion seemed to surge through the crowded chapel. A young woman stood up, pale and shaking, and was led out to the vestry, where a band of evangelical helpers was waiting to confirm the converts. Another followed, then a man or two, and the flow ceased. And now the preacher began with a new earnestness, warning all of the danger of struggling against the inner movements of the Spirit. 'A week or two ago, I had just finished a course of mission sermons in

a North country town, and the crowd were streaming out of the chapel into the night. Suddenly, in the court-yard in front of the chapel, there was a rush of wind and a whirring of wings. A young woman screamed, "He's gone, He's gone, the Holy Spirit has left me!" and fell into a dead faint. Night after night during the mission she had resisted the invitation to stand up and confess her faith before men, and now it was too late—too late for ever, for she died a few days later.' Again the preacher appealed for those to stand up whose hearts had been changed,—and now converts came thick and fast."⁴⁹ There is no need of postulating a divine revelation in the subconscious soul to explain such a phenomenon. Truths which once actually engaged the soul, may have been preserved in a habitual state until, under favorable circumstances, they suddenly rearise before the mind

⁴⁹ Cfr. *The Month*, London, May, 1927, Vol. CXLIX, p. 388. "How far such emotional conditions rest on a basis of reasonable conviction," comments the writer (J. L. King) whom we are quoting, "it is difficult to estimate, but we are bound to respect and even to reverence such experiences, since they are the cherished possession, in many cases the only possession, of those who know nothing of the treasure-house of the Church's teaching. It is unlikely, however, that resolutions taken under such an emotional stress as has been described, will be able to survive the strain of daily humdrum practice, unless solidly supported by intellectual conviction; while it is certain that they will not so survive in the face of an intellectual rejection of the idea of God."

with victorious clarity. Then, too, we must always reckon with the possibility of supernatural enlightenment and the operation of divine grace.

γ) The intuitive, mystical knowledge of God which some Modernists substitute for the abstract, philosophical knowledge of Him, *per se* exceeds the powers of human reason and, because of its inevitable obscurity and vagueness, undoubtedly is in most instances to be regarded as a hallucination. But here, too, we must leave open the possibility of a knowledge such as, according to revelation, we may expect in the life beyond, and which seems to have been granted to certain saints already here below, as a special privilege.

δ) The private revelations and apparitions from the lives of the saints which are cited by the Modernists in favor of their claims, prove nothing; first, because all these phenomena belong to the realm of the supernatural and do not, as the Modernists assert, arise from the natural union of the soul with God; and, secondly, because they do not serve to establish new religions, but merely to communicate the blessings and graces of Christianity, and both as to content and certitude (this is true especially of so-called

private revelations) are completely subordinated to the existing economy of salvation.⁵⁰

b) Religious experience of the Modernist type lacks that universality which it would have to possess if it belonged in any way to the essence of religion.

If this interior experience were indeed the divinely intended religious activity of man, it would have to be universal, inasmuch as every human being is obliged to lead a religious life, and no one may be deprived of the opportunity of doing so. As a matter of fact, those who claim to experience the actual presence of God in the manner described above, form but a very small percentage, not only of the whole of mankind, but even of the number of those who take religion seriously.⁵¹

The theory that religion is purely a matter of sentiment, therefore, has no foundation in fact. But how is it that so many adhere to this false idea nowadays? Dr. Mausbach answers this question substantially as follows: (1) Those who

⁵⁰ Cfr. M. Grabmann, *Wesen und Grundlagen der katholischen Mystik*, Munich, 1922, pp. 56 sqq.; Aug. Poulain, S.J., *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XIII, pp. 5-7.

⁵¹ Cfr. J. Mausbach, *Die Religion und das moderne Seelenleben*, in *Religion, Christentum, Kirche*, Vol. I, 5th ed., Kempten, 1923, pp. 1 sqq.

allow themselves to be governed by sentiment fail to perceive the intellectual element in religion. Others, who lead a devout life, regard the idea of God as so natural, and the principles of religion as so self-evident, that they pay little or no attention to the intellectual labor that is involved in its acceptation and defence, and advert solely to its moral and edifying features. (2) It is a special privilege which religious truths have over purely mundane thoughts, that they possess much greater power to stir the feelings, to elevate men and render them happy. The truths of religion derive this power from the fact that they embody the highest and greatest things that lie within human reach. It is for this reason that a residuum of religious emotion remains in the soul even after it has lost the knowledge of God. (3) The sentiments of reverence, love, gratitude, etc., are precious fruits of the knowledge of God and, therefore, catechists, preachers, ascetics, and others make special efforts to elicit religious emotions in the soul, frequently neglecting the facts of the Redemption and the dogmas of the faith in the belief that these are sufficiently well known to the average Christian. (4) Many overstress the importance of sentiment in religion in the hope of thus escaping

painful conflicts between faith and science. Nevertheless, religious sentiments which are not based on the idea of God, are a contradiction in themselves. But as soon as reason forms concepts about God and His relation to the world, conflicts between religion and science become possible. He who does not wish to represent purely worldly sentiments as religious, must see to it that his religion has a definite and characteristic intellectual content.⁵²

⁵² Mausbach, *op. cit.*, p. 84 sq.; cfr. K. Girgensohn, *Der seelische Aufbau des religiösen Lebens*, Leipzig, 1921, pp. 309 sqq., 436 sqq. From all that has been said and quoted, it will have been possible to gain a fair idea of what may be embraced under the term "religious experience" or "sentiment," when used by a non-Catholic writer. "It has no certain objective value. On the other hand, that there are sentiments and emotional states proper to religious intellectual activity cannot be denied; indeed such affective tendencies are of the very greatest assistance in the religious life of the individual. . . . The Catholic view may be thus epitomized:—In the first place, the existence of God, *as a hypothesis*, does not involve intellectual contradiction or repugnance. Secondly, the *fact* that He exists follows as a necessary inference from the following two premisses:—(1) There exist in the world things which are the effects of other causes. (2) In order that things should exist, whose being is contingent on other causes, there must be a Cause which is itself uncaused. In other words, if we go back along the series of cause and effect, we must either accept a *processus in infinitum*, which is a contradiction in terms, or come to an Uncaused or Absolute Cause, who is God." (J. L. King, *l. c.*; see note 49, *supra*.)

4. Religion Not a Product of Animal Instinct

"We must content ourselves," says EDUARD VON HARTMANN,⁵³ "with having gained, from the demonstration of a religious relation in the soul of the brute beast, the conviction that all intellectual life is homogeneous and differs only in degree, also in regard to religion, which up to the present time has been commonly considered a specific prerogative of the human soul. . . . We are forced to admit the existence in higher animals of such intellectual qualities as the desire to live in common, pity, love, the tendency to repay good and bad, gratitude, loyalty, fidelity, humility, magnanimity, contrition, devotion, a willingness to make sacrifices for others, heroic self-denial, nay, even the sense of duty; and consequently we cannot doubt that animals would be capable of entering into religious relations if they were furnished with fit objects for this purpose in a comprehensible, *i. e.*, sensibly perceptible, form. Since this is accomplished for animals by intercourse with men," he adds, "we cannot but attribute a religious character to the relation that exists between our more intelligent domestic animals and their masters."⁵⁴

⁵³ *Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit im Stufengange seiner Entwicklung*, Berlin, 1881, p. 11.

⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 4 sqq.

This curious view is harbored by nearly all those who profess the theory of Monistic evolution. But it is untenable, as we shall show.

Aside from the fact that Monistic evolution regards man as the descendant of animal ancestors both as to body and soul,—an assertion which it does not prove and which involves a contradiction,—it unjustifiably puts certain acts of more highly developed animals, because of a purely external resemblance to human acts, on a level with the latter. This is contrary to experience, which teaches that those phenomena of brute life which we loosely call love, gratitude, sorrow, etc., are merely manifestations of the animal instinct, even when they occur in the intercourse of animals with men. This instinct may be variously modified by habit and training, but it never transcends the level of exclusively material and sensible needs in the functioning of animal life. Its only object is the preservation of the individual and of the species.⁵⁵ For this reason the "love" of an animal for its progeny ceases as soon as the young has outgrown the need of parental care, and the "af-

⁵⁵ Cfr. F. Knickenberg, "*Die Dressur und ihre Grundlagen*," in *Natur und Offenbarung*, Vol. L (1904), pp. 705 sqq.; H. Muckermann, S.J., *Humanizing of the Brute*, St. Louis, Mo., 1906; IDEM, *Attitude of Catholics toward Darwinism and Evolution*, 4th ed., St. Louis, 1924.

fection" and "gratitude" shown by a horse or a dog sometimes manifests itself in such a way that it inflicts serious damage upon the master. We have in mind an instance where a dog refused to let anyone come near its owner, who had been mortally wounded by the accidental discharge of his gun, until the man had bled to death. That a dog will sometimes "starve itself to death" on the grave of its master may be explained as a result of its having been so accustomed to that particular person that his absence causes the animal keen suffering. The presence of its master may become a vital necessity to a dog, just as alcohol may become a vital necessity to a drunkard. Even men and women can grow so accustomed to their environment that a separation from it will entail serious illness. Need we wonder that a brute beast, which is unable to neutralize the influence of environment by intellectual considerations, is affected in a similar manner? No matter from what point of view we regard the behavior of even the most "intelligent" animals, it is absolutely impossible to discover therein a religious element.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Cfr. C. Gutberlet, *Der Mensch*, 3rd ed., Paderborn, 1911, pp. 553 sqq.; P. von Schanz, *Apologie des Christentums*, Vol. I, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B., 1910, pp. 139 sqq.

THE EVOLUTIONARY PHASES OF RELIGION ACCORDING TO LUBBOCK.—Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury) enumerates the following stages or phases through which, in his opinion, religion has passed in the course of its development:

1. *Atheism*, or the absence of any definite ideas on the subject of the existence of a deity.

2. *Fetishism*, the stage in which man supposes he can force the deities to comply with his desires.

3. *Nature-worship* or *Totemism*, in which natural objects, such as trees, lakes, stones, animals, etc., are worshipped.

4. *Shamanism*, in which the superior deities are regarded as far more powerful than man; their place of abode also is far away and accessible only to "Shamans."

5. *Idolatry* or *Anthropomorphism*, in which the gods take still more completely the nature of men, being, however, more powerful; they are still amenable to persuasion; they are part of nature, and not creators; they are represented by images or idols.

6. In the next stage, the deity is regarded as the *author*, and not merely as a part, *of nature*, and becomes for the first time a really supernatural being.

7. The last stage is that in which *morality* is associated with *religion*.⁵⁷

Criticism of this Theory.—The assumption that Atheism was the preliminary stage of religion is arbitrary and untenable, for, as we have pointed out before, there has never been a godless nation or tribe, and, as we shall see presently, the religious beliefs of those nations which stand lowest in the scale of culture and social progress do not permit us to conclude that their ancestors were atheists. In the light of what we have said above, Fetishism, in spite of its wide diffusion, cannot be regarded as the beginning of religion. Like Fetishism, so all the other forms of religion enumerated by Sir John Lubbock,—altogether aside from the fact that morality did not enter into relationship with religion in the seventh phase of the latter's development, but from the very beginning of the human race was always and everywhere in close connection with it,—are found among various nations at the present day. That they followed one another in the order described by Sir John is an aprioristic assumption not supported by facts, but based entirely on Modernistic principles of evolution. It is quite as gratuitous as

⁵⁷ Sir John Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*, 5th ed., London, 1889, pp. 209 sq.

the theory that Monotheism developed from Polytheism. Both propositions are postulates of evolutionistic Monism, refuted by the fact that religious development demonstrably began with pure Monotheism, and Polytheism with its innumerable varieties did not arise until a much later date, when religion had entered upon its decline. We shall discuss this aspect of our subject more fully in the next section.

§ II. MONOTHEISM AT THE BEGINNING OF RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT

Monotheism was the primitive religion of the human race.

1. The first book of the Old Testament, known as Genesis, is a trustworthy record of the primitive traditions of mankind.⁵⁸ This record proves that religion was originally Monotheistic, inasmuch as our First Parents and their immediate descendants believed in one God, the sole Creator of heaven and earth.⁵⁹ The form *Elohim* does not prove that man's idea of God was at

⁵⁸ For a succinct proof of the authenticity and genuineness of the Book of Genesis as well as of other books of the Bible, we must refer the reader to Vol. II of this *Handbook*. See also H. Pope, *The Catholic Student's "Aids" to the Bible*, new ed., Vols. I and II, *The Old Testament*, London, 1926 sq.

⁵⁹ Gen. I, 1 sqq.

first pluralistic, since this term, whenever it is used to designate the one true God, is always combined with the singular of the verb, and there is not in this early historical record the slightest trace of any Polytheistic beliefs or practices.

2. The science of comparative religion has fully established the fact that the idea of God among the Indo-Germanic and Semitic nations of antiquity was singular and not plural. These groups employed each the same name for the supreme deity, while the names they gave the minor deities differed. This proves the original identity of the supreme God. Consequently, the Indo-Germanic and the Semitic nations at the beginning of their history not only worshipped one and the same supreme God, but this supreme God was the only God in whom they believed. The Indo-Germanic names for the supreme deity were: The Vedic *Dyaus-pitar*, which corresponds to the Greek *Ζεὺς πατήρ*; the Latin *Jupiter* (*Diespiter*); the Old-German *Tyr* and *Zio*, and the Gothic *Tius*. The generic names *deva*, *deus*, and the Baltic *deives*, also have an intimate connection with the name of the most ancient Vedic deity. The common root of all these words is the Sanskrit *dyu*, *dev* or *div*, which, as a verb, means *to shed light* and, as a noun, signifies *heaven*.

There is a similar connection between the Semitic names of the deity. The ancient Hebrews and the Phœnicians called their highest and only God *El*; the Arabs employ the word *Allah* (compounded from the article *al* and *ilah*); the Syrians at first used *El*, later *Alloho*; the Babylonians and Assyrians, *Ilu*. The root form is the same in all Semitic dialects and signifies *the strong or powerful one*.

The agreement of these names alone would not be conclusive evidence that either the Indo-Germans or the Semites worshipped only one God before their separation. But it is justifiable to conclude from this agreement that these nations originally worshipped one and the same supreme Being. For the striking agreement of the names which they applied to this Being cannot possibly be the result of a purely accidental formation of the respective words simultaneously among the different tribes, but must have its origin in a common source. The only satisfactory explanation is that the nations in question retained both the name and the cult of their supreme God when they left their common home and broke up in search of new habitations.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Cfr. F. Max Müller, *The Science of Language*, London, 1899, Vol. II, pp. 524 sqq.; Th. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, London, 1926, p. 147.

"If one and the same word with its regular phonetic variations," says Giesswein, "is met with among several nations of the same linguistic family, now widely separated (so that borrowing cannot be assumed, which, be it incidentally observed may, as a rule, be easily recognized by means of the irregular shifting of the consonants), it may justly be concluded that these words constitute a portion of the common heritage, *i. e.*, that their corresponding fundamental type existed before the respective nations separated from their common stock; if, in addition to this, the meaning is identical in all, we may suppose that the object or notion signified by them at present was known already to the *Urvolk* (namely, the still undivided primitive people before their separation)." ⁶¹

In view of the further fact that there was no agreement among the Indo-Germanic and Semitic nations regarding the names of their minor deities, we may go a step farther and say: Had these nations before their separation worshipped other deities besides the supreme God, some traces of this worship would surely have remained. Since this is not the case, however, we are forced to conclude that the supreme God,

⁶¹ A. Giesswein, *Die Hauptprobleme der Sprachwissenschaft*, Freiburg i. B., 1892, pp. 222 sq.

whose names we have enumerated above, was the only God worshipped by the Indo-Germans and the Semites; in other words, these nations were Monotheistic before they drifted apart.

3. In nearly all the pagan religions there are found relics of Monotheistic concepts in the belief in one God, and the farther back we trace the development of religion, the closer the idea of the supreme God approaches Monotheism. The concept of God grows in perfection and purity as the number of gods decreases. The simplest and only possible explanation of this remarkable fact is that the process of development began with Monotheism. Consequently all religions were originally Monotheistic.

1. The Indo-Germanic Religions

A) The most ancient deity of the Hindus was *Dyaus-pitar*. "Out of the ruins of a decadent religious world there reaches over into the Rigveda the grand and solitary Dyaus, also called 'Father Asura' or 'the Asura,' *i. e.*, Lord in the pregnant sense of the word, or simply 'the Father.' . . . As men became accustomed to transfer his name to the visible heaven (firmament), . . . the memory of his personal fatherhood and sole supreme dominion became ex-

tinct.”⁶² After him *Varuna* ruled over the pantheon. He is the omniscient creator of nature and of the moral order. He punishes sin, but is merciful to the penitent who begs for forgiveness.⁶³ *Varuna*, whose ethical character appears in a favorable light, is succeeded by *Indra*, a powerful war-god, sole king of the world. These two gods, *Indra* and *Varuna*, stand in a certain opposition to each other. “The one [*Indra*] slays the enemy in battle, the other [*Varuna*] always protects the laws.”⁶⁴ *Indra* judges the good and the bad, but he is not gifted with the sublime wisdom of *Varuna*.⁶⁵

The Vedic period of religious development among the Indo-Germanic nations is followed by *Brahminism*, which is essentially Pantheistic.

⁶² E. Hardy, *Vedisch-brahmanische Periode der Religion des alten Indiens*, Münster i. W., 1893, p. 23.

⁶³ See, e. g., the touching prayer of the singer *Vashista*: “Forgive the crimes our fathers have committed; forgive what we ourselves have done; take my sins from me, O Lord, and do not permit me to suffer for the sins of others.” (Chantepie de la Sausseye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. II, 3rd ed., Tübingen, 1905, pp. 18 sq.)

⁶⁴ *Rig Veda*, VII, 83, 9; *apud* Hardy, *Vedisch-brahmanische Periode der Religion des alten Indiens*, p. 58. Cfr. H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894. *The Hymns of the Rig Veda* have been translated into English by Griffith, 2 vols., Benares.

⁶⁵ D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 4th ed., Tübingen, 1925, Vol. II, pp. 24 sqq.

Brahma is regarded as the cause and foundation of the world. He alone is "without a second," the only reality. He is the innermost essence of man, his very self. Whatever exists, exists in and through the Brahma; whatever is known, is known through the Brahma. "He who perceives anything in anything else but self, has given up everything; this self is everything."⁶⁶

The conglomeration of religious beliefs and practices which became predominant in India at a later period and is designated by the generic term *Hinduism*, is really a corrupted Brahminism, in which Indra and Brahma are displaced by Vishnu and Siva. Vishnu assumes various forms,—fish, turtle, bear, etc.,—and these metamorphoses plainly indicate that he lacks the dignity of the Vedic gods. Kindness and benevolence are the characteristic traits of Vishnu, whereas Siva is mainly a god of destruction, feared by men because of his cruelty, and if he is sometimes called "the merciful," this appellation is plainly to be interpreted as a euphemism. Thus the religion of the Hindus, which in its beginnings was so closely related to Mono-

⁶⁶ E. Hardy, *op. cit.*, p. 219; cfr. Chas. F. Aiken, *s. v.* "Brahminism" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 730 sqq.

theism, in the course of centuries sank deeper and deeper into the mire of Polytheism.⁶⁷

B) The *Zendavesta* (*Avesta*=knowledge; *zend*=tradition) is the collection of sacred books of the Parsis, or Zoroastrians, held by them to be divinely inspired. It describes the religion of *Zoroaster* (Zarathustra), the prophet of ancient Iran, who was probably a contemporary of Ezechiel (5th century B. C.). This religion is a decided dualism. Ahura Mazdāh (literally, "Wisdom of Ahura"; in the hieroglyphic inscriptions Aurmazd, later Ormuzd), the "wise spirit," surpasses all Hindu deities in the perfection of his

⁶⁷ See Chas. F. Aiken in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. VII, pp. 358 sq.; M. Williams, *Hinduism*, New York, 1897; L. D. Barnett, *Hinduism*, London, 1906; J. E. Carpenter, *Theism in Medieval India*, London, 1921; W. Crooke, *Introduction to the Popular Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, Allahabad, 1894; new ed., 2 vols., Westminster, 1896; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, tr. by H. K. Beauchamp, 2 vols., 3rd ed., Oxford, 1906; Guru Prasad Sen, *An Introduction to the Study of Hinduism*, Calcutta, 1893; H. Jacobi, *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern und deren Beweise für das Dasein Gottes*, Bonn and Leipsic, 1923; W. J. Wilkins, *Hindu Mythology, Vedic and Puranic*, Calcutta, 1882; *Modern Hinduism, an Account of the Religious Life of the Hindus in Northern India*, London, 1887.—The official number of the deities of the Hindu pantheon is given as 330,000,000, and whilst it can hardly be claimed that this number has been accurately checked, the actual number is certainly very large. "Hinduism is, in fact, the most striking and in most ways the most typical Polytheism that we know." (Th. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, pp. 77-78.) Professor de La Vallée Poussin notes that whenever we

nature and operation. His spirituality manifests itself theoretically in perfect knowledge or correct discrimination between good and bad and ethically in absolute purity and justice, which attributes are indissolubly united in him. His royal dominion, the preservation and governance of all nature, including man, is based on the fact that he is the creator of all things. His

affirm something of Buddhism, we should hold ourselves ready to affirm also the contrary. There is no Buddhist orthodoxy, but only a complexus of heterodoxies, which on account of their origin and a certain family resemblance, we call Buddhism. The same remark applies *a fortiori* to Hinduism, whose only unity is one of culture and not of philosophy or of faith. Modern Hinduism is largely rationalistic. S. Radhakrishnan in his book *The Hindu View of Life* (London, 1927) shows how a very modernized Hindu views the *dharma* of his fathers and interprets it to himself. All mythology, all the "supernatural," has, of course, been discarded. Of all the possible Hindu points of view, from idolatry to rank Pantheism, it is the *Advaita* of Samkara that has been taken as the norm, the other points of view being considered as aberrations or adaptations thereof, and this *Advaita* has been rendered more religious by the infusion of what is best in *bhakti* and more modern by opening its *sâdhana* to all men and dropping its antiquated views as, *e.g.*, on the nature of *sruti*. What Professor Radhakrishnan admires most in Hinduism is its intellectual tolerance and the worldly-wise balance of its *dharma*. Hinduism has received within its fold all doctrines, creeds and practices, from Vedic Aryan "henotheism" to animist or tantric practices. It "has understood that all men are not made in the same mould and that what is poison to the one may be *amrita* to the other. The *dharma* with its castes and four *âsramas* outlines a plan of life which reconciles the ideal and the real." (See *The Week*, Calcutta, 12 May, 1927, p. 408).

great task is to preserve the world from evil. This task he fulfills by constantly pouring out divine energy for the purification of mankind. He coöperates with man in combating evil.⁶⁸

The last sentence indicates the antagonism between Ahura Mazdāh (Ormuzd) and Ahriman (*Angro Mainyu*, evil spirit; Ormuzd: *spenta Mainyu*, holy spirit), the opposition between the principle of goodness and the principle of evil. Ahriman, like Ormuzd, is a spiritual power; his task is to combat goodness, purity, and perfection; he is the source of all evil; he strives to rule the world and to triumph over Ormuzd.

But though Ahriman is the creator of evil, as Ormuzd is the creator of goodness, the former is not by any means equal to the latter in knowl-

⁶⁸ E. Hardy, *Vedisch-brahmanische Periode der Religion des alten Indiens*, pp. 188 sq. With this exalted conception of the nature of the Deity the utterances of Persian monarchs handed down to us in the Old Testament are in full agreement. (Cfr. Dan. VI, 25-27; 2 Par. XXXVI, 23; Est. XVI, 16). On the Avesta see A. F. J. Remy in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 1151 sqq.; W. S. Lilly, *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*, pp. 123 sqq. On Zarathustra and his teaching cfr. W. Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, New York, 1897; Edv. Lehmann, *Zarathustra, en Bog om Persernes gamle tro*, 2 vols. Copenhagen, 1899-1902; J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913; V. Henry, *Le Parsisme*, Paris, 1905; M. N. Dhalla, *Zoroastrian Theology*, London, 1915; R. Pettazoni, *La Religione di Zarathustra*, I, Bologna, 1920; Chr. Bartholomae, *Zarathustra, Leben und Lehre*, Heidelberg, 1924; C. de Harlez, *Les Origines du Zoroastrisme*, Paris, 1878 sq.

edge and power. In a contract which he makes with Ormuzd, Ahriman is deceived, and in the end destroyed with all his works and followers. This fact indicates a considerable weakening of the original dualism. Besides, there are Greek, Armenian, Arabic, and later Persian testimonies to the effect that these two hostile gods were preceded by a higher being, who created both Ormuzd and Ahriman, which shows that the original Persian concept of the Deity was Monotheistic.⁶⁹ That this earlier belief is not reflected in the cult of the Avesta, is no reason why the ancient tradition should be rejected. It was but natural that a god whose memory had al-

⁶⁹ Cfr. Isaias, Ch. xlv; Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. III, p. 213 (this reference is to the second edition; in the third the passage has been omitted.)—On the theology of the Avesta, see L. C. Casartelli in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 154–156; cfr. Hovelacque, *L'Avesta, Zoroastre et le Mazdaïsme*, Paris, 1880; A. Carnoy, "The Religion of the Avesta" in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, C.T.S., London, 1910. Robinson notes (*An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, p. 153) that there seems to have been in recent years a distinct tendency to revert to the teaching of Zarathustra himself. "The higher criticism of the Zend-Avesta has done much to make this possible, and it may well be that in Zoroastrianism we shall in the next few generations have one of the purest forms of Monotheism that the world has known." In its modern form the religion of the Parsis has learned something from Christianity. (Cfr. M. Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis*, 3rd ed., Bombay, 1884, quoted by S. Lilly, *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*, 2nd ed., London, 1885, p. 127).

most faded away, should no longer be worshipped by the people.

An important figure in the more recent portions of the Avesta is *Mithra*, who is described as a great god, worthy of sacrifice, but a creature of, and subordinate to, Ahura Mazdāh. Mithra is "a much more concrete, living and livelier god, and more intimately connected with nature than all the Ahuric deities put together."⁷⁰ Conceived originally as the precursor of the sun, Mithra was later identified with that luminous body and worshipped as sun-god. Mithraism in course of time became a regular religious cult and spread from Persia all over the Roman Empire, as far as Britain.⁷¹

C) The beginnings of the *religion of ancient Greece* are wrapped in obscurity. The first deity that appears in vague outline on the horizon of the pre-Homeric age is *Uranos*, of whom we know nothing except that he was worshipped as the god of the heavens. The leader of the

⁷⁰ Chantepie de la Saussaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, 2nd ed., p. 196.

⁷¹ L. C. Casartelli in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, p. 155; cfr. F. Cumont, *Textes et Monuments relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra*, Bruxelles, 1896-99; C. C. Martindale, S. J., "The Religion of Mithra" in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, London, 1910; Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte*, 4th ed., Tübingen, 1925, Vol. II, pp. 225 sqq.

Homeric pantheon is *Zeus*, the "Father of gods and men," who can be traced far back into Indo-Germanic antiquity. He boasts of his superiority to all the other gods and presides over Olympus like an earthly monarch over his kingdom.⁷² The *Orphic mysteries*, which are of very ancient origin, and strongly influenced Greek philosophic thought, declare of Zeus that "he is the beginning and the middle, and all things move in him."⁷³

F. Max Müller says that in spite of the haze which mythology has thrown around the name of Zeus, it is easy to see that the ancient Grecians originally regarded him as the supreme God, the true God, nay, at times even as their only god.⁷⁴

In the post-Homeric period, when the Greek nation began to decline, Olympian Zeus relinquished his scepter to other gods, some of whom

⁷² *Iliad*, VIII, 5-27; II, 204; cfr. J. Huby, S.J., "The Religion of Ancient Greece" in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, Vol. II, pp. 10 sqq.; Chantepie de la Saussaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 281 sqq.

⁷³ Ζεύς ἀρχή, Ζεύς μέσσα, Διὸς ἐκ πάντα πέλονται.

⁷⁴ *The Science of Language*, London, 1899, Vol. II, pp. 545, 548 sqq., 551. The most complete collection of materials for the study of the ancient Greek religion in the days of Homer is C. F. von Nägelsbach's *Homerische Theologie*, 3rd ed., Nuremberg, 1884; a useful recent survey of the subject in G. Finsler's *Homer*, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Leipsic, 1918, pp. 220 sqq. See also J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 1903; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie*, Munich, 1906.

were lower earth-gods of a malignant disposition.⁷⁵

D) The *mythology of the Romans* is closely intertwined with that of the Greeks. *Jupiter* (Diespiter) Optimus Maximus is the highest lord of heaven and earth, who "rules the fates of men and gods, the ocean, the land, and the worlds at all times."⁷⁶ Both gods and men owe him their existence and are subject to his rule.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Chantepie de la Saussaye, *op. cit.* (4th ed.), Vol. II, pp. 347 sqq.; E. R. Hull, S.J., *Archaic Religions*, Bombay, 1913, pp. 155 sq. The Greek religion is fitly characterized by the last mentioned author as "an incoherent jumble of poetical and mythological elements, never harmonized into a consistent theology. Various sporadic developments took place; new elements were introduced from other countries, and old ones modified to suit the changes of current taste. It seems hard to say whether there was any decadence or not. The earliest that we know of the Greek religion presents something so low, so unworthy, so foolish that there seems hardly any room for a retrograde movement, except in two ways—an increasing complexity of foolishness, or a loss of sincerity among the worshippers; both of which certainly did take place. Greek philosophy (we read of a later period) from its first rise broke with the sacred traditions and constructed its systems without concern for the preservation of religion. Unlike the civilizations of the East, in which powerful schools of theology, as in Babylon or Heliopolis, kept renovating and putting new life into religious thought, mythology in Greece gained nothing from philosophical reflection. Such thinkers as refrained from attacking it held themselves aloof from it; and religion, from lack of some quickening principle, necessarily became a dry formalism, a mere collection of rites void of meaning. As Cumont well expresses it: 'Never had so cultured a people so childish a religion.'" (*Ibid.*)

⁷⁶ Horace, *Odes*, I, 12.

⁷⁷ Virgil, *Æneid*, I, 65, 254.

The variety of tasks assigned to him appears from his many names. The supreme dominion of Jupiter is more clearly apparent than that of Zeus. But Jupiter is not the most ancient of the Italian deities. Long before him *Janus* and *Diana* were highly venerated in that country. Janus, it is said, was the first to introduce religious worship into Italy.⁷⁸ In an ancient hymn he is invoked as "the god of gods."⁷⁹ He and *Vesta* form the Alpha and Omega of the roster of divinities cited in the ancient formularies of solemn prayer.⁸⁰ The name of Jupiter (from the root *dyu*), also used in the form Januspater, harks back to the original home of the Indo-Germanic nations, the center from which all the Aryan languages proceeded in their world-wide expansion.⁸¹

In process of time the number of gods constantly increased, and it has been truly said that "perhaps nowhere else has the multiplication of divinities been carried to such extremes as among the Romans; every condition, every

⁷⁸ Döllinger, *The Gentile and the Jew*, tr. by N. Darnell, Vol. II, p. 39.

⁷⁹ "*Divum deus*."

⁸⁰ E. Aust, *Religion der Römer*, Münster i. W., 1899, p. 117; C. C. Martindale, S.J., "The Religion of Early Rome" in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, Vol. II, London, 1910.

⁸¹ F. Max Müller, *The Science of Language*, Vol. II, p. 485.

act, every part of every act, every class of objects, had its special protectors among the gods."⁸²

However, the consciousness that the divine nature must be one, accompanied by a desire for a purer cult, never vanished entirely. Terentius Varro (116 B. C.), the most eminent contemporary authority on the religion of ancient Rome, says that men should worship only one God.⁸³ For more than 170 years, he adds, the Romans adored their gods without the aid of pictorial representations, and if this custom had maintained itself, their religious cult would have remained purer than it was. Clement of Alexan-

⁸² Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte*, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 414. Hull (*Archaic Religions*, pp. 161 sq.) observes that the ancient Roman deities, though vague, unpicturesque, and homely, were at least decent. The amours of the gods and immoralities connected with their worship, were a later importation from Greece, Syria, and Egypt—partly as an effect, partly as a cause of degeneration. On the religious beliefs and practices of the ancient Romans see also L. Deubner, in the fourth edition of Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. II, pp. 418–505; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, 2nd ed., Munich, 1912; E. Aust, *Die Religion der Römer*, Münster, 1899 (a popular synopsis of Wissowa); W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911; IDEM, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899; F. Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, Chicago, 1911; J. Geffcken, *Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums*, Heidelberg, 1920.

⁸³ *Antiquitates*, cited by St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 31 (P. L., XLI, 137 sq.)

dria⁸⁴ traces this purer cult to King Numa Pompilius (d. 715 B. C.), who is said to have instructed his people that, according to an ancient and secret tradition, man could know the highest being only through his intellect. Another witness to the fact that the religion of imperial Rome showed traces of a primitive Monotheism, is Tertullian, who observes that the pagan Romans, when they were in trouble, lifted their eyes, not to the Capitol, but to Heaven, and invoked, not their gods, but the one true God.⁸⁵

E) Of the most ancient deities of the *Teutons* we have but little reliable knowledge. The primitive Runic inscriptions contain only the name of the Nordic god *Tyr*, and in connection therewith the more or less differently formed, but substantially synonymous divine appellations of the other tribes, which show the root *dyu* and thus enable us to recognize a common Aryan origin. Tyr had to be invoked twice whenever the runes indicating victory in battle were incised into a sword; ⁸⁶—from which fact we may conclude that this god was the most ancient and

⁸⁴ *Stromata*, I, 15 (*P. G.*, VIII, 777).

⁸⁵ *Apol.*, c. 17 (*P. L.*, I, 376 sq.)

⁸⁶ J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, Vol. I, 4th ed., Gütersloh, 1875, p. 166.

most highly venerated among all those worshipped by the Germanic nations.

In the mythology of the Scandinavians, *Wuotan* (of which the Nordic form is *Odin*) was the highest among the gods. He was credited with creative, formative, all-penetrating power; he endowed the fields with fertility, invested all things with form and beauty, and bestowed favors and graces upon men.⁸⁷ *Wuotan* resides in heaven, but sees and hears everything that happens on earth.⁸⁸ He is the supreme lawgiver and the custodian of the moral order.⁸⁹ At the time when the *Edda* was composed, *Tyr* was venerated only as the god of battle and is referred to as the son of *Odin*, though in some respects the two are on a par. For instance, both are invoked for protection and victory in battle. The correct interpretation of the somewhat confused mythology of the Nordic *Edda* probably is that *Wuotan* was originally a local deity, who was gradually deprived of his dominant position by *Tyr*,—which fact in course of time led to the belief that *Wuotan* was *Tyr*'s father.

Besides *Wuotan* and *Tyr* the ancient Teutons worshipped a number of other deities, *e. g.*,

⁸⁷ Grimm, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁸⁹ *Völuspá*, 44 sq.; cfr. Chr. Pesch, S.J., *Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen des Altertums*, Freiburg, 1885, p. 74.

Donar (Thor), the god of thunder; Baldr, the god of light; Hel, the goddess of death; Nanthus, the goddess of the earth. But Wuotan was always regarded as the first, to whom the others were subject, "as children to their father."⁹⁰ How deeply belief in the identity of the supreme deity was rooted in the religious convictions of the Germanic tribes appears from their expectation that after the great conflagration that was to devastate the world, Baldr would inaugurate a new era.

F) The *Slavs* and *Lithuanians*, according to A. Brückner, who has written the section dealing with the ancient religious beliefs of these nations for the latest (4th) edition of Chantepie de la Saussaye's standard *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, venerated the old Aryan god Deives after the manner of Zeus Dodonaïos, as god of storm and of thunder, and dedicated to

⁹⁰ J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, Vol. III, 4th ed., p. 48. On the religion of the ancient Teutons see, besides Grimm, E. H. Meyer, *Germanische Mythologie*, Berlin, 1891; W. Golther, *Handbuch der germanischen Mythologie*, Leipsic, 1895; P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *The Religion of the Teutons*, Boston and London, 1902; R. M. Meyer, *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte*, Leipsic, 1910; K. Helm, *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte*, Heidelberg, 1913; V. Grönbech, "Die Germanen," in Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 4th ed., Tübingen, 1925, Vol. II, pp. 540-600; A. Anwander, *Die Religionen der Menschheit*, pp. 116 sqq.

him the oak trees, whence his name Perkunas (he who resides in the oak). Later they lost the name Deivos entirely and called their supreme being *Bog*. Bog was a sun-god, who occupied a central position in the Slavic pantheon. Brückner quotes Helmold of Bosau (13th century) as saying: "Among all the divine forces to whom they (the Slavs) assign heather and forest, sorrow and joy, they do not deny that one God in heaven thrones over all the rest"; but he thinks that the belief referred to was influenced by Christian doctrines.⁹¹ The religious beliefs of the *Lithuanians* are not yet cleared up. In the time of St. Adalbert they kindled sacred fires in honor of Perkunas and had a priesthood who offered sacrifices to that god.⁹²

2. The Semitic Religions

A) THE RELIGION OF THE BABYLONIANS.—
The name *Ilu*, which the Assyrians and Baby-

⁹¹ Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 4th ed., Tübingen, 1925, Vol. II, pp. 506, 514, 519.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 533. On the sources for the religious beliefs of the Slavs and Lithuanians, which are scarce and not very reliable, see Brückner, *ibid.*, pp. 507-509 and 525. Such recent monographs as exist, are practically worthless, except Ant. Mierzysnki, *Mythologiae Lituanicae Monumenta*, 2 vols., Warsaw, 1892 and 1896, a collection of source materials up to the middle of the 15th century. (*Ibid.*, p. 525).

lonians gave to their principal god, indicates that he was identical with the Hebrew *El*.

The name *Ilu* is found in Babylonian inscriptions dating as far back as 2,500 B. C. It occurs frequently in proper names, such as *Ilu-amranni* (God, look at me), *Ilu-turam* (God, harken to me again), *Ilûma-Ilu* (God is God). The name of the capital city, Babel, in its original form contains the word *Ilu*, *Bab-Ilu*, i. e., portal of God.⁹³ F. Delitzsch undoubtedly went too far when he concluded from this wide-spread use of the name *Ilu* "that these Northern Semitic tribes . . . about 2,500 B. C. . . . conceived and venerated God as one spiritual being."⁹⁴ There is no proof that *Ilu* was worshipped as the one supreme god of the Babylonians, though we may legitimately conclude that his memory survived for a long time in the consciousness of the people.

The leading place among the gods of Babylonia at the beginning of recorded history belonged to the triad Anu, Bel,⁹⁵ and Ea. However, these three deities were not worshipped as

⁹³ F. Delitzsch, *Babel und Bibel*, 2nd ed., Leipsic, 1903, p. 73.

⁹⁴ *Babel und Bibel*, 2nd ed., p. 72. Cfr. P. Keil, *Babel- und Bibelfrage*, Treves, 1903, pp. 19 sqq.

⁹⁵ Bel is the older lection; at present the name is read *Ellil* or *En-lil*. Cfr. H. Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder zum Alten Testamente*, Tübingen, 1909, p. 3, n. 3.

equals. Anu, god of the sky, is the highest, whom all the other gods obey. But his power is already beginning to wane, and he is mentioned but rarely in the liturgical documents that have come down to us. True, the other gods show him great reverence, and he is ranked above them; but his influence upon earthly affairs is exercised entirely through the medium of others. Bel (Enlil=god of the earth) has also withdrawn, and in the nether regions Ea, god of the ocean, has assumed the reins of government. His cult is most frequently in evidence. At the side of these three great gods an important place is held by the goddess *Ishtar*, also called Nin-makh, *i. e.*, "Great Lady," who is generally added to the triad after Ea.⁹⁶

In the age of Hammurapi (about 2,300 B. C.) it is asserted that *Marduk*, the son of Ea, originally a sun-god and protector of Babylon, was venerated as the supreme god of the Babylonians. Hammurapi himself says that he brought about the final triumph of Marduk. At a later period the Babylonian pantheon was artificially enlarged until every vestige of Monotheism was lost and Polytheism reigned supreme.

⁹⁶ F. Jeremias in Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 498 sqq.

B) THE RELIGION OF THE ASSYRIANS.—The religion of the ancient Assyrians differed from that of the Babylonians only in this respect, that their national deity, Asshûr, stood at the head of the great triad. Asshûr is worshipped by the Assyrians as king of the gods and creator of heaven and earth; his throne is high up in the sky. He is "the prince of the gods," "the omniscient one who fixeth destinies," etc.⁹⁷

But the idea of one God, which existed in an almost pure form among the early Assyrians, gradually became obscured as the number of deities multiplied and superstition, star-worship, and sorcery grew apace.⁹⁸

C) THE RELIGION OF THE PHŒNICIANS.—The name of the chief god of the Phœnicians,

⁹⁷ A. Condamin, S.J., "The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria" in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, Vol. I, p. 4; E. R. Hull, S.J., *Archaic Religions*, pp. 108 sqq.; Jeremias, *l. c.* (see note 96), pp. 536 sqq.) The quoted phrases are from an ancient hymn translated by F. Scheil.

⁹⁸ Condamin, *l. c.*, p. 18. On the religion of the ancient Babylonians and Assyrians see H. Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, Leipsic, 1893-1901; Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der babylonischen Religion*, Leipsic, 1901; A. Ungnad, *Die Religion der Babylonier und Assyrier*, Jena, 1921; Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament*, Oxford, 1912; M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898 (enlarged German edition under the title, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1902-12); P. Dhorme, *La Religion Assyro-Babylonienne*, Paris, 1910; J. Jeremias, *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur*, Leipsic, 1913; J. Hehn, *Die biblische und die babylonische Gottes-*

El, reveals the primitive connection of their religion with the Monotheism of the Hebrews. *El* does not occur as often in the documents and inscriptions that have come down to us as *Baal* (Lord) and *Melek* (King) ; but there can be no reasonable doubt that *El* enjoyed a certain prestige among the gods of ancient Phœnicia, since Philo reports that *El* was the supreme god of Byblos, though he had no temple and no established cult.

The common denominator of the different local deities is *Baal*, the great lord of heaven, from whom both good and evil was believed to emanate. But the name *Baal* did not always designate the same deity. It was a generic term, as its combination with the names of various cities shows. There were many Baals or *Baalim*. The *Baal* of one city was not identical with that of another. But the lack of proper names for these different deities and their common name *Baal*, which means "lord," sufficiently indicates that the religion of the Phœnicians was originally Monotheistic or at least Henotheistic.

At a later period *Melkarth*, that is, "King of the City" (*i. e.*, Tyre), is most frequently mentioned. This fact is attributable to the pre-

eminent position which the city of Tyre occupied at that time. Occasionally Melkarth is simply called "Baal of Tyre." Melkarth, it may be noted, is one of those numerous forms of the name *Melek* (identical with the Biblical Moloch), which was variously compounded with the names of cities, gods, and persons. Melek was worshipped as the sun-god.

The two female companions of Baal and Melek, *Baalat* and *Milkat*, are merely the infamous Ashtart (Astarte) under another name. Her worship was later connected with the cult of Adonis, in honor of Adon, the god of the spring sun.

We must also mention the seven or eight *Kabirim* ("mighty ones") who, according to Philo, were regarded as the protectors of shipping. They have not yet been traced in ancient inscriptions, and were probably, like so many others, added to the original list of Phœnician deities at a later period.

Among the Phœnicians, as among other nations, the number of gods constantly increased and, as a consequence, the true idea of God became obscured and the people finally lost sight of the Monotheistic origin of their religious worship.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Fr. Jeremias in Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der*

D) THE RELIGION OF THE SYRIANS.—It is difficult to trace the development of the religion of ancient Syria, because that country was “the confluence and the sink of nations,” constantly exposed to foreign influences, and no contemporary sources of information are available. It is important to note, however, that the inscriptions of Sendshirli (eighth century), besides *Hadad*, whom later writers call the highest god of the Syrians, also mention *El*, whose rôle is indicated by the proper name of Sassariel, *i. e.*, “El is the king of kings.” This seems to indicate that El, the Jehovah of the Hebrews, was at an earlier period acknowledged and worshipped also in Syria. His name has been preserved among the people in the form “*Alloho*.”¹⁰⁰

E) THE RELIGION OF THE ARABS.—The pre-Islamic Arabs worshipped, as their highest god, *Allah* ('Ilâh=god; 'Allâh [=al-'Ilâh]=the

Religionsgeschichte, 4th ed., Tübingen, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 629-647. Cfr. E. Meyer's article on Phœnician deities in Roscher's *Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, and the article “Phœnicia” by the same writer in Cheyne-Black's *Encyclopædia Biblica*, London, 1902; Max Ohnefalsch-Richter, *Kypros, die Bibel und Homer*, Berlin, 1893; W. Baudissin, *Adonis und Esmun*, Leipsic, 1911; J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough. A Study in Magic and Religion*, Part IV: *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914; J. Leipoldt, *Sterbende und auferstehende Götter*, Leipsic, 1923.

¹⁰⁰ On “The Religion of Ancient Syria” cfr. G. S. Hitchcock in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, Vol. I, London, 1910.

God, *i. e.*, the one, true God). The most important among the minor deities were Manat, Allat, and Aluzza, whom tradition designates as daughters of Allah.¹

¹ Chantepie De la Saussaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 648 sqq.; E. Power, S.J., in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, Vol. IV, "The Religion of the Koran"; Th. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, London, 1926, pp. 183 sqq.; Th. P. Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam*, 2nd ed., London, 1896; J. Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Edinburgh, 1908-1921 s. v.; A. von Kremer, *Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, Leipsic, 1868; Carra de Vaux, *Les Penseurs de l'Islam*, 4 vols., Paris, 1921-23; I. Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, 2 vols., Halle, 1889 sq.; C. H. Becker, *Islamstudien*, Vol. I, Berlin, 1924; D. B. MacDonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory*, London, 1903; IDEM, *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, Chicago, 1909; IDEM, *Aspects of Islam*, New York, 1911; T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, 2nd ed., London, 1913; A. Mez, *Die Renaissance des Islams*, Heidelberg, 1922; E. Sell, *The Faith of Islam*, London, 1880; M. Hartmann, *Der Islam*, Leipsic, 1909; D. G. Hogarth, *Arabia*, Oxford, 1922; I. Guidi, *L'Arabie Antéislamique*, Paris, 1921; W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, 2nd ed., London, 1894; H. Lammens, S.J., *Le Berceau de l'Islam*, Rome, 1914; IDEM, *L'Islam, Croyances et Institutions*, Beyrouth, 1926; H. Hirschfeld, *Jüdische Elemente im Koran*, Berlin, 1878; D. S. Margoliouth, *The Relations between Arabs and Israelites prior to the Rise of Islam*, London, 1924; Alois Musil, *Arabia Petraea*, 3 vols., Vienna, 1897 sq.; W. Muir, *The Life of Mohammad*, rev. ed. by T. H. Weir, Edinburgh, 1912; Th. Nöldeke, *Geschichte des Qorâns*, 2nd ed., by Fr. Schwally, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1909, 1919; D. Nielsen, N. Rhodokanakis, and Fr. Hommel, *Handbuch der arabischen Altertumskunde*, Vol. I, *Die Altarabische Kultur*, Kopenhagen, 1927. Dr. Nielsen, treating at length of the religious life of ancient Arabia, says that Il, Ilâh, al Ilâhu, Allâh, was the great national lunar deity and adds: "The possibility cannot be denied that Il once was what he later became, a spiritual, personal god, having

The central sanctuary of the supreme god, whose essence was conceived as the plenitude of divinity, was the Kaaba at Mecca. The worship that was practiced there was common to all the tribes of the Arab nation; it prevented the various local deities from gaining a foothold and later made it possible for Muhammad (Mohammed) to raise Allah, whose name and cult had never entirely concealed his Monotheistic origin, to the rank of the one and only god of the Arabs.

F) THE RELIGION OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS.—Scholars are at variance as to the nature and development of the religion of ancient Egypt. De Rougé, Pierret, Le Page Renouf, and Lieblein held that the original cult of the Egyptians was Monotheistic and that "the later phases of religious development were much cruder than the earlier ones and interspersed with magic elements."² To this contention it has been objected that the most ancient usages in connection with the handling of the dead were tainted with magic superstitions and that the

nothing to do with any nature cult."—The best translations of the Koran into English are those by J. M. Rodwell, 2nd ed., London, 1876 (which gives the *sures* in chronological order) and by E. H. Palmer in the *Sacred Books of the East*, London, 1880.

² Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 3rd ed., Vol. I, p. 191.

sources for the early history of Egyptian religious worship do not flow as freely as those for its later phases. However, the former of these two facts merely proves that pure Monotheism no longer flourished in Egypt at the dawn of history, though we must not forget that most of the documents that are quoted to illustrate the prevalence of superstition among the ancient Egyptians date from a later age.³ The second fact, namely, that the ancient sources are deficient, is no argument, since the paucity of sources might be alleged in favor of either view. The testimonies that have been lost may have established the purity of the ancient religious worship just as likely as the contrary. That the number of gods worshipped in Egypt increased constantly in course of time, is admitted by those who hold that it is impossible to form an adequate notion of the earliest form of the Egyptian religion.⁴

The Egyptian mythology, which in part at least reaches back to the fourth millennium B. C., shows some traces of Monotheism. The

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ A. Wiedemann, *Religion der alten Ägypter*, Münster i. W., 1890, pp. 2 sq.; IDEM, in *Hastings' Dictionary*, extra vol., 1904, pp. 176-197; A. Mallon, in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, Vol. I; Steindorff, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, London, 1905.

chief figure in the pantheon was the sun-god *Râ*, who was worshipped more generally than any other deity. His cult was not a purely local one though the sun under some other name was worshipped here and there also as a local deity. *Râ*'s dominion over gods and men dates from the earliest period of history. The phrase, "since the time of *Râ*," was frequently used to indicate remote antiquity. *Râ* retained a certain precedence even at a later period, after *Osiris* had usurped his place as pattern-exemplar of the Egyptian kings. For while the latter governed men only, *Râ* ruled at a time when gods and men were still united under one scepter. When, about 200 B. C., at Thebes, *Râ* and *Amon* were amalgamated into one deity, called *Amon-Râ*, *Amon* lost his former prestige as the god of fertility or god of the dead and, with *Râ*, became the sun-god. To *Amon-Râ* was dedicated the gigantic temple of Karnak, upon which every generation spent new labor and which grew worthy to be considered one of the seven wonders of the world. Many of the hymns sung in honor of *Râ* have an almost purely Monotheistic trend. He is exalted as "singular in his forms amid the gods, the beautiful progenitor of the divine nine, the highest of all the gods, the lord of truth and

father of the gods, the fashioner of man, the creator of brute beasts, the master of all that exists, . . . who is kind-hearted towards those that invoke him.”⁵ He says of himself:—

I am he that hath made the heavens and the earth, that hath lifted up the mountains and created all that is upon them.

I am he that hath made the water and created the great abyss.

I am he that hath created the firmament and covered therewith the two horizons; and I have placed therein the souls of the gods.

I am he who if he openeth his eyes produceth light, and if he closeth them the darkness; he that maketh the water of the Nile to rise at his command; he of whose name the gods themselves are ignorant.

I am he that maketh the hours and giveth birth to the days. I am he that sendeth the feasts of the year and maketh the inundations.

I am he that maketh the flame of life to rise, that the labours in the fields may be permitted.

In the morning I am Khopri, and at midday Râ, and in the evening Atum.

This, as Fr. Hull notes, “is exalted theology, and a corrective of much that is inferior elsewhere. For instance, it asserts the one Supreme God, creator of all things—even the ocean and

⁵ A. Wiedemann, *Religion der alten Ägypter*, pp. 64 sq.

chaos and darkness out of which he is said to have emerged. The other gods are manifestly treated as inferior beings, and therefore creatures of limited capacity, not to be confused with himself. In short, primitive Egypt at its best stands forth as a witness to a simple theism, expressed naïvely here and there in human terms and images, but otherwise not to be found fault with."⁶

The Egyptian religion of later times is inseparably associated with animal-worship of a

⁶ E. R. Hull, S.J., *Archaic Religions*, pp. 114 sq.; cfr. Wiedemann, *op. cit.*; Chr. Pesch, S.J., *Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen des Altertums*, pp. 115 sqq. Of all the ancient religions, that of Egypt seems to be the most complex. (Cfr. Th. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, London, 1926, p. 71). The sources in S. Birch, *Records of the Past*, Vols. II, IV, VI, VIII, XII (London, 1873-1881) and A. H. Sayce, Vols. II to VI of the new series, London, 1888-1892; J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Vols. I-V (1906-1907); Ad. Ermann, *Die Literatur der Aegypter*, Leipsic, 1923; IDEM, *Die ägyptische Religion*, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1909; G. Maspero, *Les Contes Populaires de l'Égypte Ancienne*, 4th ed., 1911; G. Roeder, *Urkunden zur Religion des alten Aegypten, übersetzt und eingeleitet*, Jena, 1915; Th. Hoppner, *Fontes Historiae Religionis Aegyptiacae*, Bonn, 1922 sqq.; P. Lacau, *Textes Religieux Égyptiens*, Paris, 1910; R. Lepsius, *Das Totenbuch der Aegypter*, Leipsic, 1842; E. A. W. Budge, *The Chapters of Coming Forth by Day, or the Theban Recension of the Book of the Dead*, 3 vols., London, 1910; IDEM, *The Book of the Dead*, 2 vols., London, 1913; IDEM, *Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life*, London, 1899; Th. G. Allen, *Horus in the Pyramid Texts*, Chicago, 1916; P. Boylan, *Thoth, the Hermes of Egypt*, London, 1922.

degrading kind. But this arose only in the last period, *i. e.*, from the 7th century B. C. downwards. Previous to this nothing similar can be detected.

If from our present coign of vantage we survey the course of development taken by religion in Egypt, we find that it approaches Monotheism in more than one respect, but recedes from pure Monotheism in proportion as it recedes from its own beginnings.

We part from the Semitic tribes with the conviction that all of them preserved definite traces of Monotheism in their religious beliefs and practices. Ernest Renan sought the explanation of this remarkable fact in what he termed the "Monotheistic instinct" of the Semites and the "Monotheistic character of the desert."⁷ But this is an arbitrary assumption not borne out by facts. The Semitic tribes were driven with almost irresistible force into Polytheism. Even the Hebrew people, the only ancient nation that preserved its Monotheism pure, showed a strong tendency towards Polytheism, and it was owing only to the repeated and powerful intervention of the prophets that Monotheism survived

⁷ "*Le desert est monothéiste*"; *cfr. Histoire Générale et Système Comparé des Langues Sémitiques*, Paris, 1855.

among the Chosen People. Hence it would be more correct to speak of a Polytheistic than of a Monotheistic instinct among the Semitic nations.

Nor is it true that the desert is Monotheistic in character. On the contrary, Monotheism has nowhere survived in the desert. The descendants of Ishmael,—who was a faithful adherent of Jehovah when he went to live in the desert,—all without exception became Polytheists, and the Israelites made their first attempt to repudiate Jehovah when they set up the golden calf in the desert.

3. *The Religion of the Chinese*

All we know about the religious beliefs of ancient China, whose inhabitants probably came straight from the banks of the Euphrates about 3000 B. C., is contained in the sources preserved for us by CONFUCIUS (Kong-tse=teacher of the Kong race), who lived in the seventh century B. C. His statements can be accepted without hesitation, since he was a highly conservative reformer, who had but one aim, namely, "to restore the former state of felicity on the basis of the existing conditions and of the remnants that had been preserved from ancient times."⁸

⁸ R. Dvořák, *Chinas Religionen*, Vol. I, *Confucius und seine*

Though Confucius never expressly mentions God or Heaven, he was not an atheist. His standpoint is that of an orthodox Chinese, whose religious views coincide with those commonly held by the people of his day.⁹ He regarded *Thian* (Heaven) as the supreme being, who governs the destinies of men, rules over life and death, and bestows earthly possessions and dignities. A crime against *Thian* is the worst that can be committed, because when man turns away from Heaven, he has no one to whom he can pray. The whole universe is animated by *manes* (spirits), which are the executive organs of the supreme master and serve as intermediaries between him and the human race.¹⁰ This theory of the Supreme Being led Legge, Faber, Happel,

Lehre, Münster i. W., 1895, p. 217; L. Wieger, S.J., "The Religion of China" in *Lectures on the History of Religions*, Vol. I, pp. 11 sqq. T. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, London, 1926, p. 52, says: ". . . Confucius himself, for all practical purposes, left religion on one side, content to recognize traditional duties and perform conventional rites, while he devoted his main thinking to the establishment of a really high order of practical life."

⁹ Dvořák, *l. c.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 218 sqq. On Confucianism see Chs. F. Aiken in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. IV, pp. 223-228; J. J. M. De Groot, *The Religious Systems of China*, 3 vols., Leyden, 1892-1912; *Idem*, *The Religion of the Chinese*, New York, 1910; J. Edkins, *Religion in China*, London, 1884; J. Legge, *The Religions of China*, New York, 1881; R. K. Douglas, *Confucianism and Táoism*, London,

and other scholars to list the religion of ancient China among the Monotheistic religions of antiquity, especially since an even purer notion of God is found in the teachings of LAO-TSE, who lived a short time before Confucius. The theology of Lao-tse, in the opinion of a recent writer, is probably the highest achievement of its kind, not merely in China, but in the whole cultured world of the pre-Christian era, eastern as well as western.¹¹ His fundamental notions, as the parallel passages between his teaching and that of Confucius show, are typically Chinese.¹² Confucius himself describes Lao-tse as a scholar who "is well-informed with regard to the old and also knows the new," and it was for this reason that he chose him for his teacher.¹³

Lao-tse calls the supreme being *Tâo* (Intellect, Logos, the Absolute, Eternal). Hence his religion is termed *Tâoism*. While every other

1900; C. de Harlez, *Les Religions de la Chine*, Leipsic, 1891; E. H. Parker, *China and Religion*, London, 1905; L. Wieger, S.J., *Histoire des Croyances Religieuses et des Opinions Philosophiques en Chine*, Paris, 1922; M. Granet, *La Religion des Chinois*, Paris, 1922; W. Grube, *Religion und Kultus der Chinesen*, Leipsic, 1910; O. Franke, "Die Chinesen," in Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 4th ed., Vol. I, pp. 193 sqq.

¹¹ Dvořák, *Chinas Religionen*, Vol. II, p. 141; Wieger, *l. c.*, p. 12.

¹² Dvořák, *l. c.*

¹³ Dvořák, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Robinson, *Outline*, pp. 139 sqq.

kind of being is born from non-being (*i. e.*, created out of nothing), Tão has no cause, but exists by himself, is eternal, spiritual, omnipresent, the creator of Heaven and earth. In him are contained the archetypes of all things. He preserves and protects all his creatures and is the sole cause of their perfection and sanctification. Already in ancient times, according to Lao-tse, Tão was "the most highly regarded under heaven," because he allowed himself to be found by those who sought forgiveness of their sins.¹⁴ Unfortunately, this pure concept of God did not long survive. Under the Chou dynasty, 1122 to 213 B. C., a process of gradual degeneration set in. Religion was overloaded with divination, astrology, sorcery, the infiltration of aboriginal fetish worship, the importation of foreign ideas from Zoroastrianism and Brahminism. The sublime ruler was viewed under many aspects, and these came to be personified, so as to result in a sort of incipient polytheism. This looks like an endeavor to break down the monopoly of the

¹⁴ Dvořák, *op. cit.*, pp. 36 sqq. On Tãoism see, besides the works cited, A. Réville, *La Religion Chinoise*, Paris, 1889; J. Legge, *The Texts of Tãoism*, in *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. III, 1879, Vol. XVI, 1882, and Vols. XXVII-XXVIII, 1885; J. J. M. de Groot, *On the Origin of the Tãoist Church*, in *Transactions of the Third International Congress of the History of Religions*, Oxford, 1908; W. Grube, *Tãoistischer Schöpfungsmythus*, Berlin, 1896; L. Wieger, S.J., *Tãoisme*, Paris, 1911-13.

emperor, by dividing God into parts and worshipping him piecemeal. There also grew up an inferior conception of the transcendent beings, who became vulgarized, began to eat and drink like men, and put on animal forms. Besides the benevolent *manes* of their own ancestors, mischievous spirits or demons are introduced, probably from India. Fear of ghosts, and especially the dread of hunger in the life beyond the grave, takes possession of the popular mind. Another sign of Indian influence is the introduction of *sati*, or the burning of relations, animals, etc., on the pyre of the dead. Servants even committed suicide in order to act as messengers between the living and the dead.¹⁵

Later on, about A. D. 65, Buddhism was introduced into China and became the leading religion, while the Tâoism of Lao-tse was prohibited on account of the revolutionary tendencies of its followers, and Confucianism was forgotten because of the dryness of its doctrines. Attempts were made in later centuries to revive these two religions, and with some success. But

¹⁵ Hull, *Archaic Religions*, Bombay, 1913, pp. 137 sq.; Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 220 sqq.; W. S. Lilly, *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*, 2nd ed., London, 1885, pp. 109 sqq. On the similarity in principle between Buddhism and Tâoism, see J. Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, London, 1880, p. 373.

the popular notion that Confucianism is the religion of China is altogether a mistake. The official religion (down to the recent declaration of the republic) always retained its primitive form. Buddhism became the religion of the people, who, as we have seen, were professedly debarred from the true Chinese religion by the Emperor's monopoly. Shintoism (a modified form of Tâoism) and Confucianism became the religion of certain of the select classes merely. The system of Chuhsi, a sort of materialistic monism singularly akin to that of Haeckel, has for the last thousand years been the official philosophy of the learned.¹⁶

The Chinese, therefore, have had the same experience as the Indo-Germanic and Semitic na-

¹⁶ Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 138; Chantepie de la Saussaye, *op. cit.*, p. 229 sqq. A fine specimen of the Confucian doctrine is *The Great Plan* (*Shû King*, Pt. V, Bk. IV, pp. 139 sqq.), of which an English translation may be seen in W. S. Lilly, *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*, 2nd ed., London, 1885, pp. 116-121. On Buddhism in China see further: E. Eitel, *Three Lectures on Buddhism*, Hong-kong, 1871; S. Beal, *Buddhism in China*, London, 1884; H. Hackmann, *Buddhism as a Religion*, London, 1910; R. F. Johnston, *Buddhist China*, London, 1913; J. J. M. de Groot, *Der Thûpa, das heiligste Heiligtum des Buddhismus in China*, Berlin, 1919.—On the canon of the Chinese Buddhists, *Tripitaka*, see O. Franke in Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 4th ed., Vol. I, pp. 240 sqq.—On the Lamaism of Tibet, IDEM, *ibid.*, pp. 247-255; C. F. Koeppen, *Die lamaische Hierarchie und Kirche*, Berlin, 1859; E. Schlagintweit, *Buddhism in Tibet*, London, 1863; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895.

tions: they gradually sank from a high plane of Monotheistic thought and life to the level of Polytheistic superstitions and abuses.

4. *The Religion of the Primitives*

In the minds of many the term "primitives" is so inseparably connected with Fetishism and Animism, sorcery and Ancestor Worship, that these races are regarded as absolutely destitute of a belief in one Supreme Being. This theory is in fact a postulate of materialistic evolution, which regards the uncultured Negro as scarcely superior to his alleged ancestor, the anthropoid ape. How far removed this view is from the truth, careful investigations among many primitive races have latterly proved. It may now be set down as an incontestable fact that, generally speaking, the traces of Monotheism are more clearly discernible among the primitive races than among the cultured nations of pagan antiquity.

A. THE PRIMITIVE RACES OF AFRICA.—Among the primitive races of Africa there is such a close connection of religious beliefs and views that the late Bishop Schneider entitled his classic work on the subject, "The Religion [not

Religions] of the Primitive Races of Africa." ¹⁷

Hence it is not necessary for our purpose to examine all these races separately, but it will suffice to mention those that are commonly believed to be destitute of religious beliefs and those that are distinguished for the purity of their religious idéas.

Let us begin our survey on the west coast of Africa. The *Negroes of the Gold Coast* of Northern Guinea, that classic land of Animism, sorcery, and Fetishism, clearly distinguish between Yankompon, the creator and lord of the world, and the created spirits subject to him. They salute him as the father and greatest benefactor of mankind. Yankompon, it is true, also inflicts evil; but kindness and benevolence are his predominant traits. ¹⁸

The *Ewe* races, according to earliest and recent reports, worship Mawu, the all-conquering, transcendent god, the creator and preserver of the world, who permeates the universe after the manner of the ether as a personal and primitive power. ¹⁹

The *Jabus* in the delta of the Niger have a

¹⁷ *Die Religion der afrikanischen Naturvölker*, Münster i. W., 1891; see the Introduction.

¹⁸ W. Schneider, *Die Religion der afrikanischen Naturvölker*, pp. 28 sqq.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

vague inkling of a higher, invisible being, whom they regard as the author of all that exists. Their neighbors, the *Ibos*, call this deity Tshuku, or Tshi (*i. e.*, Heaven) and attribute to him the creation, preservation, and government of the world. Tshuku is kindly disposed towards men, determines their fate, rewards them for the good they do, and punishes them for their wicked deeds.²⁰

The inhabitants of Kamerun, both *Bantus* and *Sudanese*, seem to feel little need of religion, but some of the native tribes entertain a more or less distinct belief in a supreme creator.²¹

The Negroes of the *Gaboon* and *Ogowe* countries believe in a supreme being who created the world and then withdrew from it forever. They call this being Aniambia and say that he created the spirits, sends death, and tolerates sorcery.²²

In South Africa the San, usually called *Bushmen* (from the Dutch *Bosjeman*), nomadic hunters, chiefly confined to the Kalahari Desert, are on about the same low level of culture as the natives of Australia and Tierra del Fuego. Yet they believe in an invisible being residing in

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 42 sq.; cfr. A. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 27 sq., 114 sqq.; J. Deniker, *The Races of Man*, 1900.

²² W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

Heaven, whom they invoke in prayer and venerate by means of dances. The name of this being is *Kage*. The Bushmen regard *Kage* as the creator of all things and say that he was good in the beginning, but changed his disposition in consequence of having had to fight too many battles.

One tribe of the Bushmen, the *Makolong*, have a purer idea of the deity than the others. They hold that *Kaang* (= *Kage*) is the lord of creation, invisible to the eye, but perceptible through the heart. He sends rain and drought, life and death, and the *Makolong* appeal to him in every need.²³

The *Hottentots* (or *Koi-Koin*, as they call themselves) inhabit the Cape of Good Hope province, where they are now somewhat advanced from their former extreme degradation. Sir John Lubbock counted them among the races entirely destitute of religion, but we know now that they believe in a supreme being, who resides above the stars, has created all things, and rules

²³ *Op. cit.* pp. 48 sqq. Cfr. W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Die Stellung der Pygmäenvölker in der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen in Studien und Forschungen zur Menschen- und Völkerkunde*, VI-VII, Stuttgart, 1910, pp. 237 sqq., and the same author's work, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, Vol. I, pp. 132 sqq. Father Schmidt victoriously sustains the thesis that almost purely Monotheistic ideas existed among certain absolutely primitive nations. (Cfr. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 113 sqq.)

the world with great power. His name is *Gounja*, i. e., Great Chief.²⁴

The *Kaffirs* form the second group of primitives in South Africa. They were at one time believed to lack the very idea of God, but upon closer investigation have been found to possess the notion of a supreme creative spirit, a life-giving and death-dealing power and an omnipotent providence which rules the universe.²⁵

The *Makalaka*, who form a link between the South African Negroes and the natives of the Zambesi country in the interior of the Dark Continent, profess belief in a supreme being who is benevolent and lives in Heaven.²⁶

Of the eighty-two tribes in the *Zambesi* country, among whom the *Marutse* and *Mabunda* are prominent, one of the best authorities on the subject writes: "The Bantu family, before its division into the numerous tribes with which we meet to-day, believed in a powerful and invisible god; among the *Marutse* this belief persists in a purer form than among any of the

²⁴ Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilization*, pp. 224, 388, 409; W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 53 sq.; Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, Vol. I, pp. 133 sqq.

²⁵ W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 sq.

²⁶ W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

other Bantu tribes. They acknowledge an invisible, omniscient lord, who closely observes the conduct of men and deals with every one according to his good pleasure. They are afraid to utter the name of this being and usually employ another word to designate him. . . . The true name of this being is Nambe Njambe." ²⁷

The religion of the *central African races* has not been sufficiently explored to justify any positive statements as to their beliefs.

The *Baynazi*, who inhabit the country between the mouth of the Quango and the Equator, believe in a supreme spirit, Ndsakumba, to whom they ascribe the creation of the world, which in their opinion is governed by lower spirits, known as Virimu. The *Babumba* and the *Bateke* also believe in one god. ²⁸

Surprisingly well developed is the religious consciousness of the *Pygmies*, a race of Central African Negritos found chiefly in the great forests of the equatorial belt. They are timid and their level of culture is very low. Bishop Le Roy reports, as the result of his own investigations and those of his fellow missionaries, that

²⁷ E. Holub, *Sieben Jahre in Südafrika*, Vol. II, Vienna, 1881, p. 337, quoted by W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 78; cfr. A. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, pp. 114 sqq.; C. Meinhof, *Afrikanische Religionen*, Berlin, 1912.

²⁸ W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

these tribes, which are probably descended from the original inhabitants of that region, possess no amulets and adore neither fetishes nor spirits, but recognize a supreme being, whom they worship with prayer and sacrifices. All things belong to him. He is invisible, but sees everything that happens in the world, rewards the good and punishes the wicked.²⁹

Concerning the religious notions of the tribes living between the Kassai and the Tanganyika, we have no reliable information, except that the *Bashilanges* worship a good spirit residing in heaven, of whom they believe that he has created and preserves all things, rewards the good and punishes the wicked.³⁰

The tribes that live around *Lake Tanganyika* believe in a god, whom they call Kabesa and venerate as the creator of the world; he resides in heaven and receives the good and rejects the bad after death.³¹

The *Negro tribes of East Africa* recognize a supreme being, whom most of them call Mulungu. He is believed to be the creator of all

²⁹ *Les Pygmées*, Tours, 1905, pp. 175 sqq.; IDEM, *The Religion of the Primitives*, *passim*; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Die Stellung der Pygmäenvölker*, pp. 231 sqq.; IDEM, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, Vol. I, p. 113.

³⁰ W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

things and the author of whatever is good. They sacrifice to this being when in need of assistance, and honor him by petty gifts, which they offer at meal time.³²

The *Yorubas* of Southern Nigeria, according to the latest student of their religious beliefs, Dr. Stephen S. Farrow, recognize four distinct classes of spiritual beings, viz.: (1) a Supreme Being, infinitely good, and unique; (2) a multitude of lesser deities, called *orishas*; (3) the spirits of the dead (ancestor-worship, etc.); (4) an evil spirit, who takes precedence of all those in Class 2, and who inspired the leading orisha, *Ifa*. On this remarkable system of religious beliefs Dr. Farrow observes: "Scientifically, these four classes fall into two divisions: Classes 2, 3, and 4 comprise a full system of Polydæmonism, or 'Animism,' not in Dr. Tylor's narrower sense of the word, but in its widest application. The Supreme Being of Class 1 is entirely left out of the Yoruba Animistic system, from which the belief in Him is quite distinct, and to which it is clearly anterior. It is plainly the remnant of an ancient Monotheism." In confirmation of this conclusion, Dr. Farrow lays stress on certain significant facts. Thus, he observes that there is a vast difference between the highest orisha and

³² *Op. cit.*, pp. 88 sq.

the Supreme Deity, and he asks the pointed question: "If the latter is a development of Animism, why is there no trace of any connection?" And, again, after noting that "the Supreme Being is not worshipped, but left in the background," he adds: "How is this to be reconciled with the opinion that belief in Him is a development of the lower faith? The opposite result should be found." It is further added that the belief in the Supreme Being is most jealously guarded by the highest of the heathen priests, who have never come under any Christian influence, and it is enshrined in an ancient Yoruba lyric poem, of which a translation is given.*

* S. S. Farrow, *Faith, Fancies, and Fetich: or, Yoruba Paganism. Being Some Account of the Religious Beliefs of the West African Negroes, particularly of the Yoruba Tribes of Southern Nigeria*, London, 1927. In a lengthy review of this book W. H. Kent in his trenchant way calls attention to certain facts which deserve special consideration in connection with the study of religion among the "primitives." He says *inter alia*:

"The missionary, like all other teachers, must needs have a full and accurate knowledge of the doctrine he is to teach to his hearers. But for many reasons it is no less necessary that he should have a real knowledge and understanding of their previous beliefs, the measure of their knowledge of truth, and the nature of their errors and prejudices. Without this the most accurate and luminous exposition of the true doctrine may often be foredoomed to failure. For the errors must be removed and eradicated to gain admission for the truth, and this cannot be done very effectually by one who has only a vague notion of their nature. And the truth itself cannot well be presented in a manner really intelligible and attractive to the hearers unless the teacher

Thus we find among the primitive races of Africa a wide-spread belief in one supreme being, in whom they see the creator of the world and the author of all good things, without, however, always rendering him due worship or honors. This god and his cult are nearly everywhere

has a fair notion of the amount of their previous knowledge and of their ways, and of their habits of thought and language. . . . But, unfortunately, it is often a matter of peculiar difficulty for the Christian teacher to get a real knowledge of the mind of his pagan pupils and the nature of their beliefs and superstitions. We all know how strangely our own doctrines and devotions have been misapprehended and distorted by some of our non-Catholic countrymen, in spite of the fact that they speak the same language and have the same national habits and fashions of thought. And from this we may gather how easily European travellers may be led to form erroneous notions of the real beliefs of Negro pagans, whose language and customs and religion are so widely different from our own. To acquire a true knowledge of their beliefs and so to be in a position to correct the mistaken impressions too often put on record by more superficial observers, a missionary must live among the natives for a considerable time and make himself familiar with their language and customs and characteristics. Happily, as we have seen before now from the valuable papers by Father Schebesta and other Catholic missionaries, brought together in the records of 'La Semaine d'Ethnographie Religieuse,' many of our missionaries have already done this necessary service among various tribes in many parts of the world. And while their papers have a high scientific value, the better knowledge of the native religions resulting from their patient and prolonged study of the subject will do much to facilitate the conversion of these tribes to Christian truth. . . . Such studies on religious beliefs and superstitions may be of good use to theologians and Christian apologists as well as to those who labor in the missionary field. Those who are familiar with earlier

among these tribes relegated to the background, and the spirits of ancestors are worshipped by sorcery and all sorts of superstitious practices. "The African idea of God nowhere bears traces of a joyous development, but shows incontestable signs of stunted growth and the distortion of

writers on Natural Theology and Christian Apologetics will remember the importance attached to the argument from the common consent of mankind, and the attention given to the possibility of attaining to knowledge of religious truth among the heathen nations, whether by the light of reason or by remnants of tradition. And we may be sure that the old theologians who were occupied with these problems would have welcomed any fresh evidence as to the religious beliefs prevailing in hitherto unknown or little known heathen lands. But in these days, when evolutionary philosophers come forward with new-fangled theories on the origin of religion, whether in Nature Worship, or Animism, or the Worship of Ancestors, there is more need than ever of a serious and systematic study of the tenets and practices of these pagan tribes. For these questions are no longer left in the hands of theologians who work on the time-labored lines of tradition. And we have to do with a new science of Comparative Religion in which the divers forms of religious beliefs and worship are treated by the scientific methods already made familiar by such well-established sciences as Comparative Anatomy and Comparative Philology. It is idle to object that there is a deeper element in religion which cannot be reached by the instruments and methods employed with such eminent success in the field of natural science, and to urge the necessity of the student of Comparative Religion being a man of religion as well as a man of science. An anthropologist who had to treat of the music cultivated by various African or Australian tribes would surely recognize the need of musical knowledge here, and if he felt himself incompetent to deal with the subject, he would call in the aid of a musician. But a philosopher or scientist without religious belief or spiritual perception is too often apt to be unconscious of his own incompetence. If only for this reason

an originally purer and richer consciousness of the deity." ⁸³

The Negroes of Africa are not atheists; nor are they Polytheists in the strict sense of the term. Their idea of the deity more nearly approaches Monotheism; but they do not carry out the Monotheistic concept consistently. They believe in God without rendering Him divine worship and without obeying His laws.

B. THE NATIVES OF AUSTRALIA AND OF THE SOUTH SEA ISLANDS.—The chief god of the *Polynesians* is Tangaroa (Tangaloa, Taaroa, Kanaloa), who because of his majesty and power has been compared to the Grecian Zeus. He is

it is scarcely surprising that some of our modern scientific writers on the origin of religion have labored with little result, and have been led to adopt mistaken and conflicting theories. But what is more surprising is the fact that there is another flaw in their method of conducting the inquiry. We may have a shrewd suspicion that the methods of natural science alone would not lead to a successful result. But the odd thing is that some of these new theorists in this field have not really observed the accepted rules of scientific research and experiment. A student of Comparative Philology who turns to the work of some exponents of the younger comparative science may well be reminded of the crude efforts of pre-scientific etymologists, who were too often misled by the superficial resemblance between words of widely different origin, and grouped together languages as remote from one another as Celtic and Phœnician." (*The Tablet*, 16 Apr., 1927, pp. 512 sq.)

⁸³ W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

regarded as the lord of heaven, the creator of the world and of mankind.³⁴

The *Melanesian* idea of the deity agrees in its essential traits with the Polynesian.³⁵

The *Micronesians*, a people of mixed Polynesian and Papuan stock, in language, customs, and civil institutions belong to the Polynesian family.³⁶ Sir John Lubbock counted them among the races that had no religion, but more careful research has established the fact that they venerate a "Great Spirit," who is identical with the Polynesian Tangaroa.³⁷

The natives of the Australian mainland have no metals, bows, earthen vessels or fixed dwellings, and lack all traces of an ancient and more perfect culture, thus showing that they rank low in the scale of human development.³⁸ They were formerly regarded as entirely destitute of religious beliefs, but it is now quite generally recognized that they worship a supreme being (Koyan, Nurrundere, Motogon), who, himself

³⁴ E. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Leipsic, 1894, p. 286; W. Schneider, *Die Naturvölker*, Vol. II, Paderborn, 1886, pp. 368, 404.

³⁵ E. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, Vol. I, p. 294.

³⁶ O. Peschel, *Völkerkunde*, 7th ed., Leipsic, 1897, p. 380.

³⁷ Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 315, 355, 374, 380; Schneider, *Die Naturvölker*, Vol. I, p. 370.

³⁸ Cfr. O. Peschel, *Völkerkunde*, pp. 349 sqq.; Lubbock, *op. cit.*, pp. 325, 384, 402, 406.

uncreated, dwelt in heaven before the hero-gods brought forth the world and the human race by blowing or painting. He is the source of all goodness. Having had much unpleasant experience on earth, however, he has retired to his palace in heaven.³⁹

There is a notable difference, in respect of religion, between the natives of Southeastern Australia and those inhabiting the central and northern portions of that continent. While the latter excel their southern neighbors in culture and social attainments, they have a much less developed religious consciousness,⁴⁰—a proof, if any were needed, that religion and culture do not necessarily go hand in hand.

The *Andaman Islanders*, who are possibly related to the Micronesians,⁴¹ rank somewhat higher in the scale of general culture than the Australians, but otherwise retain all the characteristics of a primitive race as yet untouched by outside influences. An English official, who lived among these people for eleven years and carefully studied their religious beliefs and customs, reports that the Andamanese worship a supreme

³⁹ E. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, Vol. I, pp. 352 sqq.

⁴⁰ Cfr. Andrew Lang, *The Making of Religion*, 2nd ed., London, 1900, pp. 178 sqq.; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, Vol. I, pp. 113 sqq., 222 sqq., 281 sqq.

⁴¹ E. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, Vol. I, p. 199.

being, Puluga, who resembles fire, but is invisible, was never born and will never die. Through his power all things have been created, with the sole exception of evil. He knows the secret thoughts of men, and his anger is roused by injustice, falsehood, theft, murder, and adultery. He helps those who are in need and judges the souls of men when they arrive in the other world. The Andamanese seem to be free from Animism and Ancestor Worship, which play such an important part in the religion of nearly all the tribes we have so far reviewed.⁴²

C. THE MADAGASCANS AND MALAYANS.—The natives of *Madagascar*, an island in the Indian Ocean, on the East coast of Africa, have a poorly developed sense of religion. Although they acknowledge a large number of gods, they do not worship them. They have no temples, idols, or sacrifices. Nevertheless they invoke a supreme god, whom they call lord of heaven and creator of the world. "It is to thee," they pray, "that we appeal, O god, who hast created

⁴² Andrew Lang, *The Making of Religion*, pp. 194 sq.; cfr. Max Müller, *Anthropological Religion*; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Die Stellung der Pygmäenvölker*, pp. 193 sqq.; IDEM, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, Vol. I, pp. 129 sqq.; IDEM, "Die religiösen Verhältnisse der Andamanesen-Pygmäen" in *Anthropos*, XVI/XVII (1921-1922), pp. 978-1005.

men, heaven, the sun, the moon, the stars, the rainbow, the wind, the earth, the sea, the sweet water and every being that breathes and moves under the vault of heaven.”⁴³

The *Malayans* residing on the Great Sunda Islands, are kin to the Madagascans, but, unlike them, possess a well-developed pantheon. On important occasions they are wont to pray to the highest god, whom they regard as the creator of the world and of mankind, the father of gods, who dwells invisibly in Heaven.⁴⁴ These people have not entirely lost the Monotheistic idea of God, though it has been considerably obscured among them by Polytheism.

An exceptional position in the Malay States is occupied by the *Semang*, who inhabit the Malacca peninsula. Like the Andaman Islanders, the Bushmen, and the inhabitants of Central Africa, the Semang belong to the Pygmy race and their culture is very low.⁴⁵ Yet they are not, as one might expect, addicted to Animism or Ancestor Worship,⁴⁶ but adore and invoke a supreme, super-excellent god, whom they call *Kari*. Existing before the creation of the uni-

⁴³ Chr. Pesch, S.J., *Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen der Neuzeit*, Vol. II, Freiburg i. B., 1888, p. 38.

⁴⁴ E. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, Vol. I, pp. 436 sq.

⁴⁵ W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Die Stellung der Pygmäenvölker*, p. 54.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 224.

verse, Kari produced all things, with the exception of the earth and man. These latter creatures were called into being by a subordinate god at Kari's command. Kari himself is invisible, all-powerful, and omniscient. He knows the good and evil deeds of men and is the supreme judge of souls, the lord over life and death. Here, again, it is remarkable that among the three tribes which inhabit Malacca, the knowledge and worship of the supreme being decrease, and Animism and Manism increase, in proportion to the progress of civilization.⁴⁷ The least cultured are the Semang, the oldest tribe on the peninsula. Next come the *Sakei*. The highest degree of culture is enjoyed by the *Jakun*, whose religious status is in inverse proportion to their cultural attainments.

D. THE PRIMITIVE RACES OF AMERICA.—“No American nation,” say Ratzel, “is without a religion. . . . The concept of one God hovers vaguely over the worship of heaven or of the sun. . . . The Indian idea of God becomes distinct only when it enters into cosmogonic relations; then it crystallizes into the notion of one

⁴⁷ See P. Schebesta, S.V.D., *Bei den Urwaldzwerge von Malaya*, Leipsic, 1927.

personal Creator. The highest god created the sun, the moon, and the stars." ⁴⁸

This belief in a supreme god, who dwells in heaven and thence governs the world, is found also among the *Eskimos* of the North, though their religious worship is full of Manism, Animism, and sorcery.

The "Great Spirit" (Manito) is venerated by the *Indians of North America* as the creator who has made all things, who takes the good into heaven after death and punishes the wicked. However, he is not concerned about the doings of his creatures here on earth, but has withdrawn to his heavenly abode and leaves the government of the world in the hands of lower spirits.

We meet with the same religious beliefs, on the whole, among the *Indians of Central and South America*, except those of Brazil, who stand on a much lower religious plane. ⁴⁹

The natives of *Tierra del Fuego*, an archipelago situated at the extreme south, separated from the mainland of South America by the Strait of Magellan, were described by Darwin as completely destitute of religious notions, but

⁴⁸ E. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, p. 573; Boas's article "Religion" in Hodge's *Handbook of American Indians*, Washington, D. C., 1912, Vol. II, pp. 365 sqq., is unsatisfactory.

⁴⁹ Cfr. Chr. Pesch, S.J., *Der Gottesbegriff* (see note 43, *supra*), pp. 100 sqq.

have since been found to believe in a just god, who sends disasters as a punishment for crime.⁵⁰ Here, too, it must be remarked that these people, though representing an extremely low grade of culture, do not venerate spirits or ancestors and show no other signs of religious degeneration.⁵¹ Recent ethnologic research has demonstrated that the Fuegians, especially those of the Yagan tribe, have an exceedingly pure and highly developed idea of God, whom they call Watauinewa, *i. e.*, the ancient, eternal, immutable one; also Hitapuan, *i. e.*, my father. Watauinewa, as his name indicates, existed always, according to the Yagans; he is extremely powerful, the lord of life and death; all things belong to him. He is the supreme being, but he is good, and men may ask him for any gift and must be grateful if he grants their petitions. He resides in heaven and, being a pure spirit, is invisible, though he sees and hears everything, even what happens in secret, and sternly punishes the evil deeds of men. Watauinewa does not seem to play a rôle in any of the myths and sagas of the Yagans.

That the belief in Watauinewa is not attributable to the influence of Christian missionaries,

⁵⁰ O. Peschel, *Völkerkunde*, pp. 151 sq.

⁵¹ Andrew Lang, *The Making of Religion*, p. 174.

is proved by very ancient and linguistically obsolete formulas and phrases used by these Indians in reference to the supreme being.⁵²

In view of these facts it can hardly be doubted that the Yagans of Tierra del Fuego have inherited from their ancestors an ancient Monotheistic belief in a comparatively pure form.⁵³

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.—We have studied the concept of God among many different nations and found that, while not one of the races and tribes outside the pale of Christian revelation possesses a purely Monotheistic religion, traces of Monotheism are everywhere in evidence, among the cultured nations of pagan antiquity as well as among the Indo-Germans, the Semites, the Chinese, and even more so among the primitives of the present time.

⁵² W. Koppers, S.V.D., *La Religion et l'Être Suprême chez les Yagans* in *Études*, Paris, Vol. 173 (1922); IDEM, *Bei den Indianern auf Feuerland*, Stuttgart, 1924, Chapter XIV; IDEM, "Die Feuerlandsreise von Gusinde-Koppers zu Anfang 1922," in *Anthropos*, XVI/XVII (1921-1922), pp. 520 sqq.; M. Gusinde, S.V.D. "P. M. Gusindes vierte Reise zum Feuerlandstamm der Yagan," *ibid.*, pp. 966-977; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Menschheitswege zum Gotterkennen*, Munich, 1923, pp. 32 sqq., 48 sq.

⁵³ Cfr. E. R. Hull, S.J., *Archaic Religions*, Bombay, 1913, pp. 170 sqq.; P. Ehrenreich, *Die Mythen und Legenden der süd-amerikanischen Naturvölker*, Berlin, 1908; M. Wolf, *Iroquois Religion*, New York, 1919, and the numerous monographs of such writers as Boas, Dorsey, Swanton, Fewkes, Fletcher, Cushing, etc.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to investigate the religious development of the ancient nations in its first beginnings. The oldest documents that have come down to us indicate an evolution extending over many centuries of a highly developed culture. But in the religious traditions of all those nations there are signs pointing unmistakably to Monotheistic beginnings. The Indo-Germanic and the Semitic nations have but one name wherewith to designate the Supreme Deity, who is at the head of the gods and excels all others. The concept of this being grows more perfect and the number of the other gods dwindles in proportion as we go farther back in tracing the process of religious development. Evidently there must have been a time when men knew and worshipped but one God, or, in other words, when pure Monotheism was predominant throughout the world.

Does it follow from this that Monotheism was the first religion, that it marked the beginning of the religious life of mankind? Must the evolution of the pagan religions be conceived as a constant and progressive process of degeneration? To both questions the answer is: yes. This reply becomes all the more convincing if we take into account the peculiar character of the nature religions of the present time. We cannot investi-

gate the first stages of the pagan religions of antiquity, but we *can* examine the development of the religions of the primitive races of to-day. These races are far behind the civilized nations of antiquity, but the farther removed they are from culture, the more plainly does the Monotheistic character of their religion appear. On the lowest stage of cultural development the concept of God appears in such purity and perfection that we could almost call it Monotheistic *sans phrase*.⁵⁴ Consequently, if the religious consciousness of the primitive races of the present day is, on the whole, more perfectly developed than that of the cultured nations of pagan antiquity, and if, moreover, the races and tribes which are still in the first stages of develop-

⁵⁴L. von Schröder (*Wesen und Ursprung der Religion*, Munich, 1905, pp. 17 sqq.) writes: "If we regard the religions of the primitive and most primitive nations more closely, we meet with a remarkable fact, which simply cannot be squared with the current theories of the origin of religion from Animism or Nature Worship. It is the widely spread, not to say universal, belief in a supreme being, which is mostly conceived as creative, is goodness itself, and demands of men that they be righteous, just, moral, in some respects unselfish, and self-sacrificing. This being watches over the doings of men and is frequently, though not always, conceived as punishing the wicked and rewarding the good. . . . We have here an extremely simple, but at the same time highly important primitive thought: There is some one, there must be some one, who has made all things; there is one who wills me to act thus or thus, to omit this or that, and so forth."

ment possess a conception and worship of God which, though tainted, must be recognized in its innermost essence as Monotheistic, then no other rational explanation is possible but that religion originated in Monotheism.

This also explains two other facts, namely, that the history of all pagan religions is a record of degeneration and that civilization and religion do not run parallel.⁵⁵ On the deeper reason and the extent of these phenomena we shall have something more to say later on.

READINGS

Besides the works mentioned in the text and in the footnotes of this chapter the student may consult the following:

Æ. DORSCH, S.J., *Institutiones Theologiae Fundamentalis*, Vol. I, Innbruck, 1916, pp. 172 sqq.

B. C. A. WINDLE, *Religions Past and Present*, New York, 1927, pp. 26 sqq.

A. SEITZ, *Natürliche Religionsbegründung*, Ratisbon, 1914.

L. VON SCHRÖDER, *Arische Religion*, Leipsic, 1914.

N. SÖDERBLOM, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*, Leipsic, 1914.

W. KOPPERS, S.V.D., *Die Anfänge des menschlichen Gemeinschaftslebens*, M. Gladbach, 1921.

P. SCHEBESTA, S.V.D., *Der Urmensch und seine Religion*, Hamm i. W., 1921-22.

⁵⁵ Cfr. W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Die Stellung der Pygmäenvölker*, p. 297.

H. PINARD DE LA BOULLAYE, S.J., *L'Étude Comparée des Religions*, Vol. I, Paris, 1922.

W. SCHMIDT and W. KOPPERS, S.V.D., *Völker und Kulturen*, Ratisbon, 1923.

W. SCHMIDT, S.V.D., *Die Uroffenbarung*, in ESSER-MAUSBACH, *Religion, Christentum, Kirche*, Vol. I, 5th edition, Kempten-Munich, 1923 (also printed separately).

E. R. HULL, S.J., *Archaic Religions*, Bombay, 1913.

§ III. THE ORIGIN OF THE MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPT OF GOD

What we have set forth above gives rise to the question: How did the idea of one God originate at the beginning of human development? If the origin of Monotheistic religion seems to be shrouded in obscurity, this is true to an even greater extent of the first manifestations of the concept of the deity which underlies that religion in human consciousness.

In this part of our treatise we shall abstract from the possibility of a supernatural revelation, (which cannot of course, be denied from the theistic standpoint), and strive to find the answer to our question in the indications furnished by human nature, which is the same in all nations and individuals, and in the historic forms of religion found nearest to the cradle of humanity.

The capacity and disposition to formulate a concept of the deity follows from the ability of the human intellect to think. The natural and compelling desire of the intellect to find a sufficient reason and explanation for every phenomenon of the internal and external world furnished the first occasion for investigating the origin and purpose of man and his environment.

In what direction this investigation was undertaken, and what most strongly attracted the attention of the human mind at the beginning, may be clearly seen from the mythology of the different nations, which in its initial stages harks back in nearly all cases to ideas connected with the regular movements and changes of the sun and the moon, and, in the second place, with extraordinary atmospheric phenomena that struck primitive man most forcibly and seemed to point to sun and moon as their causes.⁵⁶ The heavenly gods, whom we meet with among most nations, and whose number shows a strong tendency to increase in proportion to the growth of ethnologic knowledge,⁵⁷ were at an early date brought into connection with the sun and the moon, which were regarded as the abode of the

⁵⁶ P. Ehrenreich, *Die allgemeine Mythologie und ihre ethnologischen Grundlagen*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 109.

⁵⁷ IDEM, *Götter und Heilbringer*, Berlin, 1906, p. 587.

gods, their means of locomotion, their badges, their eyes, etc.⁵⁸

These beliefs, in spite of the grotesque distortions of truth which they betray, allow us to perceive that among all the phenomena of nature the splendor of the sun and the moon and the regular movements of these heavenly bodies, which manifestly obeyed certain definite laws, made a deep and lasting impression on the mind of primitive man. To this we may add as secondary momenta the phenomena of the weather, rain, hurricanes, thunder and lightning, etc., which with their overpowering grandeur caused wonder, fear, and admiration.

These phenomena must have exerted their influence most strongly when man observed them for the first time, with a mind not yet warped by prejudices and false notions. At that time the light and course of the stars, the setting of the sun in the evening and its rising in the morning, the sublime spectacle of a thunder-storm and the disastrous consequences of tornadoes, must have given rise more vividly than ever after to the question, whence all these phenomena came and what was their purpose. Men concluded that effects whose magnitude and sublimity manifested superhuman power and strict compliance

⁵⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 589.

with law, indicated superhuman wisdom and must have an adequate cause, and, being endowed with a mind bent upon ascertaining the truth, they formed the conclusion that there must be a super-mundane being that governs the heavenly phenomena with infinite power and wisdom, and that man, too, is dependent on this being, to whom, like all other creatures, he owes his existence. This supreme being must be recognized and worshipped by all as the omnipotent Father and infinitely wise Ruler of the universe. When these thoughts imposed themselves on the mind of man, the Monotheistic concept of the deity in its fundamental outlines had come into being.⁵⁹

NOTE ON HENOtheISM.—Henotheism (or Kathenotheism) is a term introduced by Max Müller to describe the tendency to make a single god in a pantheon supreme and to exalt him as the sole or at least the supreme god, though recognizing many others. Henotheism is said to be a characteristic of the Vedic religion. In the hymns of the Veda, according to Müller, one god is often invoked, not to the exclusion of, but with no particular attention paid to, the others. Where the choice is that of a community, and is theoretically permanent, the term used is *Monolatry*. The religious belief in which this worship is rooted, cannot correctly be called Polytheism; nor is it true Monotheism.

Eduard von Hartmann defines Henotheism in much

⁵⁹ Cfr. W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Menschheitswege zum Gotterkennen*, pp. 51 sqq.; A. Anwander, *Die Religionen der Menschheit*, pp. 50 sqq.

the same way as Max Müller, but regards it, not as a particular manifestation of the religious instinct, but as the *terminus a quo*, the point of departure, of the entire religious evolution of the human race.⁶⁰ However, it is impossible to establish a real distinction between Henotheism and Polytheism, since a worship of the kind described can be shown to have existed among nations whose religion was distinctly Polytheistic. In fact, among the races and tribes addicted to Polytheism there is scarcely one that always worshipped all its gods in the same manner, without at times showing a preference for the one or the other, to the neglect of the rest.

It would be even more difficult to prove that Henotheism in the sense defined by Max Müller was a stage of religious development preceding Monotheism and, therefore, is to be regarded as the starting-point of religious development.

§ IV. MONOTHEISM VS. PAGANISM

The study of religion among diverse peoples has shown us that all forms of religion not based on supernatural revelation gradually drifted away from original Monotheism. The totality of these religions is called Paganism, in contradistinction to those which have remained Monotheistic, namely, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism.

⁶⁰ Cfr. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 4th ed., Vol I, pp. 8, 10 sq., 442 sq., Vol. II, pp. 61 sq., 493, 502 sq.

This universal degeneration of religion is a surprising historical fact, for since Monotheism is the only religion that can be justified in the light of reason, it would have been natural to expect that belief in one God should have permanently kept the upper hand. That it did not do so, gives rise to the question: How are we to explain the deterioration of primitive Monotheism into Paganism?

With this question there is intimately bound up another, namely: How could God permit such a tragic error as the universal defection of humanity from Monotheism? We answer:

The development of Paganism from pure Monotheism was the result of human guilt and weakness, and God's tolerance of this aberration must be regarded as part of His gracious plan to conduct the human race back to truth and salvation.

1. The defection of the greater portion of mankind from Monotheism must be ascribed to human guilt and weakness. Man is endowed with free will, and as long as he has not yet been admitted to the possession of God through the attainment of his last end, he is at liberty to turn away from Him and to seek his happiness and the supreme perfection of his nature elsewhere, in creatures.

Man is led to turn away from God by his inordinate self-love. He ought to be governed by the fundamental instincts of self-preservation and the conservation of the species, but unfortunately temperance and fortitude degenerate into intemperance, cowardice, and vice, and thus he throws off the yoke of reason. In the intellectual realm, where justice ought to govern man's conduct towards his fellowmen, self-love prompts injustice towards others and manifests itself in rudeness, avarice, cruelty, and malice. Once the human will has become a slave to selfishness, the intellect can no longer maintain its independence, and man loses interest in truth and adapts his judgment to the dictates of his misguided will. Selfishness causes him to regard his ego as the goal and centre of all his aspirations, and thus he enters into the sharpest possible opposition to religion, which proposes God as man's last end and purpose. This opposition and the contradiction existing between the demands of unlimited selfishness and those of sound reason, are perceived by the latter; but after passion has once gained complete control of man, it subjugates reason, warps the judgment, and impels the intellect to counterfeit the idea of God and, finally, to get rid of it entirely. The heart, blinded by passion, renounces God

or reconstitutes His image according to its own egotistic wishes. This usually produces religious indifference and eventually results in rank atheism, and in this process we have the psychological explanation of Paganism. For when man disobeyed God and devoted all his thoughts and efforts to the gratification of his lower instincts, the idea of God gradually lost its intellectual content, and the deity was conceived as similar to man, subject to human weaknesses and passions. From this stage it was but one step to the assumption of a multitude of gods and the worship of these instead of the one true God. What further aided the development of Polytheism and helped to distort the idea of God, was the dispersion of the human race and its division into innumerable nations and tribes with different languages, customs, and social conditions. All these factors co-operated in impressing a special, national and individual stamp on the idea of God held by each nation. Thus in course of time each evolved its own idea of God and persuaded itself that this idea corresponded to the reality.

However, the process of degeneration did not end here. Soon men came to regard certain awe-inspiring natural phenomena, such as thunderstorms and earthquakes, as direct manifestations

of the deity, or identified the deity with external symbols (the sun, the moon, the earth, the sky, etc.), and began to worship these symbols.⁶¹

Thus the anthropomorphic idea of God, in connection with certain particularly striking contrasts in nature, such as light and darkness, heaven and earth, day and night, gave rise to a dualistic conception, which developed either in the direction of sex or ethics. Thus the multiplication of gods, not infrequently promoted by the fusion of peoples or their gods into new unities, slowly but irresistibly took its course, until it arrived at Fetishism, Animism, and Nature Worship.

That the human race did not lose religion altogether in this process of degeneration is a clear proof that atheism is contrary to nature. The truth was too impressive to be entirely lost. It could be obscured and distorted, but it could not be completely suppressed. This also explains why, in spite of their degraded notions of the deity, the pagan nations still regard their highest god as the author and custodian of the moral order. It also explains why the adherents of Paganism, in spite of their defective religious ideas, willingly assume so many arduous duties

⁶¹ Cfr. Wisdom, XIII; P. Ehrenreich, *Die allgemeine Mythologie*, p. 589.

and sacrifices. Though their gods are represented to them in the crudest and most sensual form, they have not lost belief entirely in the supreme dominion of the deity as such.

The worship which these pagans give to their gods, on the other hand, fully corresponds to their distorted religious notions. They simply attribute to their gods the unlimited selfishness and the unbridled passions of man and, as a consequence, find it quite natural that the gods should be served by acts of impurity and violence, and all sorts of cruel sacrifices, including human lives.⁶²

2. God permitted Paganism to rise and spread because He wished to use it as a guidepost to direct the human race on the way to salvation. The fact that the majority of men were blinded by pagan errors and strayed from the path of truth, does not disprove the theistic world-view. For it was not God who, after offering Himself as the ultimate goal of human as-

⁶² Cfr. F. Hettinger, *Apologie des Christentums*, Vol. V, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B., 1908, pp. 236 sqq.; S. Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*, Freiburg i. B., 1907, pp. 122 sq.; J. Döllinger, *The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ*, tr. by N. Darnell, 2nd ed., London, 1906, Vol. I, pp. 68 sqq.; E. L. Fischer, *Heidentum und Offenbarung*, Mayence, 1878; F. Kaulen, *Die Sprachenverwirrung zu Babel*, Mayence, 1861; W. Schmidt, S.V.D., *Die Menschheitswege zum Gotterkennen*, pp. 49 sqq.

pirations and perfections, arbitrarily rejected man: it was man who incurred the guilt of this disastrous separation by deliberately cutting loose from God. True, God could have prevented the fall of the human race; but, aside from the fact that a forced religion would be of little value, God was not bound to save man against his will. In His justice, wisdom, and holiness He was under no obligation to man except to give him the means necessary to attain his last end, if he cared to do so. For the abuse of his liberty man alone was accountable.

On the other hand, the aberrations of the pagan world must be regarded as a means by which Divine Providence intended to restore the connection between humanity and its highest aim and purpose. Nothing was so well calculated to make man realize his intellectual and moral degradation as the dark night of Paganism. God permitted man to drain the poison cup of sin to its last dregs, so that he might learn from bitter experience the folly of serving his fellow-creatures instead of his Maker. No doubt these considerations brought many pagans to their senses and, with the help of divine grace, which is denied to no man of good will, enabled them to reach their supernatural goal.

The divine toleration of Paganism, of course,

did not entail the eternal damnation of all its adherents. God's goodness and mercy cannot permit any man to be lost without his fault.

As the toleration of paganism itself, so, too, its long duration had an educational purpose. The longer God tarried before coming to the rescue, the more time man had to realize his own impotence and misery, the more clearly was he enabled to see that God does not need man, whereas man cannot possibly be happy without God, and separation from Him by sin is the greatest misfortune that can befall a rational creature. This conviction offered the most favorable condition for a contrite return of sinful humanity to its Creator and a ready acceptance of the divine aid when proffered.⁶³

§ V. RELIGION AND CIVILIZATION

1. *Civilization Defined.*—Civilization is the perfection of man in the spiritual as well as in the material order. Consequently, it includes whatever appertains to his economic well-being and his intellectual, esthetic, moral, and religious culture.⁶⁴ Frequently the religious factor

⁶³ Cfr. S. Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*, l. c.; F. Hettinger, *Apologie*, Vol. V, pp. 511 sqq.

⁶⁴ Cfr. R. v. Nostiz-Rieneck, S.J., *Das Problem der Kultur*, Freiburg i. B., 1888.

is separated from the others, and only from this point of view is it possible to speak of civilization and religion as two separate and distinct entities, as we shall do in the following paragraphs.

The observation that religious development does not always run parallel with the progress of civilization, nay, often stands in direct opposition to it, gives rise to two questions: (a) What is the relation between religion and civilization? and (b) How can progress in civilization go hand in hand with retrogression in religion?

We maintain that civilization and religion are not opposed to each other *per se*, and the decay of religion that sometimes accompanies the progress of civilization is the result of false cultural standards and misdirected efforts.

1. *Civilization and Religion are not per se opposed to each other.* Man is by nature endowed with a tendency to develop his interior and exterior life. By means of this natural tendency the Creator has assigned to him the task of developing and ennobling his faculties in the intellectual as well as in the material order and of co-operating with his fellowmen in the steady perfecting of human nature and the conditions under which it flourishes in private and

public life. The whole material creation is designed to serve man as a means for attaining this end. But we must remember that these efforts and their result, which we usually call progress of civilization, are never to be regarded as an end, but only as a means to an end. That end is the honor and glory of God, who is the highest goal and the centre of all human activity as well as of the created universe in general. Every creature must glorify Him. In this sense whatever tends to promote true civilization is ennobled by that very fact and contributes its share towards widening and deepening the influence of religion on life.⁶⁵

3. *The Progress of Civilization and the Degeneration of Religion.*—Though individual nations have degenerated, civilization on the whole has made undoubted progress in the course of centuries.⁶⁶ The development of religion has not always kept pace with that of civilization. Frequently the tendency has been in the opposite direction. While this is not a necessary result of the connection existing between civilization and religion, it is nevertheless inti-

⁶⁵ H. Pesch, S.J., *Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie*, Vol. I, Freiburg, 1905, pp. 128 sqq.

⁶⁶ G. Ratzinger, *Die Volkswirtschaft in ihren sittlichen Grundlagen*, 2nd ed., Freiburg, 1895, p. 511.

mately bound up with the nature of both these factors and can easily be deduced and explained therefrom. The efforts for the advancement of civilization mostly belong to the material order, and consequently appeal more strongly to men than the religious life with its predominantly spiritual content, its supramundane goal, and the stern duties which it imposes. Thus there arises the danger that man may devote his powers one-sidedly to the advancement of worldly culture and neglect the religious life.

In the long run, of course, civilization can make no real and permanent progress without the aid of religion. Luxury, effeminacy, and vice undermine the welfare of nations as well as individuals.⁶⁷

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⁶⁷ Cfr. H. Schell, *Religion und Offenbarung*, 3rd ed., Paderborn, 1907, pp. 16 sq.; E. R. Hull, S.J., *Archaic Religions*, pp. 127 sqq.; H. G. Graham, *Prosperity, Catholic and Protestant*, London, 1912.

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CONCLUSION

In order to gain a solid foundation for the argument demonstrating the divine origin of the Christian religion, we had first to examine the nature of religion as such. We have seen that religion, defined as reverent consecration to God, or complete submission to His will as that of the supreme Lord and Ruler of the universe, is essential for the perfection of man. Human nature contains all the faculties and powers necessary for an active religious life. Religion is a historical phenomenon of such universality that we must regard it as a strong confirmation of a need existing deep down in every human heart.

These are the preliminary conditions on the part of man for the reception of a supernatural revelation. Natural religion, in other words, imposes on man the obligation of submitting himself unreservedly to God. This circumstance favors the acceptance of a supernatural religion when it pleases God to reveal Himself. As soon as man recognizes with sufficient certainty that a

supernatural revelation has been made, he is bound to accept it at the peril of his soul's salvation.

The original purity of Monotheistic religion was greatly obscured by the aberrations of Paganism, but this sad consequence of human weakness makes a supernaturally revealed religion all the more desirable. For the supernatural aid granted to man by God furnishes a certain guaranty that humanity, when put back upon the right way, will more clearly perceive its supernatural goal and use with greater zeal the means of reaching it.

Thus we find in the universality of natural religion the foundation of supernatural religion, and the almost equally universal aberrations of Paganism in the hands of Providence become efficacious means of rendering the free will of man more favorable to the reception of a supernatural revelation.

In the second volume of this work we will show that humanity actually received from God a supernatural revelation, together with certain moral precepts which must be embraced and followed by all who wish to save their souls.

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